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Abstract
Existing methods for dealing with knowledge updates differ greatly depending on the underlying knowledge
representation formalism. When Classical Logic is used, updates are typically performed by manipulating
the knowledge base on the model-theoretic level. On the opposite side of the spectrum stand the semantics
for updating Answer-Set Programs that need to rely on rule syntax. Yet, a unifying perspective that could
embrace both these branches of research is of great importance as it enables a deeper understanding of all
involved methods and principles and creates room for their cross-fertilisation, ripening and further develop-
ment. Furthermore, from a more pragmatic viewpoint, such a unification is a necessary step in addressing
updates of hybrid knowledge bases consisting of both a classical and a rule component.
This paper bridges the seemingly irreconcilable approaches to updates. It introduces a novel monotonic
characterisation of rules, dubbed RE-models, and shows it to be a more suitable semantic foundation for rule
updates than SE-models. Then it proposes a generic scheme for specifying semantic rule update operators,
based on the idea of viewing a program as the set of sets of RE-models of its rules; updates are performed
by introducing additional interpretations – exceptions – to the sets of RE-models of rules in the original
program. The introduced scheme is then used to define particular rule update operators that are closely
related to both classical update principles and traditional approaches to rules updates, enjoying a range of
plausible syntactic as well as semantic properties. In addition, these operators serve as a basis for a solution
to the long-standing problem of state condensing for two of the foundational rule update semantics, showing
how they can be equivalently defined as binary operators on some class of logic programs.
Finally, the essence of these ideas is extracted to define an abstract framework for exception-based
update operators, viewing a knowledge base as the set of sets of models of its elements. It is shown that the
framework can capture a wide range of both model- and formula-based classical update operators, and thus
serves as the first firm formal ground connecting classical and rule updates.
1. Introduction
Recent standardisation efforts gave rise to widely accepted knowledge representation languages such as
the Web Ontology Language (OWL)1 and Rule Interchange Format (RIF),2 based on Description Logics [8]
and Logic Programming [14, 28, 45, 52], respectively. This has fostered a large number of ontologies and
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rule bases with different levels of complexity and scale. Whereas ontologies provide the logical underpin-
ning of intelligent access and information integration, rules are widely used to represent business policies,
regulations and declarative guidelines about information.
Since both ontologies and rules offer important features for knowledge representation, considerable
effort has been invested in identifying a unified hybrid knowledge framework where expressivity of both
formalisms could be seamlessly combined. Over the years, work on hybrid knowledge bases has matured
significantly and fundamental semantic as well as computational problems were addressed successfully
[15, 16, 35, 44, 54]. While such formalisms make it possible to seamlessly combine rules and ontologies
in a single unified framework, they do not take into account the dynamic character of application areas
where they are to be used. More particularly, the essential support for keeping a hybrid knowledge base up
to date, by incorporating new and possibly conflicting information, is still missing. Nonetheless, this topic
has been extensively addressed in the context of both Description Logics and Logic Programs, when taken
separately.
Ontology Updates
The area of research called ontology change encompasses a number of strongly related though distin-
guishable subareas, such as ontology matching, ontology integration and merging, or ontology translation
[26]. The purest type of change, concerned with modifications to a single ontology, is generally referred to
as ontology evolution. Approaches to ontology evolution with a firm semantic underpinning, thus amenable
to a formal analysis of their behaviour and properties, are based on research in the area of belief change,
initiated by the seminal work of Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson (AGM) [1] who proposed a set of
desirable properties of change operators on monotonic logics, now referred to as the AGM postulates.
Subsequently, revision and update were distinguished as two very related but ultimately different belief
change operations [41, 42, 73]. While revision deals with incorporating new information about a static
world into a knowledge base, update takes place when a knowledge base needs to be brought up to date
when the modelled world changes. While AGM postulates were deemed appropriate for describing revision,
Katsuno and Mendelzon suggested a different set of postulates for updates: the KM postulates for belief
update [41].
Update operators respecting the KM postulates, usually referred to as model-based, are based on the
idea that the models of a knowledge base correspond to possible states of the represented world. When a
change in the world needs to be recorded, inertia is applied to each of these possible states, making only
the smallest necessary modifications to reflect the change, and arriving at a new collection of possible states
that represent the world after the update. Since the updates are specified on the semantic level, they are
naturally syntax-independent. These ideas, and particularly Winslett’s update operator [42, 72], were later
used to partially address ontology updates [9, 17–19, 23, 43, 51], namely to update the part of the ontology
with assertions about individuals (the ABox).
On the other hand, model-based operators are considered inappropriate for updating ontological axioms
that define the terminology (the TBox) [13, 64]. Their antipole, formula-based operators, which manipulate
the knowledge base at a syntactic level and are strongly related to base revision operators, were adopted for
performing TBox updates instead [13], and they also inspired a recent approach to ABox updates [49].
Rule Updates
When updates started to be investigated in the context of Logic Programming, it was only natural to
adapt belief update principles and operators to this purpose [2, 53]. However, such approaches proved
insufficiently expressive, principally because the model-based approach fails to capture the essential rela-
tionships between literals encoded in rules [48], and the formula-based approach is too crude as it does not
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allow rules to be reactivated when reasons for their suppression disappear [75]. Although state-of-the-art
approaches to rule updates are guided by the same basic intuitions and aspirations as belief updates, they
build upon fundamentally different principles and methods.
Many of them are based on the causal rejection principle [3, 5, 24, 48, 55], which states that a rule is
rejected only if it is directly contradicted by a more recent rule. This essentially means that inertia and min-
imal change is applied to rules instead of to the state, as with model-based belief updates. Causal rejection
semantics are useful in a number of practical scenarios [4, 37, 59, 63] and their behaviour is intuitively pre-
dictable. Alternative approaches to rule updates employ syntactic transformations and other methods, such
as abduction [60], prioritisation and preferences [20, 75], or dependencies on default assumptions [47, 62].
Despite the variety of techniques used in these approaches, certain properties are common to all of them.
First, the stable models assigned to a program after one or more updates are always supported: for each true
atom p there exists a rule in either the original program or its updates that has p in the head and whose body
is satisfied. Second, all mentioned rule update semantics coincide when it comes to updating sets of facts
by newer facts. We conjecture that any reasonable rule update semantics should indeed be in line with the
basic intuitions regarding support and fact update. Another common characteristic of all these approaches
is that they need to refer to the syntactic structure of a logic program: the individual rules and, in most
cases, also the literals in their heads and bodies. This renders them seemingly irreconcilable with ontology
updates since ontology axioms simply have no heads and bodies.
Towards Hybrid Updates
A unifying framework that could embrace both belief and rule updates is of great importance as it
enables a deeper understanding of all involved methods and principles and creates room for their cross-
fertilisation, ripening and further development. It is also important for the development of update semantics
for hybrid knowledge bases – in [64, 70] we provided partial solutions to this problem but the inherent
differences between the distinct approaches to updates have prevented us from suggesting a universal hybrid
update semantics.
Moreover, we argue that syntax-independence, central to model-based belief updates, is essential and
should be pursued at large in order to encourage a logical underpinning of all update operators and so
facilitate analysis of their semantic properties. When equivalence with respect to classical models is inap-
propriate, as is the case with rules, syntax-independence should be retained by finding an appropriate notion
of equivalence, specific to the underlying formalism and its use.
With these standpoints in mind, we proceed with our previous work addressing the logical foundations
of rule updates. In [69] we have shown that strong equivalence is not a suitable basis for syntax-independent
rule update operators because such operators cannot respect both support and fact update. This can be
demonstrated on programs P = { p., q. } and Q = { p., q ← p. } which are strongly equivalent, so, due to
syntax independence, an update asserting that p is now false ought to lead in both cases to the same stable
models. Due to fact update, such an update on P should naturally lead to a stable model where q is true.
But in case of Q such a stable model would be unsupported.
This led us to the study of stronger notions of program equivalence. In [65] we proposed to view
a program as the set of sets of models of its rules in order to acknowledge rules as the atomic pieces
of knowledge and, at the same time, abstract away from unimportant differences between their syntactic
forms, focusing on their semantic content. In this paper we develop these ideas further and arrive at a
unifying perspective on both classical and rule updates. More particularly, our main contributions are as
follows:
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• We introduce a novel monotonic characterisation of rules, RE-models, and show that they form a
more suitable semantic foundation for rule updates than SE-models;
• We propose a generic scheme for defining semantic rule update operators: a program, viewed as the
set of sets of RE-models of its rules, is updated by introducing additional interpretations to those sets
of RE-models;
• We identify instances of the framework that bridge classical update principles with traditional rule
update semantics: they combine syntax-independence with support and fact update and have other
desirable syntactic as well as semantic properties.
• We solve the enduring problem of state condensing for two foundational rule update semantics by
showing how they can be equivalently defined as binary operators on some class of logic programs;
• We define abstract exception-based operators for any knowledge representation formalism with a
model-theoretic semantics;
• We show that exception-based operators capture a wide range of model- and formula-based belief
update operators.
This paper is organised as follows: We introduce the necessary theoretical background in Section 2
and in Section 3 we define RE-models and associated notions of equivalence. Section 4 introduces the
generic scheme for specifying exception-based rule update operators as well as its particular instances and
analyses their theoretical properties. Section 5 is devoted to the problem of state condensing and introduces
operators for condensing an update sequence into a single program for foundational rule update semantics.
Sections 6 and 7 introduce abstract exception-based operators and show how they are able to characterise
belief updates. We discuss our findings in a broader context and conclude in Section 8. Proofs of all formal
results can be found in the appendices.
2. Background
2.1. Propositional Logic
We consider a propositional language over a finite set of propositional variables A and the usual set of
propositional connectives to form propositional formulas. A knowledge base is a finite set of formulas. A
(two-valued) interpretation is any I ⊆ A and the set of all interpretations is denoted by I. The set of models
of a knowledge base B is defined in the standard way and denoted by [[B ]]. Given an interpretation I , we
sometimes write I |= B or I(B) = T if I is a model of B, and I 6|= B or I(B) = F if I is not a model of
B. A knowledge base B is consistent if [[B ]] is non-empty; complete if [[B ]] is a singleton set. Given two
knowledge bases B, C, we say that B entails C, denoted by B |= C, if [[B ]] ⊆ [[C ]], and that B is equivalent
to C, denoted by B ≡ C, if [[B ]] = [[C ]]. The models, set of models, consistency, completeness, entailment
and equivalence are generalised to formulas by treating every formula φ as the knowledge base {φ }.
2.2. Logic Programs
The basic syntactic building blocks of rules are also propositional atoms from A. A default literal is an
atom preceded by ∼ denoting default negation. The set of all literals L consists of all atoms and default
literals. The complementary literal to a literal L is denoted by L and defined as follows: for any atom p, p =
∼ p and ∼ p = p. Given a set of literals S, we introduce the following notation: S+ = { p ∈ A | p ∈ S },
S− = { p ∈ A | ∼ p ∈ S }, S = { L ∣∣ L ∈ S }.
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A rule is a pair of sets of literals pi = (Hpi,Bpi). We say that Hpi is the head of pi and Bpi is the body of pi.
Usually, for convenience, we write pi as
(
H+pi ;H
−
pi ← B+pi ,B−pi .
)
. A rule is called non-disjunctive if its head
contains at most one literal; a fact if its head contains exactly one literal and its body is empty. A program
is any set of rules. A program is non-disjunctive if all its rules are; acyclic if it satisfies the conditions set
out in [6]. We also introduce the following non-standard notion that is needed throughout the rest of the
paper:
Definition 1 (Canonical Tautology). Let pτ ∈ A be fixed. The canonical tautology τ is the rule (pτ ← pτ .).
Turning to the semantics, we need to define stable models [28, 29] and SE-models [56, 71] of a logic
program. We start by generalizing the set of (classical) models to literals, rules and programs. Given an
atom p, a set of literals S, a rule pi and a program P, we define the following:
[[∼ p ]] = I \ [[p ]] , [[S ]] = ⋂L∈S [[L ]] ,
[[pi ]] = { J ∈ I | J /∈ [[Bpi ]] ∨ ∃L ∈ Hpi : J ∈ [[L ]] } , [[P ]] =
⋂
pi∈P[[pi ]] .
For a set of literals S, we also write J |= S whenever J ∈ [[S ]]. A program P is consistent if [[P ]] 6= ∅.
The stable and SE-models are defined in terms of reducts. Given a rule pi and an interpretation J , the
reduct of pi w.r.t. J , denoted by piJ , is the rule (H+pi ← B+pi .) if J |= B−pi and J |= H−pi ; otherwise it is the
canonical tautology τ .3 The reduct of a program P w.r.t. J is defined as PJ = { piJ ∣∣ pi ∈ P }.
An interpretation J is a stable model of a program P if J is a subset-minimal model of PJ . The set of
all stable models of P is denoted by [[P ]]SM.
SE-models are semantic structures that can be seen as three-valued interpretations. In particular, we call
a pair of interpretations X = (I, J) such that I ⊆ J a three-valued interpretation. Each atom p is assigned
one of three truth values in X: X(p) = T if p ∈ I; X(p) = U if p ∈ J \ I; X(p) = F if p ∈ A \ J . The
set of all three-valued interpretations is denoted by X. A three-valued interpretation (I, J) is an SE-model
of a rule pi if J is a model of pi and I is a model of piJ . The set of all SE-models of a rule pi is denoted
by [[pi ]]SE and for any program P, [[P ]]SE =
⋂
pi∈P[[pi ]]SE. Note that J is a stable model of P if and only if
(J, J) ∈ [[P ]]SE and for all I ( J , (I, J) /∈ [[P ]]SE. Also, J ∈ [[P ]] if and only if (J, J) ∈ [[P ]]SE. We
say that a rule pi is (SE-)tautological if [[pi ]]SE = X. Note that the canonical tautology (c.f. Definition 1) is
tautological.
2.3. Belief Updates
In this section we briefly introduce model-based as well as formula-based belief update operators which
form the basis of formal approaches to ontology updates [9, 13, 17–19, 23, 43, 49, 51].
We liberally define a belief update operator as any function that takes the original knowledge base and
its update as inputs and returns the updated knowledge base.
Definition 2 (Update Operator). A belief update operator is a binary function over the set of all knowledge
bases. Any belief update operator  is inductively generalised to finite sequences of knowledge bases
〈Bi〉i<n as follows: 3〈〉 = ∅ and 3〈Bi〉i<n+1 = (3〈Bi〉i<n)  Bn.
3In other words, if J satisfies all default literals in the body of the rule and none of the default literals in its head, then the reduct
is obtained from the original rule by removing all default literals from its head and body. In other cases, J is certainly a model of
the rule, so the reduct is defined as the canonical tautology.
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Table 1: Belief update postulates
Postulate Knowledge base as a single formula Knowledge base as a set
(B1) φ  µ |= µ. B  U |= U .
(B2) If φ |= µ, then φ  µ ≡ φ. If B |= U , then B  U ≡ B.
(B2.>) φ  > ≡ φ. B  ∅ ≡ B.
(B2.1) φ ∧ µ |= φ  µ. B ∧ U |= B  U .
(B2.2) (φ ∧ µ)  µ |= φ. (B ∧ U)  U |= B.
(B3) If [[φ ]] 6= ∅ and [[µ ]] 6= ∅, then [[φ  µ ]] 6= ∅. If [[B ]] 6= ∅ and [[U ]] 6= ∅, then [[B  U ]] 6= ∅.
(B4) If φ ≡ ψ and µ ≡ ν, then φ  µ ≡ ψ  ν. If B ≡ C and U ≡ V , then B  U ≡ C  V .
(B5) (φ  µ) ∧ ν |= φ  (µ ∧ ν). (B  U) ∪ V |= B  (U ∪ V).
(B6) If φ  µ |= ν and φ  ν |= µ, then φ  µ ≡ φ  ν. If BU |= V and BV |= U , then BU ≡ BV .
(B7) If φ is complete, then (φµ)∧(φν) |= φ(µ∨ν).
(B8) (φ ∨ ψ)  µ ≡ (φ  µ) ∨ (ψ  µ).
The fundamental idea underlying model-based update operators [41, 42, 72, 73] is that models of the
original knowledge base are viewed as possible or admissible states of the modelled domain, only one of
which is the actual state. Given this perspective, it is natural to perform an update with U by modifying each
of the possible states independently of the others, making it consistent with U , and thus obtaining a new set
of interpretations – the models of the updated knowledge base. Formally this is captured by the equation
[[B  U ]] =
⋃
I∈[[B ]]
incorporate([[U ]], I) , (1)
where incorporate(M, I) returns the members of M closer to I so that the original information in I is
preserved as much as possible. For instance, Winslett’s operator, first introduced to deal with change in
action theories and relational databases with incomplete information [42, 72], and used extensively to study
ontology updates [9, 17–19, 23, 43, 51], is characterised by equation (1) where incorporate(M, I) is the set
of models fromM that interpret a minimal set of atoms differently than I . From a more general perspective,
Katsuno and Mendelzon have shown [41] that if each knowledge base is represented by a single formula
and incorporate(M, I) is bound to return those members ofM that are minimal w.r.t. a closeness relation
≤I assigned to I ,4 then the class of operators which satisfy (1) coincides with the class of operators which
satisfy the declarative postulates (B1) – (B8) listed in Table 1. Note that (B1) – (B6) can be immediately
generalised to deal with arbitrary knowledge bases but (B7) and (B8) require disjunction of knowledge bases
to be defined.
Some of these postulates, and especially (B4) which guarantees syntax-independence of an update oper-
ator, continue to be seen as fundamental cornerstones of belief updates [34]. The desirability of others has
been questioned by many [10, 11, 22, 34], and particularly (B2), (B5), (B6) and (B7) are deemed controver-
sial: the first three sometimes lead to undesirable behaviour while the last one is hard to explain intuitively
and is satisfied only by a minority of existing update operators [34]. Note also that (B2) entails the weaker
4Technically, the closeness relation is simply a partial order on I such that I is the least interpretation w.r.t. ≤I .
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principles (B2.>), (B2.1) and (B2.2). The first two are uncontroversial as they are satisfied by all update
operators. In addition, in the presence of (B4), the latter two are together powerful enough to entail (B2), so
the controversial part of (B2) is (B2.2) [34].
Earlier approaches to updates, dubbed formula-based [73], operate on the syntax of a knowledge base
and, as a consequence, are not syntax-independent. Nevertheless, they have recently been considered for
performing ontology updates [13, 49]. Traditional formula-based update operators are Set-Of-Theories
[25], WIDTIO (When In Doubt, Throw It Out) [30, 31, 73] and Cross-Product [30]. We define only the
latter two as the Set-Of-Theories operator produces a collection of knowledge bases as its result instead of
a single knowledge base, and is equivalent to the Cross-Product operator which compiles these knowledge
bases into one.
The central notion in these operators is that of a possible remainder which is a maximal set of formulas
from the original knowledge base that is consistent with the update. Formally, given knowledge bases B
and U , the set of possible remainders rem(B,U) is the set of maximal subsets B′ of B such that B′ ∪ U
is consistent. The distinct formula-based operators differ in how they deal with the case when there is
more than one possible remainder. While Cross-Product compiles the different remainders into a single
formula, WIDTIO takes the safer path – it keeps exactly those formulas that belong to the intersection of
all remainders and throws away the rest. Additionally, in [13] the new formula-based operator Bold was
suggested for performing TBox updates. The Bold operator solves the problem of multiple remainders
by using a selection function to choose one and commit to it. Formally, a remainder selection function
is a function s that assigns to every set of remainders R a remainder s(R) ∈ R. Given such a selection
function s, the Cross-Product operator ◦cp, WIDTIO operator ◦widtio and Bold operator ◦sbold are defined for
all knowledge bases B, U as follows:
B ◦cp U = U ∪
{∨
B′∈rem(B,U)
∧B′ } , B ◦widtio U = U ∪⋂ rem(B,U), B ◦sbold U = U ∪ s(rem(B,U)).
2.4. Rule Updates
Rule update semantics assign stable models to pairs or sequences of programs where each component
represents an update of the preceding ones. In the following, we formalise some of the intuitions behind
these semantics and define two foundational rule update semantics.
We start with the basic concepts. A dynamic logic program (DLP) is a finite sequence of non-disjunctive
programs. Given a DLP P , we use all(P ) to denote the set of all rules belonging to the programs in P .5
We say that P is acyclic if all(P ) is acyclic. A rule update semantics S assigns a set of S-stable models
[[P ]]S to every DLP P .
As indicated in the introduction, rule update semantics implicitly follow certain basic intuitions. Par-
ticularly, they produce supported models and their behaviour coincides when it comes to updating sets of
facts by newer facts. We formalise these two properties w.r.t. rule update semantics for DLPs, calling them
syntactic because their formulation requires that we refer to the syntax of the respective DLP.
In the static setting, support [7, 21] is one of the basic conditions that Logic Programming semantics
are intuitively designed to satisfy. Its generalisation to the dynamic case is straightforward.
Syntactic Property 1 (Support). Let P be a program, p an atom and J an interpretation. We say that P
supports p in J if p ∈ Hpi and J |= Bpi for some rule pi ∈ P.
5In order to avoid issues with rules that are repeated in multiple components of a DLP, we assume throughout this paper that
every rule is uniquely identified in all set-theoretic operations. This can be formalised by assigning a unique name to each rule
and performing operations on names instead of the rules themselves. However, for the sake of simplicity, we leave the technical
realisation to the reader.
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A rule update semantics S respects support if for every DLP P and every S-stable model J of P the
following condition is satisfied: Every atom p ∈ J is supported by all(P ) in J .
Thus, if a rule update semantics S respects support, then there is at least some justification for every
atom in an assigned S-stable model.
The second syntactic property that is generally adhered to is the usual expectation regarding how facts
are to be updated by newer facts. It enforces a limited notion of state inertia but only for the case when both
the initial program and its updates are consistent sets of facts.
Syntactic Property 2 (Fact Update). A rule update semantics S respects fact update if for every finite
sequence of consistent sets of facts P = 〈Pi〉i<n, the unique S-stable model of P is the interpretation
{ p | ∃i < n : (p.) ∈ Pi ∧ (∀j : i < j < n⇒ (∼ p.) /∈ Pj) } .
We also introduce two further syntactic properties that are more tightly bound to approaches based on
the causal rejection principle [3, 5, 24, 48, 55]. The first one states the principle itself, under the assumption
that a conflict between rules occurs if and only if the rules have complementary heads.
Syntactic Property 3 (Causal Rejection). A rule update semantics S respects causal rejection if for every
DLP P = 〈Pi〉i<n, every S-stable model J of P , all i < n and all rules pi ∈ Pi, if J is not a model of pi,
then there exists a rule σ ∈ Pj with j > i such that Hσ = Hpi and J |= Bσ.
Intuitively, the principle requires that all rejected rules, i.e. rules that are not satisfied in an S-stable
model J , must be in conflict with a more recent rule whose body is satisfied in J . This rule then provides a
cause for the rejection.
The final syntactic property stems from the fact that all rule update semantics based on causal rejection
coincide on acyclic DLPs [5, 36]. Thus, the behaviour of any rule update semantics on acyclic DLPs can
be used as a way to compare it to all these semantics simultaneously. Before formalising the property, we
define two foundational rule update semantics based on causal rejection: the JU-semantics [48] and the
UA-semantics [24].
Definition 3 (JU-Semantics [48] and UA-Semantics [24]). Let P = 〈Pi〉i<n be a DLP and J an interpreta-
tion. The sets of rejected rules rejJU(P , J) and rejUA(P , J) are defined as follows:
rejJU(P , J) =
{
pi ∈ Pi
∣∣ ∃j ∃σ ∈ Pj : i < j < n ∧ Hσ = Hpi ∧ J |= Bσ } ,
rejUA(P , J) =
{
pi ∈ Pi
∣∣ ∃j ∃σ ∈ Pj \ rejUA(P , J) : i < j < n ∧ Hσ = Hpi ∧ J |= Bσ } .6
The set [[P ]]JU of JU-models of a DLP P consists of all interpretations J such that J is a stable model
of the program all(P ) \ rejJU(P , J). Similarly, the set [[P ]]UA of UA-models of a DLP P consists of all
interpretations J such that J is a stable model of the program all(P ) \ rejUA(P , J).
Under the JU-semantics, a rule pi is rejected if a more recent rule σ is in conflict with pi and the body
of σ is satisfied in the stable model candidate J . The only difference in the UA-semantics [24] is that
rejected rules are prevented from rejecting other rules. Perhaps surprisingly, this renders the UA-semantics
more sensitive to tautological updates, which cannot indicate any change in the modelled world, than the
JU-semantics. For example, the DLP
P 1 = 〈{ p. } , {∼ p. } , { p← p. }〉 (2)
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has only one JU-model, ∅, but the UA-semantics admits the additional undesired model { p }. Nevertheless,
there are also situations in which the JU-semantics assigns additional models only due to the presence of
tautological rules. This is discussed in more detail in Section 8.
The final syntactic property can now be stated as follows:
Syntactic Property 4 (Acyclic Justified Update). A rule update semantics S respects acyclic justified up-
date if for every acyclic DLP P , the set of S-stable models of P is [[P ]]JU.
2.5. Program Equivalence
While in propositional logic equivalence under classical models is the equivalence, there is no such
single notion of program equivalence. When considering Answer-Set Programs, the first choice is stable
equivalence (or SM-equivalence) that compares programs based on their sets of stable models.
In many cases, however, SM-equivalence is not strong enough because programs with the same stable
models, when augmented with the same additional rules, may end up having completely different stable
models. This gives rise to the notion of strong equivalence [50] which requires that stable models stay the
same even in the presence of additional rules. It is a well-known fact that programs are strongly equiv-
alent if and only if they have the same set of SE-models [71]. Thus, we refer to strong equivalence as
SE-equivalence.
But even SE-equivalence is not satisfactory when used as a basis for syntax-independent rule update
operators because such operators cannot respect both support and fact update [69]. So in order to arrive at
syntax-independent rule update operators that satisfy the basic intuitions underlying rule updates, we need
to search for a notion of program equivalence that is stronger than SE-equivalence. One candidate is the
strong update equivalence (or SU-equivalence) [39], which requires that under both additions and removals
of rules, stable models of the two programs in question remain the same. It has been shown in [39] that
this notion of equivalence is very strong – programs are SU-equivalent only if they contain exactly the same
non-tautological rules, and in addition, each of them may contain some tautological ones. Thus, this notion
of program equivalence seems perhaps too strong as it is not difficult to find rules such as (∼ p ← p.) and
(← p.) that are syntactically different but carry the same meaning.
This observation resulted in the definition of strong rule equivalence (or SR-equivalence) and strong
minimal rule equivalence (or SMR-equivalence) in [65] that, in terms of strength, fall between SE-equiva-
lence and SU-equivalence. It is based on the idea of viewing a program P as the set of sets of SE-models
of its rules 〈〈P〉〉SE = { [[pi ]]SE | pi ∈ P }.
The five mentioned notions of program equivalence are defined as follows:
Definition 4 (Program Equivalence). Let P,Q be programs, Pτ = P ∪ { τ }, Qτ = Q ∪ { τ }, let minS
denote the subset-minimal elements of any set of sets S and ÷ denote set-theoretic symmetric difference.
We write
P ≡SM Q whenever [[P ]]SM = [[Q ]]SM ; P ≡SMR Q whenever min〈〈Pτ 〉〉SE = min〈〈Qτ 〉〉SE ;
P ≡SE Q whenever [[P ]]SE = [[Q ]]SE ; P ≡SR Q whenever 〈〈Pτ 〉〉SE = 〈〈Qτ 〉〉SE ;
P ≡SU Q whenever [[P ÷Q ]]SE = X .
We say that P is X-equivalent to Q if P ≡X Q.
So two programs are SR-equivalent if they contain the same rules, modulo SE-models; τ is added to
both programs so that presence or absence of tautological rules in a program does not influence program
equivalence. In the case of SMR-equivalence, only the subset-minimal sets of SE-models are compared,
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the motivation being that programs such as P = { p← q. } and Q = { p., p← q. }, when updated, should
behave the same way since the extra rule inQ is just a weakened version of the rule in P. Though P andQ
are not SR-equivalent, they are SMR-equivalent.
To formally capture the comparison of strength between these notions of program equivalence, we write
≡X≡Y if P ≡Y Q implies P ≡X Q and ≡X≺≡Y if ≡X≡Y but not ≡Y≡X. Then:
Proposition 5 ([65]). ≡SM≺≡SE≺≡SMR≺≡SR≺≡SU.
3. Robust Equivalence Models
In [65] we studied the expressivity of SE-models with respect to a single rule. On the one hand, SE-mod-
els turned out to be a useful means of stripping away irrelevant syntactic details. On the other hand, a rule
with a default literal in its head is indistinguishable from an integrity constraint [12, 38, 40]. For example,
the rules
← p, q. ∼ p← q. ∼ q ← p. (3)
have the same set of SE-models. In a static setting, these rules indeed carry essentially the same meaning:
“it must not be the case that p and q are both true”. But in a dynamic context, the latter two rules may,
in addition, express that the truth of one atom gives a reason for the other atom to cease being true. For
example, an update of the program { p., q. } by {∼ p← q. } leads to the stable model { q } while an update
by {∼ q ← p. } to the stable model { p }. This convention is adopted by causal rejection-based rule update
semantics [3, 5, 24, 48, 55] which constitute one of the most mature approaches to rule updates.
In order to be able to semantically characterise causal rejection-based rule update semantics, we need to
distinguish between constraints and rules with default literals in their heads. These classes can be formally
captured as follows:
Definition 6 (Constraint and Abolishing Rule). A rule pi is a constraint if Hpi = ∅ and B+pi is disjoint with
B−pi .7 A rule pi is abolishing if H+pi = ∅, H−pi 6= ∅ and the sets H−pi , B+pi and B−pi are pairwise disjoint.
So what we are looking for is a semantic characterisation of rules that
1) can distinguish constraints from related abolishing rules;
2) discards irrelevant syntactic details (akin to SE-models);
3) has a clear link to stable models (akin to SE-models).
In the following we introduce a novel monotonic semantics that exactly meets these criteria. We show that
it possesses the desired properties and use it to introduce a notion of program equivalence that is strong
enough as a basis for syntax-independent rule update operators.
Without further ado, robust equivalence models, or RE-models for short, are defined as follows:
Definition 7 (RE-Model). Let pi be a rule. A three-valued interpretation (I, J) ∈ X is an RE-model of pi
if I |= piJ . The set of all RE-models of a rule pi is denoted by [[pi ]]RE and for any program P, [[P ]]RE =⋂
pi∈P[[pi ]]RE.
We say that a rule pi is RE-tautological if [[pi ]]RE = X. Rules pi, σ are RE-equivalent if [[pi ]]RE = [[σ ]]RE.
7The latter condition guarantees that a constraint is not tautological.
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Thus, unlike with SE-models, it is not required that J |= pi in order for (I, J) to be an RE-model
of pi. As a consequence, RE-models can distinguish between rules in (3): while both ({ q } , { p, q }) and
({ p } , { p, q }) are RE-models of the constraint, the former is not an RE-model of the first abolishing rule
and the latter is not an RE-model of the second abolishing rule. This property holds in general, establishing
requirement 1):
Proposition 8. If pi, σ are two different abolishing rules or an abolishing rule and a constraint, then pi, σ
are not RE-equivalent.
Proof. See Appendix A, page 34.
As for requirement 2), we first note that RE-equivalence is a refinement of SE-equivalence – there are no
rules that are RE-equivalent but not SE-equivalent. The following result also shows that it is only the ability
to distinguish between constraints and abolishing rules that is introduced by RE-models – rules that are not
RE-equivalent to abolishing rules are distinguishable by RE-models if and only if they are distinguishable
by SE-models. Furthermore, the classes of SE-tautological and RE-tautological rules coincide, so we can
simply use the word tautological without ambiguity.
Proposition 9 (RE-Equivalence vs. SE-Equivalence).
• If two rules are RE-equivalent, then they are SE-equivalent.
• If two rules, neither of which is RE-equivalent to an abolishing rule, are SE-equivalent, then they are
RE-equivalent.
• A rule is RE-tautological if and only if it is SE-tautological.
Proof. See Appendix A, page 35.
The affinity between SE-models and stable models is fully retained by RE-models, which establishes
requirement 3).
Proposition 10 (RE-Models vs. Stable Models). An interpretation J is a stable model of a program P if
and only if (J, J) ∈ [[P ]]RE and for all I ( J , (I, J) /∈ [[P ]]RE.
Proof. See Appendix A, page 35.
Also worth noting is that any set of three-valued interpretations can be expressed by a program using
RE-models. This is not the case with SE-models since only well-defined sets of three-valued interpretations
have corresponding programs.
Proposition 11. For anyM⊆ X there exists a program P such that [[P ]]RE =M.
Proof. See Appendix A, page 35.
Further properties of RE-models, analogous to those established in [65] for SE-models, can be found in
Appendix A starting on page 31.
Since RE-models are able to distinguish constraints from abolishing rules while keeping the essen-
tial properties of SE-models, we henceforth adopt them as the basis for defining syntax-independent rule
update operators. We denote the set of sets of RE-models of rules inside a program P by 〈〈P〉〉RE =
{ [[pi ]]RE | pi ∈ P }. We also introduce three additional notions of program equivalence: RE-, RR- and
RMR-equivalence that are analogous to SE-, SR- and SMR-equivalence.
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Figure 1: Notions of program equivalence and entailment from the weakest on the left side to the strongest on the right side.
A missing link between X and Y indicates that ≡X is incomparable with ≡Y and |=X is incomparable with |=Y, i.e. none of the
following four relations holds: ≡X≡Y, ≡Y ≡X, |=X |=Y, |=Y  |=X.
Definition 12 (Program Equivalence Using RE-Models). Let P,Q be programs, Pτ = P ∪ { τ }, Qτ =
Q∪ { τ }. We write
P ≡RE Q whenever [[P ]]RE = [[Q ]]RE ; P ≡RMR Q whenever min〈〈Pτ 〉〉RE = min〈〈Qτ 〉〉RE ;
P ≡RR Q whenever 〈〈Pτ 〉〉RE = 〈〈Qτ 〉〉RE .
In order to consider belief update principles in the context of rule updates, we also need to establish
notions of program entailment which are in line with the above defined program equivalence relations. This
task is troublesome in case of SM-equivalence because the usage of entailment in belief update postulates
is clearly a monotonic one while stable models are non-monotonic. For instance, a reformulation of (B1)
would require that P ⊕ U |= U , though there is no reason for P ⊕ U to have less stable models than (or
the same as) U . Due to these issues, we refrain from defining SM-entailment. The remaining entailment
relations are defined as follows:
Definition 13 (Program Entailment). Let P,Q be programs, Pτ = P∪{ τ } andQτ = Q∪{ τ }. We write
P |=SE Q whenever [[P ]]SE ⊆ [[Q ]]SE ; P |=SMR Q whenever ∀σ ∈ Qτ ∃pi ∈ Pτ : [[pi ]]SE ⊆ [[σ ]]SE ;
P |=RE Q whenever [[P ]]RE ⊆ [[Q ]]RE ; P |=RMR Q whenever ∀σ ∈ Qτ ∃pi ∈ Pτ : [[pi ]]RE ⊆ [[σ ]]RE ;
P |=SU Q whenever [[Q \ P ]]SE = X ; P |=SR Q whenever ∀σ ∈ Qτ ∃pi ∈ Pτ : [[pi ]]SE = [[σ ]]SE ;
P |=RR Q whenever ∀σ ∈ Qτ ∃pi ∈ Pτ : [[pi ]]RE = [[σ ]]RE .
We say that P X-entails Q if P |=X Q.
As the following proposition shows, the defined entailment relations are fully in line with the corre-
sponding equivalence relations.
Proposition 14. Let X be one of SE, RE, SMR, RMR, SR, RR, SU and P, Q be programs. Then, P ≡X Q
if and only if P |=X Q and Q |=X P.
Proof. See Appendix A, page 35.
Note that it follows directly from the previous considerations that RR-equivalence is stronger than
SR-equivalence, RMR-equivalence is stronger than SMR-equivalence and RE-equivalence is stronger than
SE-equivalence. Figure 1 illustrates the strength comparison of all eight notions of program equivalence
which are formally stated in Proposition 5 and in the following result:
Proposition 15. The following holds:
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(1) ≡SM≺≡SE≺≡RE≺≡RMR≺≡RR≺≡SU and |=SE≺ |=RE≺ |=RMR≺ |=RR≺ |=SU ;
(2) ≡SE≺≡SMR≺≡SR≺≡RR and |=SE≺ |=SMR≺ |=SR≺ |=RR ;
(3) ≡SMR≺≡RMR and |=SMR≺ |=RMR ;
(4) ≡RE≡SMR and ≡SMR≡RE and |=RE |=SMR and |=SMR |=RE ;
(5) ≡RE≡SR and ≡SR≡RE and |=RE |=SR and |=SR |=RE ;
(6) ≡RMR≡SR and ≡SR≡RMR and |=RMR |=SR and |=SR |=RMR .
Proof. See Appendix A, page 36.
4. Exception-Based Rule Update Operators
In this section we propose a generic scheme for specifying semantic rule update operators. We define
instances of the scheme and show that they enjoy a number of plausible properties, ranging from the respect
for support and fact update to syntax-independence and other semantic properties.
As suggested already, a program is semantically characterised by the set of sets of RE-models of its
rules. Our update framework is based on a simple yet novel idea of introducing additional interpretations
– exceptions – to the sets of RE-models of rules in the original program. The formalisation of this idea
is straightforward: an exception-based update operator is characterised by an exception function ε that
takes three inputs: the set of RE-models [[pi ]]RE of a rule pi ∈ P and the semantic characterisations 〈〈P〉〉RE,
〈〈U〉〉RE of the original and updating programs. Then it returns the interpretations that are to be introduced as
exceptions to pi, so the characterisation of the updated program contains the augmented set of RE-models
[[pi ]]RE ∪ ε ([[pi ]]RE, 〈〈P〉〉RE, 〈〈U〉〉RE) . (4)
Hence, the semantic characterisation of P updated by U is
{ [[pi ]]RE ∪ ε ([[pi ]]RE, 〈〈P〉〉RE, 〈〈U〉〉RE) | pi ∈ P } ∪ 〈〈U〉〉RE . (5)
In other words, rules from P are augmented with the respective exceptions and rules in U remain untouched.
From the syntactic viewpoint, we want a rule update operator ⊕ to return a program P ⊕ U with the
semantic characterisation (5). This brings us to the following issue: What if no rule exists whose set of
RE-models is equal to (4)? In that case, no rule corresponds to the augmented set of RE-models of a
rule pi ∈ P, so the program P ⊕ U cannot be constructed. Moreover, such situations may occur quite
frequently since a single rule has very limited expressivity. For instance, updating the fact (p.) by the rule
(∼ p ← q, r.) may easily result in a set of RE-models expressible by the program { p← ∼ q., p← ∼ r. }
but not expressible by any single rule. To keep a firm link to operations on syntactic objects, we henceforth
deal with this problem by allowing the inputs and output of rule update operators to be sets of rules and
programs, which we dub rule bases.8 In other words, the result of updating a rule, i.e. introducing exceptions
to it, may be a set of rules, so the result of updating a program may be a rule base. Technically, a rule base
can capture any possible result of an exception-based update due to Proposition 11.
Formally, a rule base is any set of rules and programs. Given a rule baseR, an interpretation J is a model
of R, denoted by J |= R, if J |= Π for all Π ∈ R; RJ = {ΠJ ∣∣ Π ∈ R }; the set of stable models of R
8We allow for individual rules in a rule base out of convenience only. A single rule pi in a rule base R is treated exactly the
same way as ifR contained the singleton program {pi }.
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consists of all interpretations J such that J is a subset-minimal model ofRJ ; 〈〈R〉〉SE = { [[Π]]SE | Π ∈ R }
and [[R ]]SE =
⋂〈〈R〉〉SE; 〈〈R〉〉RE = { [[Π]]RE | Π ∈ R } and [[R ]]RE = ⋂〈〈R〉〉RE. All notions of program
equivalence and entailment are naturally extended to rule bases and any rule update operator⊕ is generalised
to sequences of rule bases 〈Ri〉i<n as follows:
⊕〈〉 = ∅ and⊕〈Ri〉i<n+1 = (⊕〈Ri〉i<n)⊕Rn.
Note that a program is a special case of a rule base. Each element Π of a rule base, be it a rule
or a program, represents an atomic piece of information and exception-based update operators view and
manipulate Π only through its set of RE-models [[Π]]RE. Due to this, we refer to all such elements Π as
rules, even if formally they may actually be programs.
Having resolved this issue, we can proceed to the definition of an exception-based rule update operator.
Definition 16 (Exception-Based Rule Update Operator). Given an exception function ε, a rule update op-
erator ⊕ is ε-based if for all rule basesR, U , 〈〈R ⊕ U〉〉RE is equal to (5). Also, ⊕ is exception-based if it is
ε-based for some exception function ε.
Note that for each exception function ε there is a whole class of ε-based rule update operators that differ
in the syntactic representations of the sets of RE-models in (5). For instance, when working over the set
of propositional symbols A = { p, q } and considering some exception-based operator ⊕, the exception
function may specify that for some programs P, U , the program P ⊕ U contains a rule or program rep-
resenting the set of RE-modelsM = { (∅, ∅), (∅, p), (p, p), (∅, q), (∅, pq), (p, pq), (pq, pq) }.9 This set can
be represented by the rule pi = (p ← q.) or, alternatively, by the rule σ = (p;∼ q ← q.), or even by
the program Q = { (p← q.), (p← p,∼ q.) }, and the exception function does not specify which syntactic
representation of the set should be used in P ⊕ U .
4.1. Simple Exception Functions and Their Syntactic Properties
General exception functions, as introduced above, have as inputs the entire semantic characterisations
of the original as well as updating programs (〈〈P〉〉RE and 〈〈U〉〉RE, respectively) when determining exceptions
to any single rule. As it turns out, all this information is not strictly necessary in order to capture rule update
operators enjoying a range of plausible syntactic as well as semantic properties.
Thus, further study of general exception functions is left for future research and in this paper we con-
centrate on a simpler, constrained class of exception functions that is nevertheless powerful enough to serve
as a basis for well-behaved semantic rule update operators. Not only does this lead to simpler definitions,
but the study of restricted classes of exception functions is essential in order to understand their expressivity,
i.e. the types of update operators they are able to capture.
More particularly, we study exception functions that produce exceptions based on conflicts between
pairs of rules, one from the original and one from the updating program, while ignoring the context in
which these rules are situated. Formally, an exception function ε is simple if for allM⊆ X and S, T ⊆ 2X,
ε(M,S, T ) = ⋃N∈T δ(M,N )
where δ : 2X × 2X → 2X is a local exception function. If ⊕ is an ε-based rule update operator, then we also
say that ⊕ is δ-based and that ⊕ is simple.
As we shall see, in spite of their local nature, particular simple exception functions generate rule update
operators that satisfy the syntactic properties laid out in Section 2 and are closely related to the JU- and
UA-semantics for DLPs.
9Sometimes we omit the usual set notation when we write interpretations, e.g. instead of { p, q } we may simply write pq.
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The inspiration for defining concrete local exception functions δ comes from rule update semantics
based on causal rejection. But since the relevant concepts, such as that of a conflict or rule rejection, rely on
rule syntax to which an exception function has no direct access, our first objective is to find similar concepts
on the semantic level. In particular, we need to define conditions under which two sets of RE-models are in
conflict. But first we introduce two preparatory concepts.
We define a truth value substitution as follows: Given an interpretation J , an atom p and a truth value
V ∈ {T,U,F }, by J [V/p] we denote the three-valued interpretation X such that X(p) = V and X(q) =
J(q) for all atoms q 6= p.
This enables us to introduce the main concept needed for defining a conflict between two sets of three-
valued interpretations. Given a set of three-valued interpretations M, an atom p, a truth value V0 and
a two-valued interpretation J , we say that M forces p to have the truth value V0 w.r.t. J , denoted by
MJ(p) = V0, if
J [V/p] ∈M if and only if V = V0 .
In other words, the three-valued interpretation J [V0/p] must be the unique member ofM that either coin-
cides with J or differs from it only in the truth value of p. Note thatMJ(p) stays undefined in case no V0
with the above property exists.
Two sets of three-valued interpretationsM, N are in conflict on atom p w.r.t. J , denoted byM 1Jp N ,
if bothMJ(p) and N J(p) are defined andMJ(p) 6= N J(p). The following example illustrates all these
concepts.
Example 17. Consider rules pi = (p.), σ = (∼ p← ∼ q.) with the respective sets of RE-models
M = { (p, p), (p, pq), (pq, pq) } and N = { (∅, ∅), (∅, q), (q, q), (∅, pq), (p, pq), (q, pq), (pq, pq) } .
Intuitively, M forces p to T w.r.t. all interpretations and N forces p to F w.r.t. interpretations in which q
is false. Formally it follows that M∅(p) = T because (p, p) belongs to M and neither (∅, p) nor (∅, ∅)
belongs toM. Similarly, it follows that N ∅(p) = F. HenceM 1∅p N . Using similar arguments we can
conclude thatM 1pp N . However, it does not hold thatM 1pqp N because N pq(p) is undefined.
In order to define a particular local exception function based on causal rejection, it only remains to de-
cide which three-valued interpretations become exceptions when a conflict w.r.t. an interpretation J occurs.
One intuition we can draw on is the relationship between RE-models and stable models (c.f. Proposition 10):
J is a stable model of a program if and only if (J, J) is the unique RE-model of the program whose second
component is J . So given an original rule pi with M = [[pi ]]RE and an updating rule σ with N = [[σ ]]RE
where a conflict occurs between M and N w.r.t. J , pi needs to be weakened so that it cannot influence
whether J becomes a stable model of the updated program or not. In other words, we need to introduce all
three-valued interpretations whose second component is J as exceptions to that rule. Formally:
Definition 18 (Exception Function δa). The local exception function δa is for allM,N ⊆ X defined by:
δa(M,N ) =
{
(I, J) ∈ X ∣∣ ∃p :M 1Jp N } .
Theorem 19 (Syntactic Properties of δa). Every δa-based rule update operator respects support and fact
update and it also respects causal rejection and acyclic justified update w.r.t. DLPs of length at most two.
Proof. See Appendix B, page 43.
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This means that δa-based rule update operators enjoy a combination of desirable syntactic properties
that operators based on SE-models cannot [69]. However, these operators diverge from causal rejection,
even on acyclic DLPs, when more than one update is performed.
Example 20. Consider again the rules pi, σ and their sets of RE-modelsM,N from Example 17 and some
δa-based rule update operator ⊕. Then 〈〈{pi } ⊕ {σ }〉〉RE will contain two elements, M′ and N , where
M′ =M∪ δa(M,N ) =M∪{ (∅, ∅), (∅, p), (p, p) }. An additional update by the fact { q. } then leads to
the characterisation 〈〈⊕〈{pi } , {σ } , { q. }〉〉〉RE which contains three elements: M′′, N and [[q. ]]RE where
M′′ = M′ ∪ { (∅, q), (q, q) }. Furthermore, due to Proposition 10, J = { q } is a stable model of the
program
⊕〈{pi } , {σ } , { q. }〉 because (q, q) belongs to [[⊕〈{pi } , {σ } , { q. }〉 ]]RE and (∅, q) does not.
However, J does not respect causal rejection and it is neither a JU- nor a UA-model of 〈{pi } , {σ } , { q. }〉.
This shortcoming of δa largely stems from the asymmetry of its definition – when a conflict occurs w.r.t.
J , atoms that are true in J may become undefined in an exception (I, J) but atoms that are false must remain
false. Eliminating this asymmetry, by allowing for exceptions (I,K) with I ⊆ J ⊆ K, and choosing the
introduced exceptions more carefully, leads to more well-behaved exception functions, defined as follows:
Definition 21 (Exception Functions δb, δc, δd and δe). The local exception functions δb, δc, δd and δe are
for allM,N ⊆ X defined by:
δb(M,N ) =
{
(I,K) ∈ X | ∃J ∃p :M 1Jp N ∧ I ⊆ J ⊆ K ∧ (p ∈ K \ I ⇒ K = J)
}
,
δc(M,N ) =
{
(I,K) ∈ X | ∃J ∃p :M 1Jp N ∧ I ⊆ J ⊆ K ∧ (p ∈ K \ I ⇒ K = J ∧ (J, J) /∈M)
}
,
δd(M,N ) =
{
X ifM = N ;
δb(M,N ) otherwise ,
δe(M,N ) =
{
X ifM = N ;
δc(M,N ) otherwise .
The functions δb and δd introduce more exceptions than δa while δc and δe eliminate some of those
returned by δa and add some additional ones. The difference between δb and δd, and similarly also between
δc and δe, is in that δd additionally “wipes out” rules from the original program that are repeated in the update
by introducing all interpretations as exceptions to them, rendering them tautological. This will turn out to
be significant later when we examine semantic properties of simple exception-based rule update operators.
In all four functions, a conflict on p w.r.t. J leads to the introduction of interpretations in which atoms
either maintain the truth value they had in J , or they become undefined. Additionally, extra conditions
are imposed on the case when p becomes undefined. Interestingly, this leads to operators that satisfy all
syntactic properties.
Theorem 22 (Syntactic Properties of δb, δc, δd and δe). Let ⊕ be a δb-, δc-, δd- or δe-based rule update
operator. Then ⊕ respects support, fact update, causal rejection and acyclic justified update.
Proof. See Appendix B, page 47.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that even on programs with cycles, δb- and δd-based operators are very
closely related to the JU-semantics and, similarly, δc- and δe-based operators to the UA-semantics. They
diverge from the syntax-based semantics only on rules with an appearance of the same atom in both the
head and body. Formally, we say that a rule is a local cycle if (H+pi ∪ H−pi ) ∩ (B+pi ∪ B−pi ) 6= ∅.
Theorem 23 (Characterisation of JU- and UA-Semantics Using Exception Functions). Let P be a DLP, J
an interpretation,⊕1 a δb- or δd-based rule update operator and⊕2 a δc- or δe-based rule update operator.
Then,
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• [[⊕1P ]]SM ⊆ [[P ]]JU and [[⊕2P ]]SM ⊆ [[P ]]UA;
• if all(P ) contains no local cycles, then [[P ]]JU ⊆ [[
⊕
1P ]]SM and [[P ]]UA ⊆ [[
⊕
2P ]]SM.
Proof. See Appendix B, page 47.
This means that up to the marginal case of local cycles, δb and δd can be seen as semantic charac-
terisations of the JU-semantics and, similarly, δc and δe characterise the UA-semantics. The exceptional
cases when less stable models are found than using the traditional semantics occur when the DLP contains
tautological rules or rules with the negation of their head in the body. The former can be seen as a strict
improvement as it introduces immunity to tautologies. The latter is an unavoidable consequence of the
fact that exception-based operators only manipulate RE-models which are unable to distinguish between a
constraint (← p.) and a rule (∼ p← p.) The traditional approaches do distinguish between them in that the
former rule can never be rejected while the latter can.
This tight relationship also sheds new light on the problem of state condensing, discussed in more detail
in Section 5.
4.2. Semantic Properties
We proceed by examining further properties of rule update operators – of those based on simple excep-
tion functions in general, and of the δa-, δb-, δc-, δd- and δe-based ones in particular. The properties we
consider in this section are semantic in that they put conditions on the models of a result of an update and
do not need to refer to the syntax of the original and updating programs. Our results are summarised in
Table 2 and in the following we explain and discuss them. The interested reader may find all the proofs in
Appendix B.5 starting on page 48.
Traditional Semantic Properties of Rule Updates
The properties in the upper part of Table 2 were introduced in [5, 20, 24]. We formalise all of them for
rule basesR, S, U , V and a rule update operator ⊕ and each can actually be seen as a meta-property that is
instantiated once we adopt a particular notion of program equivalence. Therefore, each row of Table 2 has
eight cells that stand for particular instantiations of the property. This provides a more complete picture of
how simple rule update operators, properties and program equivalence are interrelated.
Unless stated otherwise (in a footnote), each tick (3) signifies that the property in question holds for all
simple rule update operators. A missing tick signifies that the property does not generally hold for simple
rule update operators, and in particular there are δa-, δb-, δc-, δd- and δe-based operators for which it is
violated. A tick is smaller if it is a direct consequence of a preceding larger tick in the same row and of the
interrelations between the program equivalence and entailment relations (c.f. Figure 1).
At a first glance, it is obvious that none of the semantic properties is satisfied under SU-equivalence.
This is because the conditions placed on a rule update operator by an exception function are at the semantic
level, while SU-equivalence effectively compares programs syntactically. For instance, an exception-based
operator ⊕, for any exception function ε, may behave as follows: ∅ ⊕ {∼ p← p. } = {← p. }. This is
because the rules before and after update are RE-equivalent. However, due to the fact that the programs
{∼ p← p. } and {← p. } are considered different under SU-equivalence, ⊕ cannot satisfy (Initialisation)
w.r.t. SU-equivalence. The situation with all other properties is analogous.
As for the other notions of equivalence, we separately discuss each group of related properties:
(Initialisation) and (Disjointness): These properties are satisfied “by construction”, regardless of which
simple rule update operator we consider and of which notion of equivalence we pick.
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Table 2: Semantic properties of simple rule update operators
Type of ≡, |= and [[ · ]]
Property Formalisation SU RR SR RMR SMR RE SE SM
(Initialisation) ∅ ⊕ U ≡ U . 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
(Disjointness) IfR, S are over disjoint alphabets, then (R∪S)⊕U ≡ (R⊕U)∪ (S⊕U). 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
(Non-interference)† If U , V are over disjoint alphabets, then (R⊕ U)⊕ V ≡ (R⊕ V)⊕ U . 3abcde3abcde 3abcde 3abcde 3abcde 3abcde 3abcde
(Tautology) If U is tautological, thenR⊕ U ≡ R. 3? 3? 3? 3? 3? 3? 3?
(Immunity to
Tautologies) If S and V are tautological, then (R∪ S)⊕ (U ∪ V) ≡ R⊕ U . 3
?
3? 3? 3? 3? 3? 3?
(Idempotence) R⊕R ≡ R. 3de 3de 3 3 3 3 3
(Absorption) (R⊕ U)⊕ U ≡ R⊕ U . 3de 3de 3bcde 3bcde 3bcde 3bcde 3bcde
(Augmentation)† If U ⊆ V , then (R⊕ U)⊕ V ≡ R⊕ V . 3de 3de 3bcde 3bcde 3bcde 3bcde 3bcde
(Associativity) R⊕ (U ⊕ V) ≡ (R⊕ U)⊕ V .
(P1) R⊕ U |= U 3 3 3 3 3 3 n/a
(P2.>) R⊕ ∅ ≡ R 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
(P2.1) R∪ U |= R⊕ U 3 3 3 3 n/a
(P2.2) (R∪ U)⊕ U |= R n/a
(P3) If [[R ]] 6= ∅ and [[U ]] 6= ∅, then [[R⊕ U ]] 6= ∅ n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
(P4) IfR ≡ S and U ≡ V , thenR⊕ U ≡ S ⊕ V 3?
(P5) (R⊕ U) ∪ V |= R⊕ (U ∪ V) 3 3 3 3 n/a
(P6) IfR⊕ U |= V andR⊕ V |= U , thenR⊕ U ≡ R⊕ V n/a
a Holds if ⊕ is δa-based.
b Holds if ⊕ is δb-based.
c Holds if ⊕ is δc-based.
d Holds if ⊕ is δd-based.
e Holds if ⊕ is δe-based.
? Holds if ⊕ is based on a local exception function δ such that δ(M,X) ⊆M for allM⊆ X. This is satisfied by δa, δb, δc, δd and δe.
† Results on this line hold only ifR,U ,V are non-disjunctive programs.
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(Tautology) and (Immunity to Tautologies): These are naturally satisfied by all simple update operators
that do not introduce exceptions merely due to the presence of a tautological rule in the updating
program. In particular, both properties are satisfied by δa-, δb-, δc-, δd- and δe-based operators. Note
that these properties are generally acknowledged as very desirable although most existing rule update
semantics fail to comply with them [3, 20, 24, 48, 55, 60, 75].
(Non-interference): This property is satisfied by δa-, δb-, δc-, δd- and δe-based rule update operators.
However, this is only the case when non-disjunctive programs are considered, pointing towards one
of the important open problems faced by state-of-the-art research on rule updates: examples, desirable
properties and methods for updating disjunctive programs. Insights in this direction should shed light
on whether (Non-interference) is desirable in the disjunctive case.
(Idempotence), (Absorption) and (Augmentation): These are the only properties that reveal differences
amongst the different exception functions. They are not satisfied by δa-, δb- and δc-based opera-
tors under SR- and RR-equivalence because a program updated by its subset may contain weakened
versions of the original rules. Since such rules are not part of the original program, the programs
before and after update are considered to be different under SR- and RR-equivalence. This problem
is dodged in δd and δe by completely obliterating original rules that appear in the update.
This also indicates that SR- and RR-equivalence are slightly too strong for characterising updates
because programs such as { p. } and { p., p← q. } are not considered equivalent even though we
expect the same behaviour from them when they are updated. We speculated in Section 3 that it
might be possible to address this issue by adopting the weaker SMR- or RMR-equivalence. However,
it turns out that due to the monotonic nature of SE- and RE-models, these equivalence relations are
too weak: programs such as { p. } and { p., q ← ∼ p. } are SMR- and RMR-equivalent but, when
updated by {∼ p. }, any rule update operator respecting fact update and causal rejection must provide
the stable model ∅ in the former case, which violates causal rejection in the latter case.
Moreover, δa-based operators fail to satisfy (Absorption) and (Augmentation). Along with Exam-
ple 20, this indicates that δa does not correctly handle iterated updates.
(Associativity): This is one of the few properties that is not satisfied by any of the defined classes of opera-
tors. It is closely related to the question of whether rejected rules are allowed to reject. (Associativity)
can be seen as postulating that an update operator must behave the same way regardless of whether
rejected rules are allowed to reject or not. As witnessed by the JU- and UA-semantics (c.f. equation 2),
rule update semantics tend to generate unwanted models when rejected rules are not allowed to reject.
Belief Update Postulates Reformulated
The lower part of Table 2 contains a reformulation of the belief update postulates (B1) – (B6) for rule
bases. We omit the last two postulates as they require program disjunction and it is not clear how to obtain
it appropriately. Note also that (B7) has been heavily criticised in the literature as being mainly a means
to achieve formal results instead of an intuitive principle [34] and though (B8) reflects the basic intuition
behind belief update – that of updating each model independently of the others – such a point of view is
hardly transferable to knowledge represented using rules because a single model, be it a classical, stable,
SE- or RE-model, fails to encode the interdependencies between literals expressed in rules that are necessary
for properties such as support.
Since we did not define SM-entailment, postulates that refer to it have the SM column marked as “n/a”.
Now we turn to the individual postulates.
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(P1) and (P2.>): Similarly as (Initialisation) and (Disjointness), these postulates are satisfied by any simple
rule update operator and under all notions of equivalence.
(P2.1) and (P5): Postulate (P2.1) is not satisfied under SR- and RR-equivalence for the same reasons, de-
scribed above, that prevent δa- and δb-based operators from satisfying (Idempotence). The situation
with (P5) is the same since it implies (P2.1) in the presence of (P2.>) [34].
(P2.2) and (P6): Postulate (P2.2) requires that { p.,∼ p. } ⊕ {∼ p. } |= p which, in the presence of (P1),
amounts to postulating that one can never recover from an inconsistent state, contrary to most existing
rule update semantics which do allow for recovery from such states. The case of (P6) is the same since
it implies (P2.2) in the presence of (P1) and (P2.>) [34].
(P3): This postulate relies on a function that returns the set of models of a rule base. Thus, [[ · ]]SM, [[ · ]]SE
and [[ · ]]RE can be used for this purpose and the other columns in the corresponding row in Table 2
make little sense, so they are marked as “n/a”. Furthermore, this postulate is not satisfied by any of
the defined classes of exception-based operators. It is also one of the principles that most existing
approaches to rule update chronically fail to satisfy. In order to satisfy it, a context-aware exception
function would have to be used because conflicts may arise in a set of more than two rules that are
pairwise consistent. For instance, when updating { p. } by { q ← p.,∼ q ← p. }, one would somehow
need to detect and resolve the joint conflict between these three rules. This is however impossible
with a simple exception function because it only considers conflicts between pairs of rules, one from
the original program and one from the update.
(P4): This postulate requires update operators to be syntax-independent. In this context it is useful to
consider the following weaker principles:
(P4.1) If P ≡ Q, then P  U ≡ Q  U . (P4.2) If U ≡ V , then P  U ≡ P  V .
The failure to satisfy (P4.1) under SM-, SE-, RE-, SMR- and RMR-equivalence is inevitable if prop-
erties such as support, fact update and causal rejection are to be respected (c.f. [69] and the above
discussion of (Idempotence), (Absorption) and (Augmentation)). Furthermore, (P4.1) is also violated
under SR-equivalence due to the fact that a constraint such as (← p.) cannot be weakened by the
introduced exception functions while the fact (∼ p.) can, although it is strongly equivalent to the
constraint.
Similar arguments can be used to show that the principle (P4.2) is not satisfied under SM-, SE-, RE,
SMR- and RMR-equivalence. We only need to observe that any δa-, δb-, δc-, δd- or δe-based operator
⊕ satisfies ∅ ⊕ P ≡RR P, so each example used to show that (P4.1) is not desirable, involving two
updates P1 ⊕ U and P2 ⊕ U , can be reused to show the same for (P4.2) by instead considering the
updates ∅⊕P1⊕U and ∅⊕P1⊕U . Additionally, (P4.2) is not satisfied under SR-equivalence due to
the fact that updates such as {∼ p← q. }, {∼ q ← p. } and {← p, q. } have different effects on the
program { p., q. }.
These observations indicate that (P4.1) and (P4.2), and thus also (P4), are too strong under SM-, SE-,
RE-, SMR- and RMR-equivalence. Under SR-equivalence, they are incompatible with operators that
solve conflicts based on the heads of rules. On the other hand, due to the semantic underpinning of
simple rule update operators, (P4) is satisfied by most of them, including all δa-, δb-, δc-, δd- and
δe-based ones, under RR-equivalence.
Summary
The results in Table 2 indicate that simple rule update operators satisfy a number of essential semantic
properties by design. This is especially important for properties such as (Tautology), (Immunity to Tautolo-
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gies) and (P2.>), generally acknowledged as very desirable although most existing rule update semantics
fail to comply with them [3, 20, 24, 48, 55, 60, 75].
Some of the semantic properties, namely (Idempotence), (Absorption) and (Augmentation), outline the
main differences between the particular local exception functions that we have defined. Although δais the
function with the simplest definition, it does not satisfy any of these properties, indicating that it cannot deal
well with iterated updates.
Our results also show that a number of KM postulates are not satisfied by the defined rule update
operators. Coincidentally, with the exception of (B3), the violated postulates are the ones that are deemed
controversial in the belief update community [10, 11, 22, 34].
Perhaps most importantly, Table 2 introduces a novel way of viewing the various semantic properties,
where each property is parametrised by a particular notion of program equivalence and/or entailment. This
richer view should prove useful in further research on rule update operators and their semantic properties.
5. State Condensing
Our results about semantic rule update operators bring along a new point of view on traditional ap-
proaches to rule updates. Particularly interesting is the fact that a semantic rule update operator, following
the belief update tradition, is a binary function on the set of programs over the same alphabet. This guar-
antees that after an update, the original program is replaced by a new program which continues to be used
in its place, and the process can be easily iterated if the need arises. Even though this perspective is very
natural, even fundamental, it has been largely neglected in the ample body of work on rule updates. Existing
semantics typically proceed by characterising the models of the update and, at most, either describe a set of
answer-set programs that could represent the update, instead of only one, or produce an answer-set program
written in a language extended with a considerable amount of new atoms, making it difficult to understand
and to further update.
For instance, semantics based on causal rejection [3, 5, 24, 48, 55], such as the JU- and UA-semantics,
assign models to sequences of non-disjunctive programs and sometimes admit non-minimal models which
no non-disjunctive program can capture. Consequently, they must resort to the introduction of additional
meta-level atoms in order to construct a single program whose stable models correspond to the models
assigned to the sequence, leading to difficulties with iterating the update process. Producing a program
from a more expressive class of logic programs would result in the inability to perform another update as
well because the update semantics are not defined for such programs.
A different approach in [60] deals with program updates by borrowing ideas from literature on belief
revision and utilising an abductive framework to accomplish such updates. In this case, multiple alternative
programs can be the result of an update and no mechanism is provided to choose among them.
A somewhat similar situation occurs with the approach of [75] where intricate syntactic transformations
are combined with a semantics for prioritised logic programs that ultimately leads to a set of logic programs.
Since all of these programs together represent the result of the update, it is once again unclear how to
construct a single program that combines all of them.
The rule update semantics suggested in [20] are also based on syntactic transformations into a logic
program with preferences among rules, but in contrast with [75], the semantics of such programs is defined
by directly specifying their preferred stable models and not by translation into an ordinary program (or a set
thereof). Thus, although an actual syntactic object is constructed that represents the update, it needs to be
interpreted in a richer formalism to take into account preferences among rules.
Finally, frameworks that specify program updates by manipulating dependencies on default assumptions
induced by rules [46, 61, 62] are mainly concerned with identifying the effects of irrelevant updates and
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other theoretical properties of the stable models assigned to a pair or sequence of programs. They do not
consider representing the result of an update by a single program.
In this section, we unravel the true potential of specifying updates as binary operators on some class of
programs. Despite the fact that existing program update semantics do not seem compatible with this point
of view, we show that at least the foundational JU- and UA-semantics can be viewed in this manner.
Theorem 23 already provides part of the solution as it shows that any DLP can be condensed into a
single rule base over the same alphabet that behaves just as the original DLP when further updates are
performed on it. Formally, this can be stated as follows:
Corollary 24 (State Condensing into a Rule Base). There exist rule update operators ⊕1 and ⊕2 such that
for every DLP P = 〈Pi〉i<n without local cycles and all j < n there exist rule basesR1 andR2 with
[[P ]]JU = [[
⊕
1〈R1,Pj+1, . . . ,Pn−1〉 ]]SM and [[P ]]UA = [[
⊕
2〈R2,Pj+1, . . . ,Pn−1〉 ]]SM .
Proof. See Appendix B, page 47.
However, this result is not completely satisfactory since it relies on rule bases instead of standard classes
of logic programs, does not provide explicit definitions of operators⊕1 and⊕2, and does not apply to DLPs
with local cycles.
In the following, we address all these issues by defining specific rule update operators that faithfully
characterise the JU- and UA-semantics – when applied to an arbitrary DLP P , they produce a program
whose stable models coincide with JU- and UA-models of P , respectively. In this way, the new operators
provide a way to condense any DLP into a single program that includes all relevant information about the
DLP, not only to identify its stable models, but also for the purpose of performing further updates. Thereby,
we solve the long-standing problem known as state condensing from the literature on causal rejection se-
mantics for rule updates.
To achieve this, our operators must deal with a more general class of programs than non-disjunctive
ones. First we define simple and elegant operators on subclasses of nested logic programs [71] with the
required property. Subsequently, we show that the full expressivity of nested programs is not necessary for
this purpose by defining an additional pair of operators that produce disjunctive logic programs and still
maintain the same properties w.r.t. JU- and UA-semantics.
Throughout this section we assume that all programs are finite. We also assume that all non-disjunctive
rules pi, originating in some DLP, have exactly one literal L in their heads. This latter assumption does
not remove any significant expressivity from DLPs under the JU- and UA-semantics since each constraint
(← Bpi.) can be equivalently encoded as the rule (p⊥ ← ∼ p⊥,Bpi.) where p⊥ is a fresh atom designated
for this purpose.
5.1. Programs with Nested Expressions
We adopt the syntax and stable model semantics of logic programs with nested expressions [71]. A
nested rule is an expression pi of the form (Hpi ← Bpi.) where Hpi and Bpi, called the head and body of pi,
are expressions built inductively from the propositional atoms in A and the 0-place connectives ⊥ and >
using the unary connective ∼ (default negation) and the binary connectives ∧ and ∨.10 A nested rule of the
form (Hpi ← >.) is usually identified with the formula Hpi. A nested program is a finite set of nested rules.
10Within this section, we refer to such expressions simply as formulas even though they are different from the propositional
formulas introduced in Section 2.
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Each disjunctive program P and DLP P = 〈Pi〉i<n, as defined in Section 2, is translated, respectively, to a
nested program and a sequence thereof as follows:
P} =
{∨
Hpi ←
∧
Bpi.
∣∣∣ pi ∈ P } and P} = 〈P}i 〉i<n .
Satisfaction of a formula φ in an interpretation J , denoted by J |= φ, is defined in the usual way.
Furthermore, J satisfies a nested rule pi, denoted by J |= pi, if J |= Bpi implies J |= Hpi, and J satisfies
a nested program P, denoted by J |= P, if J |= pi for all pi ∈ P. The reduct of a formula φ relative to
J , denoted by φJ , is obtained by replacing, in φ, every maximal occurrence of a formula of the form ∼ψ
with ⊥ if J |= ψ and with > otherwise. The reducts of a nested rule pi and of a nested program P are,
respectively, piJ = (HJpi ← BJpi .) and PJ = {piJ | pi ∈ P }. Finally, an interpretation J is a stable model of
a nested program P if it is subset-minimal among the interpretations that satisfy PJ .
5.2. Condensing into a Nested Program
Now we can proceed with the definition of condensing operators ⊕JU and ⊕UA for the JU- and UA-se-
mantics. The property that these operators must fulfill is that for any DLPP , the stable models of the nested
program resulting from applying the operators to P are exactly the JU- and UA-models of P , respectively.
Both ⊕JU and ⊕UA are defined by utilising the concept of an activation formula which captures the
condition under which a literal L is derived by some rule in a nested program U . Formally, the activation
formula for L in U is defined as follows:
αU (L) =
∨{∧
Bpi
∣∣∣ pi ∈ U ∧ Hpi = L } .11
The operator ⊕JU is based on the following simple idea: When updating a program P by a program U ,
each rule pi from P with literal L in its head must be disabled when some rule from U for the literal
complementary to L is activated. This can be achieved by augmenting the body of pi with the additional
condition ∼αU
(
L
)
. Formally:
Definition 25 (Condensing Operator ⊕JU). A JU-rule is a nested rule with a single literal in its head and a
JU-program is a nested program that consists of JU-rules.
The binary operator ⊕JU on the set of all JU-programs is defined as follows: Given two JU-programs P
and U , the JU-program P ⊕JU U consists of the following rules:
1. for all pi ∈ P, the nested rule (Hpi ← Bpi ∧ ∼αU(Hpi) .);
2. all nested rules from U .
In case of the UA-semantics, additional choice rules are needed. Particularly, for every nested rule
pi ∈ all(P )} whose head is an atom, the update operator needs to include the nested rule (Hpi ∨ Hpi ← Bpi.)
in the resulting program. Intuitively, these additional rules account for the differences in the definition of
rejJU(P , J) and rejUA(P , J) by making sure that no rule is ever completely eliminated, but stays partially in
effect by generating alternative worlds for the atom in its head: one where it is satisfied and one where it is
not. Essentially, this means that whenever the original body of the rule is satisfied, its head atom cannot be
assumed false by default and is interpreted “classically” instead.
11Note that
∨ ∅ is simply ⊥.
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Definition 26 (Condensing Operator ⊕UA). A UA-rule is a nested rule with either a single literal or a dis-
junction of two literals L and L in its head, and a UA-program is a nested program that consists of UA-rules.
The binary operator ⊕UA on the set of all UA-programs is defined as follows: Given two UA-programs
P and U , the UA-program P ⊕UA U consists of the following rules:
1. for all pi ∈ P with Hpi ∈ L, the nested rule
(
Hpi ← Bpi ∧ ∼αU
(
Hpi
)
.
)
;
2. all pi ∈ P such that Hpi is of the form L ∨ L;
3. for all pi ∈ U with Hpi ∈ A, the nested rule
(
Hpi ∨ Hpi ← Bpi.
)
;
4. all nested rules from U .
The following example illustrates the relationship between the JU- and UA-semantics and the condens-
ing operators ⊕JU and ⊕UA, while the subsequent theorem establishes it in general.
Example 27. Suppose that programs P, U and V , written as nested programs, are as follows:
P} : p← >. U} : ∼ p← ∼ q ∧ ∼ r. V} : p← s.
q ← p. ∼ p← s. r ← r.
r ← >. ∼ r ← >. s← >.
In addition to the rules from U}, the program⊕
JU
〈P},U}〉 contains the following three nested rules:
p← >∧∼((∼ q ∧ ∼ r) ∨ s). q ← p ∧ ∼⊥. r ← >∧∼>. (6)
Also, the program
⊕
UA
〈P},U}〉 consists of the rules in⊕
JU
〈P},U}〉 and of three additional choice rules.
Note that these rules are not part of the program P} ⊕UA U}. They belong to the program ∅ ⊕UA P}, and,
consequently, also to (∅ ⊕UA P})⊕UA U} =
⊕
UA
〈P},U}〉. They are as follows:
p ∨ ∼ p← >. q ∨ ∼ q ← p. r ∨ ∼ r ← >. (7)
Furthermore, both
⊕
JU
〈P},U}〉 and ⊕
UA
〈P},U}〉 have the stable models ∅ and { p, q } which coincide
with the JU- and UA-models of the DLP 〈P,U〉.
The situation is more interesting after V} is added to the update sequence. In addition to the rules from
V}, the program⊕
JU
〈P},U},V}〉 contains the following rules:
p← >∧∼((∼ q ∧ ∼ r) ∨ s) ∧ ∼⊥. q ← p ∧ ∼⊥ ∧ ∼⊥. r ← >∧∼> ∧∼⊥.
∼ p← ∼ q ∧ ∼ r ∧ ∼ s. ∼ p← s ∧ ∼ s. ∼ r ← >∧∼ r.
Also, the program
⊕
UA
〈P},U},V}〉 consists of the rules in ⊕
JU
〈P},U},V}〉, the three choice rules
listed in (7) and, additionally, the following three choice rules rules originating in V}:
p ∨ ∼ p← s. r ∨ ∼ r ← r. s ∨ ∼ s← >.
Note that some body conjuncts, such as ∼⊥, and even whole rules, for instance (∼ p ← s ∧ ∼ s.), can
can be eliminated from the resulting programs without affecting their stable models or the stable models
resulting from further updates. Slightly less elegant definitions of ⊕JU and ⊕UA could be used to perform
such simplifications automatically. For illustration, Figure 2 lists the simplified versions of the nested
programs
⊕
JU
〈P},U},V}〉 and ⊕
UA
〈P},U},V}〉. It is also not difficult to verify that the unique stable
model of the former program is { p, q, s }, which coincides with the unique JU-model of 〈P,U ,V〉. On the
other hand, due to the rule (r ∨ ∼ r ← >.), the latter program has the additional stable model { p, q, r, s },
which coincides with the additional UA-model of the DLP 〈P,U ,V〉.
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p← ∼((∼ q ∧ ∼ r) ∨ s). q ← p.
∼ p← ∼ q ∧ ∼ r ∧ ∼ s.
p← s. s← >.
p← ∼((∼ q ∧ ∼ r) ∨ s). q ← p.
∼ p← ∼ q ∧ ∼ r ∧ ∼ s.
p← s. s← >.
p ∨ ∼ p← >. q ∨ ∼ q ← p.
r ∨ ∼ r ← >. s ∨ ∼ s← >.
Figure 2: Nested programs
⊕
JU
〈P},U},V}〉 (left) and⊕
UA
〈P},U},V}〉 (right) without irrelevant rules and body conjuncts.
Theorem 28 (State Condensing Using ⊕JU and ⊕UA). Let P be a DLP. An interpretation J is a
(i) JU-model of P if and only if it is a stable model of
⊕
JU
P};
(ii) UA-model of P if and only if it is a stable model of
⊕
UA
P}.
Proof. See Appendix C, page 55.
The significance of this theorem is in that it demonstrates that the operators ⊕JU and ⊕UA provide a full
characterisation of the JU- and UA-semantics: They condense any DLP P into a single nested program P
such that the stable models of P coincide with the JU- and UA-models of P , respectively, and any further
updates of P can be equivalently performed directly on P using the operators.
Note that since the operators manipulate rules on the syntactic level, they are completely faithful to
JU- and UA-semantics, even when the DLP contains local cycles (see also Theorem 23 where local cycles
form a special case due to the fact that exception functions manipulate rules on the semantic level).
Interestingly, an operator very similar to ⊕JU has been studied by Osorio and Cuevas [55]. They have
proven that it characterises the UA-semantics for the case of a single update but did not consider the possi-
bility of performing iterated updates. Their result is also a consequence of Theorem 28 and of the fact that
the JU- and UA-semantics provide the same result when only a single update is performed.
5.3. Condensing into a Disjunctive Program
The condensing operators defined in the previous section can be further refined in order to produce a
program that meets additional requirements. In the present section we show that nested expressions can
be completely eliminated from the resulting program while still preserving the same tight relationship with
the original rule update semantics. Thus, we introduce an additional pair of operators, ⊕∨JU and ⊕∨UA, that
operate on disjunctive programs with default negation in heads of rules. Note that due to the non-minimality
of JU- and UA-models for certain DLPs, disjunctive programs without default negation in heads of rules
would already be insufficient for this purpose.
The ideas underlying the new operators are fairly straightforward. Essentially, nested expressions are
introduced into the resulting programs only by the negations of activation formulas in their bodies, so these
are the parts of rules that need to be translated into conjunctions in bodies and disjunctions in heads of rules.
In particular, by utilising De Morgan’s law and distributivity of conjunction over disjunction, we can obtain
a new formula, a disjunction of conjunctions of default literals and double-negated atoms, that is strongly
equivalent to the original formula. For instance, in case of the first rule in (6), we can equivalently write the
condition ∼((∼ q ∧ ∼ r) ∨ s) as (∼∼ q ∧ ∼ s) ∨ (∼∼ r ∧ ∼ s). Then it suffices to break up the resulting
rule into multiple rules, each with one of the disjuncts of this formula in the body, and remove one of the
negations from each double-negated literals and “move” it into the head of the newly constructed rule. In
case of the first rule in (6), the result would be the disjunctive rules
p ∨ ∼ q ← ∼ s. and p ∨ ∼ r ← ∼ s. (8)
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We call each set of literals, without double negation, within each of the disjuncts described above a
blocking set. Formally, if the activation formula αU}(L) contains > as one of its disjuncts, then there is no
blocking set for L in U . Otherwise, suppose that αU}(L) = (L11 ∧ · · · ∧ L1k1) ∨ · · · ∨ (Ln1 ∧ · · · ∧ Lnkn). A
blocking set for L in U is any set of literals
{
L1i1 , . . . , L
n
in
}
where 1 ≤ ij ≤ kj for every j with 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
We denote the set of all blocking sets for L in U by βU (L).
Each nested rule
(
Hpi ← Bpi ∧ ∼αU}
(
Hpi
)
.
)
can thus be replaced by the set of disjunctive rules{
Hpi;S+ ← Bpi, S−.
∣∣∣ S ∈ βU(Hpi) } .
Furthermore, when Hpi is a default literal, it is more convenient to move the new default literals from the
head into the body since this operation preserves stable models [38] and makes it easier to pinpoint the
original head literal in the rule. This leads us to the following definition of ⊕∨JU:
Definition 29 (Condensing Operator ⊕∨JU). Given a disjunctive rule pi, a literal L is the original head of pi
if either L ∈ A and Hpi ∩A = {L }, or L /∈ A and Hpi = {L }.
The binary operator ⊕∨JU on the set of all disjunctive programs is defined as follows: Given two disjunc-
tive programs P and U , the disjunctive program P ⊕∨JU U consists of the following rules:
1. for all pi ∈ P with original head L ∈ A and all S ∈ βU (L), the rule
(
Hpi;S+ ← Bpi, S−.
)
;
2. for all pi ∈ P with original head L /∈ A and all S ∈ βU (L), the rule
(
Hpi ← Bpi, S+, S−.
)
;
3. all rules from U .
As for the UA-semantics, similar modifications can be applied in the definition of ⊕UA to obtain an
operator that produces a disjunctive program. Furthermore, due to the additional choice rules included in
the result, the rules can be further simplified, when compared to the rules produced by ⊕∨JU. In particular,
the first group of rules can be treated the same way as the second, leading to the following definition of⊕∨UA:
Definition 30 (Condensing Operator ⊕∨UA). The binary operator ⊕∨UA on the set of all disjunctive programs
is defined as follows: Given two disjunctive programs P and U , the disjunctive program P ⊕∨UA U consists
of the following rules:
1. for all pi ∈ P with Hpi = {L } and all S ∈ βU
(
L
)
, the rule
(
Hpi ← Bpi, S+, S−.
)
;
2. all pi ∈ P such that Hpi is of the form { p,∼ p } for some p ∈ A;
3. for all pi ∈ U with Hpi = { p } for some p ∈ A, the rule (p;∼ p← Bpi.);
4. all rules from U .
If we consider the programs P, U and V from Example 27, the two main differences between the
disjunctive program
⊕∨
JU
〈P,U ,V〉 and its nested counterpart ⊕
JU
〈P,U ,V〉, besides their different syntax,
are as follows: 1) the nested rule is turned into the two disjunctive rules listed in (8), and 2) the rule
r ← > ∧ ∼> ∧ ∼⊥ has no counterpart in the disjunctive program as there is no blocking set for ∼ r in
U . The differences between ⊕∨
UA
〈P,U ,V〉 and ⊕
UA
〈P,U ,V〉 are analogical and in Figure 3 we list the
disjunctive programs simplified in the same way as their nested counterparts in Figure 2.
From a general perspective, the operators ⊕∨JU and ⊕∨UA preserve the main property of ⊕JU and ⊕UA.
Theorem 31 (State Condensing Using ⊕∨JU and ⊕∨UA). Let P be a DLP. An interpretation J is a
(i) JU-model of P if and only if it is a stable model of
⊕∨
JU
P ;
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p;∼ q ← ∼ s. q ← p.
p;∼ r ← ∼ s.
∼ p← ∼ q,∼ r,∼ s.
p← s. s.
p← q,∼ s. q ← p.
p← r,∼ s.
∼ p← ∼ q,∼ r,∼ s.
p← s. s.
p;∼ p. q;∼ q ← p.
r;∼ r. s;∼ s.
Figure 3: Disjunctive programs
⊕∨
JU
〈P,U ,V〉 (left) and⊕∨
UA
〈P,U ,V〉 (right) without irrelevant rules.
(ii) UA-model of P if and only if it is a stable model of
⊕∨
UA
P .
Proof. See Appendix C, page 58.
Although operators ⊕∨JU and ⊕∨UA eliminate the necessity for using nested rules to condense a DLP into
a single program, this comes at a cost. Namely, the size of the nested program resulting from applying
operators ⊕JU and ⊕UA is always linear in size of the argument programs, while in case of ⊕∨JU and ⊕∨UA, the
resulting program can be exponentially larger. Furthermore, Figures 2 and 3 suggest that the representations
produced by⊕∨JU and⊕∨UA will be less faithful to the form of the rules in the original programs, and thus less
readable. This indicates that the nested program is more suitable as a way to store the condensed program,
both in terms of space and readability. Additionally, in order to find its stable models, a more efficient
translation can be used that utilises additional meta-level atoms to prevent the exponential explosion (see
[24, 48] for further details). However, such a translation will no longer be equivalent to the original program
sequence w.r.t. performing further updates.
6. Abstract Exception-Based Operators
In this section we generalise exception-based operators to arbitrary knowledge representation formalisms
with monotonic model-theoretic semantics.
Thus, we assume to be using some knowledge representation formalism in which a knowledge base is
a subset of the set of all knowledge atoms Ω and Z denotes the set of all semantic structures among which
the models of knowledge atoms are chosen. The set of models of a knowledge atom α is denoted by [[α ]].
The semantic characterisation of a knowledge base K is the set of sets of models of its knowledge atoms:
〈〈K〉〉 = { [[α ]] | α ∈ K }. The models of K are the models of all its elements, i.e. [[K ]] = ⋂〈〈K〉〉.
An abstract exception-based update operator is characterised by an exception function that, given the set
of models of a knowledge atom α and the semantic characterisations of the original and updating knowledge
base, returns the semantic structures that are to be introduced as exceptions to α.
Definition 32 (Exception Function). An exception function is any function ε : 2Z × 22Z × 22Z → 2Z .
Given such an exception function and knowledge bases K and U , it naturally follows that the seman-
tic characterisation resulting from updating K by U should consist of sets of models of each knowledge
atom α from K, each augmented with the respective exceptions, and also the unmodified sets of models of
knowledge atoms from U . In other words, we obtain the set of sets of models
{ [[α ]] ∪ ε([[α ]], 〈〈K〉〉, 〈〈U〉〉) | α ∈ K } ∪ 〈〈U〉〉 . (9)
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Turning to the syntactic side, an update operator is binary function over 2Ω that takes the original
knowledge base and its update as inputs and returns the updated knowledge base. An exception-based
update operator is then formalised as follows:
Definition 33 (Abstract Exception-Based Update Operator). Given an exception function ε, an update op-
erator ⊕ is ε-based if for all K, U ⊆ Ω, 〈〈K ⊕ U〉〉RE is equal to (9). Also, ⊕ is exception-based if it is
ε-based for some exception function ε.
7. Belief Updates Using Exception-Based Operators
Concrete exception-based operators for propositional knowledge bases are obtained from the abstract
framework presented in the previous section by identifying the set of knowledge atoms Ω with the set of all
propositional formulas and the set of semantic structures Z with propositional interpretations.
This setup allows us to immediately prove that most conceivable model-based operators can be faith-
fully modelled as exception-based ones. Particularly, this is possible for any update operator satisfying the
uncontroversial postulates (B1), (B2.1) and (B4) [34].
Theorem 34 (Model-Based Updates Using Exception-Based Operators). If  is a belief update operator
that satisfies (B1), (B2.1) and (B4), then there exists an exception function ε such that for every ε-based
update operator ⊕ and all finite sequences of knowledge bases D, [[3D ]] = [[⊕D ]].
Proof. See Appendix E, page 59.
An interesting point regarding this result is that the principles (B1), (B2.1) and (B4) are not specific to
update operators, they are also satisfied by AGM revision operators. These operators are developed for the
case of revising a belief set which is a set of formulas closed w.r.t. a logical consequence operator Cn . A
revision operator ? takes an original belief set T and a formula µ representing its revision and produces
the revised belief set T ? µ. The typical properties satisfied by AGM revision operators include success,
inclusion and extensionality [33], formalised, respectively, as
µ ∈ T ? µ , T ? µ ⊆ Cn(T ∪ {µ }) , If µ ≡ ν, then T ? µ = T ? ν.
These three properties directly imply that (B1), (B2.1) and (B4) are satisfied by AGM revision operators.
Hence, Theorem 34 directly applies to AGM revision operators as well. Note also that the operator adopted
for ABox updates in [49], inspired by WIDTIO, performs a deductive closure of the ABox before updating
it, so it corresponds to the standard full meet AGM revision operator.
Turning to formula-based belief update operators, we can achieve similar results by introducing the
following principles satisfied by many formula-based operators. Here, for any knowledge base B, 〈〈B〉〉I
denotes the set 〈〈B〉〉 ∪ { I }. The principles are as follows:
(F1) 〈〈B ◦ U〉〉 ⊇ 〈〈U〉〉.
(F2.1) 〈〈B ∪ U〉〉 ⊇ 〈〈B ◦ U〉〉.
(F4) If 〈〈B〉〉I = 〈〈C〉〉I and 〈〈U〉〉I = 〈〈V〉〉I, then 〈〈B ◦ U〉〉I = 〈〈C ◦ V〉〉I.
We can see that (F1) and (F2.1) are stronger versions of (B1), and (B2.1), respectively. While (F1) requires
that the sets of models of formulas in U be retained in the semantic characterisation of B ◦ U , (F2.1) states
that every formula in B ◦ U be equivalent to some formula in B ∪ U . Intuitively, this means that B ◦ U is
obtained from B ∪U by deleting some of its elements, modulo equivalence. Finally, (F4) is a reformulation
of (B4) that is satisfied by formula-based operators – it can be seen as syntax-independence w.r.t. the set of
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sets of models of a knowledge base, modulo the presence of tautologies, instead of the overall set of models
as in (B4). In some ways it is weaker than (B4) as its antecedent is much stronger.
The WIDTIO operator [30, 31, 73] satisfies all of these principles, and so does the Bold operator [13] if
it is based on a remainder selection function that selects remainders with the same semantic characterisation
when given sets of remainders with the same sets of semantic characterisations. More formally:
Definition 35 (Regular Bold Operator). For any set of remaindersR we define ((R))I = { 〈〈B〉〉I | B ∈ R}.
We say that the Bold operator ◦sbold is regular if for all sets of remaindersR1,R2 such that ((R1))I = ((R2))I
it holds that 〈〈s(R1)〉〉I = 〈〈s(R2)〉〉I.
The regularity condition guarantees a certain degree of independence of syntax, e.g. given the sets of
remainders R1 = { { p } , { q } } and R2 = { { p ∧ p } , { q ∨ q } }, a regular Bold operator either selects
{ p } from R1 and { p ∧ p } from R2, or it selects { q } from R1 and { q ∨ q } from R2. A non-regular
one might select, say, { p } from R1 and { q ∨ q } from R2. Thus the regularity condition ensures that the
operator is independent of the syntax of individual formulas in the knowledge base.
The Cross-Product operator [30] satisfies (F1) (thus also (B1)), (B2.1) and (F4), but not (F2.1).
Proposition 36 (Properties of Formula-Based Updates). The WIDTIO and regular Bold operators satisfy
(F1), (F2.1) and (F4). The Cross-Product operator satisfies (F1), (B2.1) and (F4) but does not satisfy (F2.1).
Proof. See Appendix E, page 62.
The following result establishes that formula-based operators such as WIDTIO and regular Bold can be
fully captured by exception-based operators. In addition, operators such as Cross-Product can be captured
for the case of a single update.
Theorem 37 (Formula-Based Updates Using Exception-Based Operators). If ◦ is an update operator that
satisfies (F1), (F2.1) and (F4), then there exists an exception function ε such that for every ε-based update
operator ⊕ and all finite sequences of knowledge bases D, [[©D ]] = [[⊕D ]].
If ◦ is an update operator that satisfies (B1), (B2.1) and (F4), then there exists an exception function
ε such that for every ε-based update operator ⊕ and all knowledge bases B, U , [[B ◦ U ]] = [[B ⊕ U ]].
Proof. See Appendix E, page 63.
Similarly as with principles of model-based update operators, principles (F1), (F2.1) and (F4) are closely
related with the properties of base revision operators [27, 33]. In particular, two types of base revision are
identified in [33], the internal and external base revision. Both of them satisfy base revision counterparts
of success and inclusion and, in addition, internal revision operators satisfy a property called uniformity.
These three principles together entail that internal revision operators satisfy (F1), (F2.1) and one half of
(F4); the other half can be achieved by putting additional constraints on the two-place selection function
that generates the revision operator, similar to the regularity condition we imposed on the Bold operator
above. Such regular internal revision operators are thus directly subject to Theorem 37. The same however
does not hold for regular external revision operators as they need not satisfy uniformity. Note also that the
WIDTIO and Bold operators coincide with internal full meet base revision and internal maxichoice base
revision operators, respectively.
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8. Conclusion
Throughout this paper we developed a novel perspective on knowledge updates and demonstrated that it
offers the first unifying ground for characterising rule update semantics as well as both model- and formula-
based classical update operators.
More particularly, we defined a new monotonic characterisation of rules, the RE-models, and introduced
a generic method for specifying semantic rule update operators in which a logic program is viewed as the set
of sets of RE-models of its rules and updates are performed by introducing additional interpretations to the
sets of RE-models of rules in the original program. This framework allowed us to define concrete semantic
rule update operators that enjoy an interesting combination of syntactic as well as semantic properties that
had never been reconciled before. Furthermore, it turned out that these operators can faithfully characterise
the foundational JU- and UA-semantics for rule updates.
These insights also allowed us to address the long enduring problem of state condensing, i.e. transform-
ing a sequence of answer-set programs – interpreted as updates – into a single answer-set program written
in the same alphabet. Partly, this problem emerges because some rule update semantics employ complex
mechanisms such as preferences or other minimality criteria that make it impossible to encode the result in a
single answer-set program. Others have model-theoretic characterisations that assign non-minimal models
to certain update sequences, and it is well known that stable models of non-disjunctive answer-set programs
are minimal. By resorting to more expressive classes of answer-set programs, namely nested and disjunc-
tive, we solved this problem for both JU- and UA-semantics. In all four cases, two for each semantics using
both classes of answer-set programs, the resulting program is written with the same alphabet and is ready
to be further updated. We have illustrated with some examples that the resulting programs written using
nested answer-set programming are perhaps more readable than those written using disjunctive answer-set
programs, in the sense that they more closely match the intuitions underlying the semantics for updates that
we consider.
Furthermore, we defined abstract exception-based operators that can be used in any knowledge repre-
sentation formalism with a monotonic model-theoretic semantics. Then we showed that exception-based
operators for propositional knowledge bases can fully capture update operators that form the basis of on-
tology updates, such as the model-based Winslett’s operator, or the formula-based WIDTIO and Bold op-
erators [13, 19, 49, 51]. The Cross-Product operator can be captured when a single update is performed
and the same can be said about the Set-Of-Theories operator since for a single update it is equivalent to
the Cross-Product operator [73]. Nevertheless, neither of these two operators offers a viable alternative for
updating ontologies – Cross-Product requires that disjunctions of ontology axioms be performed, which is
typically not supported in DLs, and Set-Of-Theories produces a disjunctive ontology which is impractical
and deviates from mainstream DL research.
Overall, exception functions and exception-based operators can capture both traditional syntax-based
approaches to rule updates as well as a wide range of model- and formula-based belief update operators.
Thus, they offer a uniform framework that bridges two very distinct approaches to updates, previously
considered irreconcilable. These findings are essential to better understand their interrelations. In addition,
they open up new possibilities for addressing updates of Hybrid Knowledge Bases consisting of both an
ontology and a rule component since the different methods used for dealing with ABox, TBox and rule
updates can be viewed uniformly by looking at their associated exception functions. When coupled with a
counterpart of SE- or RE-models in the context of hybrid knowledge bases, this can lead to universal hybrid
update semantics which, in turn, can further improve our understanding of the distinct update paradigms.
Our investigation also directly points to challenges that need to be tackled next. First, semantic charac-
terisations of additional rule update semantics need to be investigated. This poses a number of challenges
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due to the need to detect non-tautological irrelevant updates [5, 61, 62]. For instance, the simple functions
examined in this paper, as well as the original JU- and UA-semantics, cannot distinguish an update of { p. }
by U = {∼ p← ∼ q.,∼ q ← ∼ p. }, where it is plausible to introduce the exception (∅, ∅) (and the stable
model ∅ along with it), from an update of { p., q. } by U , where such an exception should not be intro-
duced due to the cyclic dependency of justifications to reject (p.) and (q.). In such situations, context-aware
functions need to be used. Such functions have the potential of satisfying properties such as (P3) and (As-
sociativity). They would facilitate the search for condensing operators for other rule update semantics and
perhaps shed some light on the problem of updating disjunctive programs which has received very little
attention up until now.
Another challenge is to find additional logical characterisations of rules, namely a notion of program
equivalence that is weaker than RR-equivalence but stronger than RE-equivalence so that both (P4) and
properties such as (P2.1) can be achieved under a single notion of program equivalence. In this context,
the close relationship between RE-models and T-models [74], used in the context of forgetting in logic
programs, asks for more attention as well.
Computational properties of different classes of exception-based update operators should also be in-
vestigated and it might be interesting to look for constrained classes of exception functions that satisfy
syntax-independence w.r.t. SR-equivalence. Such functions, however, will not be able to respect causal
rejection because SE-models cannot distinguish abolishing rules.
Our discussion of the expressivity of exception-based operators w.r.t. revision operators, on both belief
sets and belief bases, can be used to tackle and unify approaches to ontology revision [32, 57, 58]. This
seems relevant even in the context of ontology updates since it has been argued in the literature that the
strict distinction between revision and update is not suitable in the context of ontologies [13].
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Appendix A. Proofs: Robust Equivalence Models
In this section we prove formal properties of RE-models (c.f. Definition 7). We begin by defining a set
of representatives of rule equivalence classes induced by SE-models, as it was introduced in [65] since it is
needed in our proofs.
Definition 38 (Transformation into an SE-Canonical Rule [65]). Given a rule pi, we define the SE-canonical
rule canSE(pi) as follows:
(i) If any of the sets H+pi ∩ B+pi , H−pi ∩ B−pi and B+pi ∩ B−pi is non-empty, then canSE(pi) = τ .
(ii) If (i) does not apply and H+pi \ B−pi 6= ∅, then canSE(pi) =
(
(H+pi \ B−pi ); (H−pi \ B+pi )← B+pi ,B−pi .
)
.
(iii) If (i) does not apply and H+pi \ B−pi = ∅, then canSE(pi) is the constraint
(
← (B+pi ∪ H−pi ),B−pi .
)
.
Proposition 39 ([65]). Every rule pi is SE-equivalent to the SE-canonical rule canSE(pi).
Corollary 40 ([65]). No two different SE-canonical rules are SE-equivalent.
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The following presentation follows a similar pattern as the one used in [65] for SE-models. In particular,
we introduce a set of representatives of rule equivalence classes induced by RE-models and show how to
reconstruct a representative from the set of its RE-models. Then we prove the properties of RE-models that
have been formulated in Section 3.
Remark 41. We use the following additional notation: For any rule pi, pi+ denotes the rule (H+pi ← B+pi .)
and pi− denotes the rule
(
H−pi ← B−pi .
)
. Note that the definition of an RE-model (c.f. Definition 7) implies
that (I, J) ∈ [[pi ]]RE if and only if I |= pi+ or J |= pi−. This fact is used implicitly in the following proofs.
Lemma 42. Rules of the following forms are RE-tautological:
p;H ← p,B. H;∼ p← B,∼ p. H ← B, p,∼ p.
Proof. First assume that a rule pi is of the first form and take some (I, J) ∈ X. We need to show that (I, J)
is an RE-model of pi, so it suffices to show that I |= pi+. This follows from the fact that p belongs to both
H+pi and B
+
pi .
Now suppose that pi is of the second form. Given some (I, J) ∈ X, we see that the atom p belongs to
both H−pi and B−pi , so J |= pi−. Hence, (I, J) is an RE-model of pi.
Finally, suppose that pi takes the third form and take some (I, J) ∈ X. If J |= pi−, then (I, J) is an
RE-model of pi. On the other hand, if J 6|= pi−, then J |= ∼ p and, consequently, I 6|= p because I is a
subset of J . This implies that I |= pi+, so we can once again conclude that (I, J) is an RE-model of pi.
Lemma 43. The following pairs of rules are RE-equivalent:
(1) (p;H ← B,∼ p.) and (H ← B,∼ p.);
(2) (H;∼ p← p,B.) and (H ← p,B.).
Proof.
(1) Let the first rule be denoted by pi1, the second by pi2 and take some (I, J) ∈ X. We need to show
that (I, J) is an RE-model of pi1 if and only if it is an RE-model of pi2. Thus, it suffices to prove the
following:
I |= pi+1 ∨ J |= pi−1 if and only if I |= pi+2 ∨ J |= pi−2 . (A.1)
First note that pi−1 = pi
−
2 , so J |= pi−1 holds if and only if J |= pi−2 . So if J |= pi−1 , then J |= pi−2 and
we can conclude that (A.1) holds. On the other hand, if J 6|= pi−1 , then J 6|= pi−2 and (A.1) reduces to
proving that I |= pi+1 holds if and only if I |= pi+2 . Now it suffices to observe that J 6|= pi−1 implies
J |= ∼ p and since I is a subset of J , we can conclude that I 6|= p. Since pi+1 differs from pi+2 only in
the head atom p, our claim follows.
(2) Let the first rule be denoted by pi1, the second by pi2 and take some (I, J) ∈ X. We need to show
that (I, J) is an RE-model of pi1 if and only if it is an RE-model of pi2. Thus, it suffices to prove the
following:
I |= pi+1 ∨ J |= pi−1 if and only if I |= pi+2 ∨ J |= pi−2 . (A.2)
First note that pi+1 = pi
+
2 , so I |= pi+1 holds if and only if I |= pi+2 . So if I |= pi+1 , then I |= pi+2 and
we can conclude that (A.2) holds. On the other hand, if I 6|= pi+1 , then I 6|= pi+2 and (A.2) reduces to
proving that J |= pi−1 holds if and only if J |= pi−2 . Now it suffices to observe that I 6|= pi+1 implies
I |= p and since I is a subset of J , we can conclude that J 6|= ∼ p. Since pi−1 differs from pi−2 only in
the head literal ∼ p, our claim follows.
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Definition 44 (RE-Canonical Rule). We say that a rule pi is RE-canonical if either it is τ , or the sets H+pi ∪H−pi ,
B+pi and B
−
pi are pairwise disjoint.
Definition 45 (Transformation into an RE-Canonical Rule). Given a rule pi, we define the RE-canonical
rule canRE(pi) as follows:
(i) If any of the sets H+pi ∩ B+pi , H−pi ∩ B−pi and B+pi ∩ B−pi is non-empty, then canRE(pi) = τ .
(ii) If (i) does not apply, then canRE(pi) is the rule
(
(H+pi \ B−pi ); (H−pi \ B+pi )← B+pi ,B−pi .
)
.
Proposition 46. For every rule pi, [[pi ]]RE = [[canRE(pi)]]RE.
Proof. This can be shown by a careful iterative application of Lemmas 42 and 43. First observe that if
canRE(pi) = τ , then Lemma 42 implies that pi is RE-tautological, thus indeed RE-equivalent to τ .
In the principal case we can use Lemma 43(1) on all atoms from H+pi ∩ B−pi and remove them one by
one from H+pi while preserving RE-models. A similar situation occurs with atoms from H
−
pi ∩ B+pi which
can be, according to Lemma 43(2), removed from H−pi without affecting RE-models. After these steps are
performed, the resulting rule coincides with canRE(pi).
Lemma 47. For any rule pi and (I, J) ∈ X, (I, J) /∈ [[pi ]]RE if and only if B+pi ⊆ I ⊆ A \ H+pi and
H−pi ⊆ J ⊆ A \ B−pi .
Proof. Note that (I, J) /∈ [[pi ]]RE if and only if both I 6|= pi+ and J 6|= pi−. It can be easily verified that the
former is equivalent to B+pi ⊆ I ⊆ A \ H+pi and the latter to H−pi ⊆ J ⊆ A \ B−pi .
Corollary 48. Let pi be an RE-canonical rule different from τ , put I = B+pi , J = H−pi ∪B+pi and J ′ = A\B−pi ,
and let p be an atom. Then the following holds:
(1) (I, J ∪ { p }) ∈ [[pi ]]RE if and only if p ∈ B−pi .
(2) (I ∪ { p } , J ∪ { p }) ∈ [[pi ]]RE if and only if p ∈ H+pi ∪ B−pi .
(3) (I \ { p } , J ′) ∈ [[pi ]]RE if and only if p ∈ B+pi .
(4) (I, J) /∈ [[pi ]]RE.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 47 and the disjointness properties satisfied by RE-canonical rules.
Lemma 49. Let pi be an RE-canonical rule different from τ and p an atom. Then the following holds:
(1) p ∈ B−pi if and only if for all (I, J) ∈ X, p ∈ J implies (I, J) ∈ [[pi ]]RE;
(2) p ∈ H+pi if and only if p /∈ B−pi and for all (I, J) ∈ X, p ∈ I implies (I, J) ∈ [[pi ]]RE;
(3) p ∈ B+pi if and only if for all (I, J) ∈ X, p /∈ I implies (I, J) ∈ [[pi ]]RE;
(4) p ∈ H−pi if and only if p /∈ B+pi and for all (I, J) ∈ X, p /∈ J implies (I, J) ∈ [[pi ]]RE.
Proof.
(1) Suppose that p ∈ B−pi and take some (I, J) ∈ X with p ∈ J . Then J 6|= ∼ p, so it follows that
J |= pi−. Consequently (I, J) ∈ [[pi ]]RE.
To prove the converse implication, let I = B+pi and J = H
−
pi ∪B+pi . It follows that (I, J∪{ p }) ∈ [[pi ]]RE,
so by Corollary 48(1) we conclude that p ∈ B−pi .
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(2) Suppose that p ∈ H+pi and take some (I, J) ∈ X with p ∈ I . Then I |= p, so it follows that I |= pi+.
Consequently (I, J) ∈ [[pi ]]RE.
To prove the converse implication, let I = B+pi and J = H
−
pi ∪B+pi . It follows that (I∪{ p } , J∪{ p }) ∈
[[pi ]]RE, so by Corollary 48(2) we conclude that p belongs to H+pi ∪ B−pi . Moreover, by the assumption
we know that p /∈ B−pi , so p ∈ H+pi .
(3) Suppose that p ∈ B+pi and take some (I, J) ∈ X with p /∈ I . Then I 6|= p, so it follows that I |= pi+.
Consequently, (I, J) ∈ [[pi ]]RE.
To prove the converse implication, let I = B+pi and J
′ = A\B−pi . It follows that (I\{ p } , J ′) ∈ [[pi ]]RE,
so by Corollary 48(3) we conclude that p ∈ B+pi .
(4) Suppose that p ∈ H−pi and take some (I, J) ∈ X with p /∈ J . Then J |= ∼ p, so it follows that
J |= pi−. Consequently, (I, J) ∈ [[pi ]]RE.
To prove the converse implication, let I = B+pi and J = H
−
pi ∪ B+pi . Corollary 48(4) guarantees
that (I, J) /∈ [[pi ]]RE. Furthermore, by the assumption it follows that (I \ { p } , J \ { p }) ∈ [[pi ]]RE.
Consequently, J must differ from J\{ p }, which implies that p ∈ J . Furthermore, since J = H−pi ∪B+pi
and p /∈ B+pi by assumption, we conclude that p ∈ H−pi .
Definition 50 (Rule RE-Induced by a Set of Interpretations). Let M ⊆ X. The rule RE-induced by M,
denoted by ‖M‖RE, is defined as follows: IfM = X, then ‖M‖RE = τ ; otherwise, ‖M‖RE is of the form
(HRE(M)+;HRE(M)− ← BRE(M)+, BRE(M)−.) where
BRE(M)− = { p ∈ A | ∀(I, J) ∈ X : p ∈ J ⇒ (I, J) ∈M } ,
HRE(M)+ = { p ∈ A | ∀(I, J) ∈ X : p ∈ I ⇒ (I, J) ∈M } \BRE(M)− ,
BRE(M)+ = { p ∈ A | ∀(I, J) ∈ X : p /∈ I ⇒ (I, J) ∈M } ,
HRE(M)− = { p ∈ A | ∀(I, J) ∈ X : p /∈ J ⇒ (I, J) ∈M } \BRE(M)+ .
Proposition 51. For every RE-canonical rule pi, ‖[[pi ]]RE‖RE = pi.
Proof. If pi = τ , then [[pi ]]RE = X and, by Definition 50, ‖X‖RE = τ = pi, so the identity is satisfied. In the
principal case, pi is an RE-canonical rule different from τ . LetM = [[pi ]]RE. It follows from Definition 50
and Lemma 49 that pi = ‖M‖RE.
Corollary 52. No two different RE-canonical rules are RE-equivalent.
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 51.
Proof of Proposition 8. Follows from Corollary 52 since every abolishing rule and every constraint is
RE-canonical.
Lemma 53. For every rule pi, canSE(pi) = canSE(canRE(pi)).
Proof. Follows directly from Definitions 38 and 45.
Lemma 54. If pi is not RE-equivalent to any abolishing rule, then canRE(pi) = canSE(pi).
Proof. Follows directly from Definitions 38 and 45.
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Proof of Proposition 9. Suppose that pi and σ are RE-equivalent. Then canRE(pi) = canRE(σ) by Proposi-
tion 46 and Corollary 52. By Lemma 53 it follows that canSE(pi) = canSE(canRE(pi)) = canSE(canRE(σ)) =
canSE(σ), so by Proposition 39 we can conclude that pi, σ are SE-equivalent.
Now suppose that neither pi nor σ is RE-equivalent to an abolishing rule and pi is RE-equivalent to σ.
Then, by Proposition 46, canRE(pi) is RE-equivalent to canRE(σ) and by Corollary 52, canRE(pi) = canRE(σ).
It follows from Lemma 54 that canSE(pi) = canSE(σ) and by Proposition 39, pi is SE-equivalent to σ.
Finally, by Corollary 52, a rule pi is RE-tautological if and only if canRE(pi) = τ which holds if and only
if canSE(pi) = τ which, by Corollary 40, holds if and only if pi is SE-tautological.
Proof of Proposition 10. Suppose that J is a stable model of P. Then J is a subset-minimal model of PJ .
Thus, (J, J) is an RE-model of P. Now suppose that (I, J) is an RE-model of P for some I ⊆ J . Then
I |= PJ and by the minimality of J we obtain I = J .
Suppose that (J, J) is an RE-model of P and for all I ( J , (I, J) is not an RE-model of P. Then
J |= PJ and J is also a subset-minimal model of PJ . Consequently, J is a stable model of P.
Proof of Proposition 11. Let P contain the rule pi(I,J) =
(
(A \ I); J ← I, (A \ J).
)
for each (I, J) ∈
X \M. It is an immediate consequence of Lemma 47 that [[pi(I,J) ]]RE = X \ { (I, J) }. Thus,
[[P ]]RE =
⋂
(I,J)∈X\M
X \ { (I, J) } = X \
⋃
(I,J)∈X\M
{ (I, J) } = X \ (X \M) =M .
Definition 55. A program entailment relation is a preorder on the set of all programs. A program equiva-
lence relation is an equivalence relation on the set of all programs.
Given a program entailment relation |= and a program equivalence relation ≡, we say that |= is associ-
ated with ≡ if for all programs P, Q, P ≡ Q holds if and only if P |= Q and Q |= P.
Proof of Proposition 14. If X is SE, RE or SU, then the property follows immediately from the definitions
of |=X and ≡X.
If X is either SR or RR, then it follows from the definition of |=X that P |=X Q is equivalent to 〈〈Pτ 〉〉X ⊇
〈〈Qτ 〉〉X. Thus, P |=X Q together with Q |=X P is equivalent to 〈〈Pτ 〉〉X = 〈〈Qτ 〉〉X, which is the definition of
P ≡X Q.
It remains to consider the case when X is SMR or RMR. Let Y be SE or RE, respectively. First suppose
that P ≡X Q. By the definition of ≡X we obtain that min〈〈Pτ 〉〉Y = min〈〈Qτ 〉〉Y. Our goal is to prove that
P |=X Q and Q |=X P. We only show the former; the proof of the latter is analogous. Take some σ ∈ Q.
Our goal is find some pi ∈ Pτ such that [[pi ]]Y ⊆ [[σ ]]Y. Take some subset-minimalM ∈ 〈〈Qτ 〉〉Y such that
M ⊆ [[σ ]]Y. It follows from our assumption thatM belongs to 〈〈Pτ 〉〉Y. In other words, there exists some
pi ∈ Pτ such that [[pi ]]Y =M⊆ [[σ ]]Y.
Now suppose that both P |=X Q and Q |=X P. We need to prove that P ≡X Q, i.e. that min〈〈Pτ 〉〉Y =
min〈〈Qτ 〉〉Y. We only show that min〈〈Pτ 〉〉Y ⊆ min〈〈Qτ 〉〉Y; the proof of the other inclusion is analogical.
Take some pi ∈ Pτ such that
[[pi ]]Y ∈ min〈〈Pτ 〉〉Y . (A.3)
Since Q |=X P, there exists some σ ∈ Qτ such that [[σ ]]Y ⊆ [[pi ]]Y Let σ′ ∈ Qτ be such that [[σ′ ]]Y ∈
min〈〈Qτ 〉〉Y and [[σ′ ]]Y ⊆ [[σ ]]Y. Since P |=X Q, there exists some pi′ ∈ Pτ such that [[pi′ ]]Y ⊆ [[σ′ ]]Y. In
other words, we know that [[pi′ ]]Y ⊆ [[σ′ ]]Y ⊆ [[σ ]]Y ⊆ [[pi ]]Y. Thus, due to (A.3) we can conclude that
[[pi′ ]]Y = [[σ′ ]]Y = [[σ ]]Y = [[pi ]]Y, and it follows from the choice of σ′ that [[pi ]]Y ∈ min〈〈Qτ 〉〉Y.
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Lemma 56. Let |=X, |=Y be program entailment relations and ≡X, ≡Y program equivalence relations such
that |=X is associated with ≡X and |=Y is associated with ≡Y. Then |=X |=Y implies ≡X≡Y.
Proof. Suppose that |=X |=Y and take some programs P, Q such that P ≡Y Q. We need to show that
P ≡X Q. Since |=Y is associated with ≡Y, we can conclude that P |=Y Q and Q |=Y P. Furthermore, from
|=X |=Y it follows that P |=X Q and Q |=X P, and the assumption that |=X is associated with ≡X implies
P ≡X Q.
Corollary 57. Let |=X, |=Y be program entailment relations and ≡X, ≡Y program equivalence relations
such that |=X is associated with ≡X and |=Y is associated with ≡Y. Then:
≡X≺≡Y and |=X≺ |=Y if and only if |=X |=Y and ≡Y≡X .
Proof. By the definition, ≡X≺≡Y and |=X≺ |=Y hold if and only if ≡X≡Y, ≡Y≡X, |=X |=Y and
|=Y |=X. By Lemma 56, |=X |=Y implies ≡X≡Y and ≡Y≡X implies |=Y≡X, so the condition can
be simplified as desired.
Lemma 58. Let pi be a rule and J an interpretation. Then:
J |= pi if and only if J |= piJ if and only if (J, J) ∈ [[pi ]]RE .
Proof. Follows by the definition of piJ and of RE-models.
Lemma 59. Let Π, Σ be rules or programs. Then [[Π]]RE ⊆ [[Σ]]RE implies [[Π]]SE ⊆ [[Σ]]SE.
Proof. Assume that [[Π]]RE ⊆ [[Σ]]RE. Then for all (I, J) ∈ X, I |= ΠJ implies I |= ΣJ and together with
Lemma 58 this implies that for all interpretations J ,
J |= Π implies J |= ΠJ implies J |= ΣJ implies J |= Σ . (A.4)
In order to show that [[Π]]SE ⊆ [[Σ]]SE, take some (I, J) ∈ [[Π]]SE. By the definition of SE-models, J |= Π
and I |= ΠJ , so by (A.4) and our assumption we can conclude that J |= Σ and I |= ΣJ . Thus, by the
definition of SE-models, (I, J) ∈ [[Σ]]SE.
Proof of Proposition 15.
(1) First we show that ≡SM≺≡SE, i.e. that ≡SM≡SE and ≡SE≡SM. To verify the former, suppose
that P, Q are programs with P ≡SE Q. Then P ∪ ∅ has the same stable models as Q ∪ ∅. Conse-
quently, P ≡SM Q. To see that ≡SE≡SM, observe that the programs P = ∅, Q = { p← q. } are
SM-equivalent but not SE-equivalent.
Turning to the remaining relationships, it follows from Corollary 57 that we can instead prove that
|=SE |=RE |=RMR |=RR |=SU and ≡SU≡RR≡RMR≡RE≡SE . (A.5)
We first concentrate on the left-hand side of (A.5). In order to show that |=SE |=RE, suppose that
P, Q are programs such that P |=RE Q. Then [[P ]]RE ⊆ [[Q ]]RE and it follows from Lemma 59 that
[[P ]]SE ⊆ [[Q ]]SE. Consequently, P |=SE Q.
We also need to prove that |=RE |=RMR. Take some programs P, Q with P |=RMR Q and put Pτ =
P ∪ { τ }. It follows that
∀σ ∈ Q∃piσ ∈ Pτ : [[piσ ]]RE ⊆ [[σ ]]RE . (A.6)
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We need to prove that [[P ]]RE ⊆ [[Q ]]RE. Suppose that X ∈ [[P ]]RE and take some σ ∈ Q, our goal is
to show that X ∈ [[σ ]]RE. By (A.6) there exists some piσ ∈ Pτ such that [[piσ ]]RE ⊆ [[σ ]]RE. If piσ = τ ,
then it immediately follows that X ∈ X = [[τ ]]RE ⊆ [[σ ]]RE. If piσ ∈ P, then X ∈ [[piσ ]]RE by the
choice of X , so X ∈ [[σ ]]RE.
Our next goal is to show that |=RMR |=RR. This follows directly by the definitions of |=RMR and |=RR.
To prove the final part of the left-hand side of (A.5), suppose that P |=SU Q. Then [[Q\P ]]SE = X. We
need to prove that P |=RR Q, i.e. that for every σ ∈ Q there is some pi ∈ Pτ such that [[pi ]]RE = [[σ ]]RE.
Pick some σ ∈ Q and note that Q = (Q ∩ P) ∪ (Q \ P). If σ ∈ Q ∩ P, then σ ∈ P and we can put
pi = σ to finish the proof. In the remaining case, σ ∈ Q \ P and it follows from our assumption that
[[σ ]]SE = X. Thus, putting pi = τ finishes the proof.
As for the right-hand side of (A.5), we can see that≡SU≡RR because the programsP = {∼ p← p. }
and Q = {← p. } are RR-equivalent but not SU-equivalent.
Similarly, programs P = { p. } and Q = { p., p← q. } are RMR-equivalent but not RR-equivalent,
so it follows that ≡RR≡RMR.
Next, to verify that ≡RMR≡RE it suffices to observe that the programs P = { p., q. } and Q =
{ p., q ← p. } are RE-equivalent but not RMR-equivalent.
Finally, programs P = {∼ p. } and Q = {← p. } are SE-equivalent but not RE-equivalent, proving
that ≡RE≡SE.
(2) It follows from Corollary 57 that we can instead prove that
|=SE |=SMR |=SR |=RR and ≡RR≡SR≡SMR≡SE . (A.7)
We first concentrate on the left-hand side of (A.7). To prove that |=SE |=SMR, take some programs
P, Q with P |=SMR Q and put Pτ = P ∪ { τ }. It follows that
∀σ ∈ Q∃piσ ∈ Pτ : [[piσ ]]SE ⊆ [[σ ]]SE . (A.8)
We need to prove that [[P ]]SE ⊆ [[Q ]]SE. Suppose that X ∈ [[P ]]SE and take some σ ∈ Q, our goal is
to show that X ∈ [[σ ]]SE. By (A.8) there exists some piσ ∈ Pτ such that [[piσ ]]SE ⊆ [[σ ]]SE. If piσ = τ ,
then it immediately follows that X ∈ X = [[τ ]]SE ⊆ [[σ ]]SE. If piσ ∈ P, then X ∈ [[piσ ]]SE by the
choice of X , so X ∈ [[σ ]]SE.
Our next goal is to show that |=SMR |=SR. This follows directly by the definitions of |=SMR and |=SR.
To finish the proof of the left-hand side of (A.5), suppose that P |=RR Q. Then ∀σ ∈ Q∃pi ∈ P :
[[pi ]]RE = [[σ ]]RE and, due to Lemma 59, ∀σ ∈ Q∃pi ∈ P : [[pi ]]SE = [[σ ]]SE. Consequently, P |=SR Q.
As for the right-hand side of (A.5), we can see that ≡RR≡SR because the programs P = {∼ p. }
and Q = {← p. } are SR-equivalent but not RR-equivalent.
Similarly, programs P = { p. } andQ = { p., p← q. } are SMR-equivalent but not SR-equivalent, so
it follows that ≡SR≡SMR.
Finally, to verify that ≡SMR≡SE it suffices to observe that the programs P = { p., q. } and Q =
{ p., q ← p. } are SE-equivalent but not SMR-equivalent.
(3) It follows from Corollary 57 that we can instead prove that |=SMR |=RMR and ≡RMR≡SMR.
To show the former, take some programs P,Q such that P |=RMR Q. It follows that ∀σ ∈ Q∃pi ∈ P :
[[pi ]]RE ⊆ [[σ ]]RE and, due to Lemma 59, ∀σ ∈ Q∃pi ∈ P : [[pi ]]SE ⊆ [[σ ]]SE. Consequently, P |=SMR Q.
As for the latter, it suffices to observe that the programs P = {∼ p. } and Q = {← p. } are
SMR-equivalent but not RMR-equivalent.
(4) According to Lemma 56, it suffices to show that ≡RE≡SMR and ≡SMR≡RE. The former fol-
lows from the fact that the programs P = {∼ p. } and Q = {← p. } are SMR-equivalent but not
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RE-equivalent. The latter can be verified by observing that though the programs P = { p., q. } and
Q = { p., q ← p. } are RE-equivalent, they are not SMR-equivalent.
(5) According to Lemma 56, it suffices to show that ≡RE≡SR and ≡SR≡RE. The former follows from
the fact that the programs P = {∼ p. } and Q = {← p. } are SR-equivalent but not RE-equivalent.
The latter can be verified by observing that though the programsP = { p., q. } andQ = { p., q ← p. }
are RE-equivalent, they are not SR-equivalent.
(6) According to Lemma 56, it suffices to show that ≡RMR≡SR and ≡SR≡RMR. The former fol-
lows from the fact that the programs P = {∼ p. } and Q = {← p. } are SR-equivalent but not
RMR-equivalent. The latter can be verified by observing that though the programs P = { p. } and
Q = { p., p← q. } are RMR-equivalent, they are not SR-equivalent.
Appendix B. Proofs: Exception-Based Rule Update Operators
Appendix B.1. Conflicts Between Sets of RE-Models
Definition 60 (Additional Notation). Let X ∈ X. Given an atom p, we say that X is an RE-model of p if
X(p) = T. We say that X is an RE-model of ∼ p if X(p) = F. We denote the set of all RE-models of
a literal L by [[L ]]RE. Given a set of literals S, we say that X is an RE-model of S if X is an RE-model
of all literals in S. We denote the set of all RE-models of S by [[S ]]RE. Given a sequence of rule bases
R = 〈Ri〉i<n, we define 〈〈R〉〉RE = 〈〈〈Ri〉〉RE〉i<n.
Proposition 61. Let pi be a rule, p an atom and X = (I, J) ∈ X. Then (I \ { p } , J ∪ { p }) is not an
RE-model of pi if and only if the following holds:
1. Neither p nor ∼ p belongs to Bpi;
2. X is an RE-model of Bpi;
3. X is not an RE-model of any literal from Hpi \ { p,∼ p }.
Proof. We prove the direct implication first. From the assumption it follows that piJ∪{ p } is different from
τ . This has two consequences. First, H−pi is included in J ∪ { p }, so all atoms from H−pi , except possibly p,
belong to J , and thusX is not an RE-model of any default literal from Hpi\{∼ p }. The second consequence
is that B−pi ∩ (J ∪ { p }) is empty. Hence, ∼ p does not belong to Bpi. Furthermore, B−pi ∩ J must also be
empty, so we can conclude that X is an RE-model of all default literals from Bpi. It also follows from the
assumption that I \ { p } contains B+pi but does not contain any atom from H+pi . As a consequence, p does
not belong to Bpi and we can also conclude that X is an RE-model of all atoms from Bpi and X is not an
RE-model of any atom from Hpi \ { p }. Thus, X is an RE-model of Bpi and it is not an RE-model of any
literal from Hpi \ { p,∼ p }.
As for the converse implication, we need to prove that I \ { p } is not a model of piJ∪{ p }. We first
need to show that piJ∪{ p } is equal to the rule H+pi ← B+pi . This holds if H−pi is included in J ∪ { p } and
B−pi is disjoint with J ∪ { p }. Since X is an RE-model of Bpi, we can conclude that the set B−pi is disjoint
with J which, together with the assumption that ∼ p does not belong to Bpi, implies that B−pi is disjoint with
J ∪ { p }. We also know that X is not an RE-model of any literal from Hpi \ { p,∼ p }, so we can conclude
that H−pi \ { p } is included in J . Thus, H−pi is included in J ∪ { p } and we proved that piJ∪{ p } is equal to
the rule H+pi ← B+pi . It remains to show that I \ { p } includes B+pi and that it does not contain any atom from
H+pi . We know that X is an RE-model of Bpi, so I includes B
+
pi . Also, since p does not belong to Bpi, I \ { p }
also includes B+pi . Finally, we know that X is not an RE-model of any atom from H
+
pi \ { p }, so I does not
contain any atom from H+pi \ { p }. This implies that I \ { p } does not contain any atom from H+pi .
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Corollary 62. Let pi be a rule, p an atom and J an interpretation with p ∈ J . If (J, J) is an RE-model of
pi but (J \ { p } , J) is not, then p ∈ Hpi and J |= Bpi.
Proof. It follows immediately from Proposition 61 that J |= Bpi. Furthermore, by the definition of RE-model,
J is a model of piJ while J \ { p } is not. Hence, J contains some atom from Hpi that is not contained in
J \ { p }. This atom can only be p.
Proposition 63. Let pi be a rule,M = [[pi ]]RE, p an atom, J an interpretation and V a truth value. Then
MJ(p) = V if and only if the following holds:
1. Neither p nor ∼ p belongs to Bpi;
2. J is a model of Bpi;
3. J is not a model of any literal from Hpi \ { p,∼ p };
4. One of the following conditions holds:
(a) V is T and Hpi ∩ { p,∼ p } = { p }, or
(b) V is F and Hpi ∩ { p,∼ p } = {∼ p }.
Proof. We focus on the direct implication first. Assume that V = T. Then (J ∪ { p } , J ∪ { p }) is an
RE-model of pi although both (J \ { p } , J ∪ { p }) and (J \ { p } , J \ { p }) are not. By Proposition 61
and Lemma 58 we can conclude that the first three of the properties that we need to prove are satisfied. It
remains to show that Hpi ∩ { p,∼ p } = { p }, i.e. that p belongs to H+pi but it does not belong to H−pi . To
see that the former holds, note that J \ { p } is not a model of piJ∪{ p }, so J \ { p } includes B+pi and it does
not contain any atom from H+pi . Since we know that J ∪ { p } is a model of piJ∪{ p }, it must be the case
that J ∪ { p } contains an atom from H+pi . This atom can only be p. Finally, if p were a member of H−pi ,
then piJ\{ p } would coincide with τ , so (J \ { p } , J \ { p }) would be an RE-model of pi, contrary to the
assumption.
Now assume thatV = F. Then (J\{ p } , J\{ p }) is an RE-model of pi although both (J\{ p } , J∪{ p })
and (J ∪ { p } , J ∪ { p }) are not. By Proposition 61 and Lemma 58 we can conclude that the first three
of the properties that we need to prove are satisfied. It remains to show that Hpi ∩ { p,∼ p } = {∼ p }, i.e.
that p belongs to H−pi but it does not belong to H+pi . To see that the former holds, note that by the assumption
J \ { p } is a model of piJ\{ p } while it is not a model of piJ∪{ p }. Hence, piJ\{ p } must be equal to τ . We
know that B−pi is disjoint with J ∪{ p }, so it must also be disjoint with J \{ p }. Thus, there must exist some
atom from H−pi that is not contained in J \ { p } while it was contained in J ∪{ p }. This atom can only be p.
Finally, if p were a member of H+pi , then J ∪ { p } would contain an atom from H+pi , so (J ∪ { p } , J ∪ { p })
would be an RE-model of pi, contrary to the assumption.
Finally, we show by contradiction that V cannot be equal to U. Suppose that V = U. It follows that
(J ∪ { p }) 6|= piJ∪{ p }, (J \ { p }) |= piJ∪{ p } and (J \ { p }) 6|= piJ\{ p }. Thus, since both piJ\{ p } and
piJ∪{ p } are different from τ , they must be identical and this is in conflict with our latter two conclusions.
As for the converse implication, let XT = (J ∪ { p } , J ∪ { p }), XU = (J \ { p } , J ∪ { p }) and
XF = (J \ { p } , J \ { p }) First suppose that V is T and Hpi ∩ { p,∼ p } = { p }. We need to show that
XT is an RE-model of pi while both XU and XF are not. The first property follows directly from the fact
that p belongs to H+pi and X
T is an RE-model of p. The second property follows from Proposition 61 and
Lemma 58. To show that the third is also satisfied, note that since XU is not an RE-model of pi, the rule
piJ∪{ p } coincides with the rule H+pi ← B+pi . This implies that B−pi is disjoint with J ∪{ p } and H−pi is included
in J ∪{ p }. As a consequence, B−pi is also disjoint with J \{ p }. Moreover, from our assumptions we know
that Hpi ∩ { p,∼ p } = { p }, which means that p does not belong to H−pi . Thus, H−pi is included in J \ { p }.
39
As a consequence, the rule piJ\{ p } also coincides with the rule H+pi ← B+pi . Furthermore, since XU is not an
RE-model of pi, J \ { p } is not a model of piJ∪{ p }. Since piJ∪{ p } = piJ\{ p }, we obtain that J \ { p } is not
a model of piJ\{ p }. Hence XF is not an RE-model of pi.
Next, suppose that V is F and Hpi ∩ { p,∼ p } = {∼ p }. We need to show that XF is an RE-model of
pi while both XU and XT are not. The first property follows directly from the fact that p belongs to H−pi
but does not belong to J \ { p } because in this case piJ\{ p } coincides with τ . The second property follows
from Proposition 61 and Lemma 58. To show that the third is also satisfied, note that since XU is not an
RE-model of pi, the rule piJ∪{ p } coincides with the rule H+pi ← B+pi and J \ { p } is not a model of piJ∪{ p },
i.e. J \ { p } includes B+pi but does not contain any atom from H+pi . Thus, J ∪ { p } also includes B+pi and
from our assumption that Hpi ∩ { p,∼ p } = {∼ p } we can conclude that p does not belong to H+pi . Thus,
J ∪ { p } does not contain any atom from H+pi and, consequently, XT is not an RE-model of pi.
Proposition 64. Let pi and σ be non-disjunctive rules,M = [[pi ]]RE, N = [[σ ]]RE, and J an interpretation.
ThenM 1Jp N if and only if for some L ∈ { p,∼ p }, Hpi = {L }, Hσ = {L }, J is a model of both Bpi and
Bσ, and Bpi, Bσ do not contain p nor ∼ p.
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 63.
Appendix B.2. Syntactic Properties of δa-Based Operators
Definition 65. Let δ be a local exception function, M ⊆ X and S ⊆ 2X. We define augδ(M,S) =
M∪⋃N∈S δ(M,N ) and extend this definition to sequences of sets of sets of three-valued interpretations
inductively as follows: augδ(M, 〈〉) =M and augδ(M, 〈Si〉i<n+1) = augδ(augδ(M, 〈Si〉i<n),Sn).
Proposition 66. LetR = 〈Ri〉i<n be a sequence of rule bases, Si = 〈〈Ri〉〉RE for all i < n, and⊕ a δ-based
rule update operator. Then, 〈〈⊕R〉〉RE = { augδ(M, 〈Sj〉i<j<n) | i < n ∧M ∈ Si }.
Proof. Follows by induction on n.
Lemma 67. LetM⊆ X, S = 〈Si〉i<n where Si ⊆ 2X for all i < n, J an interpretation and p an atom. If
(J, J) belongs to augδa(M,S), but (J \ { p } , J) does not, then (J, J) belongs toM.
Proof. Follows by induction on n.
Proposition 68. Every δa-based rule update operator respects support.
Proof. Let ⊕ be some δa-based rule update operator, pick some DLP P = 〈Pi〉i<n, suppose that J is a
stable model of
⊕
P and take some p ∈ J . We need to show that for some rule pi ∈ all(P ), p ∈ Hpi and
J |= Bpi. Since J is a stable model of
⊕
P , we know that (J, J) belongs to [[
⊕
P ]]RE and for all I ( J ,
(I, J) does not belong to [[
⊕
P ]]RE. In particular, (J\{ p } , J) does not belong to [[
⊕
P ]]RE. Consequently,
there is someN ∈ 〈〈⊕P 〉〉RE such that (J \{ p } , J) does not belong toN although (J, J) does. According
to Proposition 66, N = augδ (M, 〈〈〈Pj〉〉RE〉i<j<n) whereM ∈ 〈〈Pi〉〉RE for some i < n. Let pi be a rule
from Pi such that [[pi ]]RE =M. Since (J \ { p } , J) does not belong to N , it cannot belong toM sinceM
is a subset ofN . Also, by Lemma 67, (J, J) belongs toM. Thus, it follows from Corollary 62 that p ∈ Hpi
and J |= Bpi.
Lemma 69. Let P be a finite sequence of sets of facts and L a literal. Then,
augδa([[L. ]]RE, 〈〈P 〉〉RE) =
{
X (L.) ∈ all(P ) ;
[[L. ]]RE otherwise .
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Proof. Follows using Proposition 64 by induction on the length of P .
Corollary 70. Let P = 〈Pi〉i<n be a finite sequence of sets of facts and⊕ a δa-based rule update operator.
Then, 〈〈⊕P 〉〉RE ∪ {X } = { [[L. ]]RE | ∃i < n : (L.) ∈ Pi ∧ (∀j : i < j < n⇒ (L.) /∈ Pj) } ∪ {X }.
Proof. By Proposition 66, 〈〈P 〉〉RE = { augδ([[pi ]]RE, 〈〈〈Pj〉〉RE〉i<j<n) | i < n ∧ pi ∈ Pi }, which can also be
written as { augδ([[L. ]]RE, 〈〈〈Pj〉〉RE〉i<j<n) | i < n ∧ (L.) ∈ Pi }. Furthermore, due to Lemma 69, we can
equivalently write this as{
X
∣∣ ∃i, j, L : i < j < n ∧ (L.) ∈ Pi ∧ (L.) ∈ Pj }
∪ { [[L. ]]RE ∣∣ ∃i < n : (L.) ∈ Pi ∧ (∀j : i < j < n⇒ (L.) /∈ Pj) } .
This directly implies the desired conclusion.
Proposition 71. Every δa-based rule update operator respects fact update.
Proof. Let P = 〈Pi〉i<n be a finite sequence of consistent sets of facts, J the interpretation
{ p | ∃i < n : (p.) ∈ Pi ∧ (∀j : i < j < n⇒ (∼ p.) /∈ Pj) }
and ⊕ a δa-based rule update operator. We need to show that J is the unique stable model of
⊕
P .
We start by proving that (J, J) belongs to [[
⊕
P ]]RE. Pick someM ∈ 〈〈
⊕
P 〉〉RE. By Corollary 70 we
know thatM is either X, or it is equal to [[L. ]]RE where
∃i < n : (L.) ∈ Pi ∧ (∀j : i < j < n⇒ (L.) /∈ Pj) .
In the former case it trivially holds that (J, J) belongs toM = X. Now suppose that L is an atom p. Then,
by its definition, J contains p, so (J, J) belongs to [[p. ]]RE =M. On the other hand, if L is a default literal
∼ p, then the fact (p.) does not belong to Pi because Pi is consistent, and it also does not belong to Pj for
any j with i < j < n. So p does not belong to J and, hence, (J, J) belongs to [[∼ p. ]]RE =M.
Now suppose that (I, J) belongs to [[
⊕
P ]]RE and take some p ∈ J . Then,
∃i < n : (p.) ∈ Pi ∧ (∀j : i < j < n⇒ (∼ p.) /∈ Pj) ,
so, by Corollary 70, [[p. ]]RE belongs to 〈〈
⊕
P 〉〉RE. Since (I, J) belongs to [[
⊕
P ]]RE, it must also belong to
[[p. ]]RE. Thus, p belongs to I and as the choice of p ∈ J was arbitrary, we can conclude that I = J . As a
consequence, J is indeed a stable model of
⊕
P .
It remains to prove that J is the only stable model of
⊕
P . Suppose that J ′ is a stable model of
⊕
P
and take some p ∈ J . We will show that p belongs to J ′. We know that
∃i < n : (p.) ∈ Pi ∧ (∀j : i < j < n⇒ (∼ p.) /∈ Pj) ,
so, by Corollary 70, [[p. ]]RE belongs to 〈〈
⊕
P 〉〉RE. Since J ′ is a stable model of
⊕
P , (J ′, J ′) belongs to
[[
⊕
P ]]RE and, consequently, also to [[p. ]]RE. Thus, p must belong to J ′. Now take some atom p that does
not belong to J . We will show that p does not belong to J ′ either. There are two cases to consider:
a) If (p.) does not belong to Pi for all i < n, then it can be seen that (J ′ \ { p } , J ′) belongs to all
elements of 〈〈⊕P 〉〉RE. Thus, since J ′ is a stable model of ⊕P , J ′ \ { p } = J ′ and, consequently,
p does not belong to J ′.
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b) If (p.) belongs to Pi0 for some i0 < n and whenever (p.) belongs to Pi for some i, there is some j
with i < j < n such that (∼ p.) belongs to Pj , then there must exist some i1 such that (∼ p.) belongs
to Pi1 and for all j with i1 < j < n, (p.) does not belong to Pj . Consequently, [[∼ p. ]]RE belongs to
〈〈⊕P 〉〉RE. Thus, since (J ′, J ′) belongs to [[⊕P ]]RE, it follows that p cannot belong to J ′.
Proposition 72. Let P = 〈P,U〉 be a dynamic logic program, ⊕ a δa-based rule update operator and J
an interpretation. If J is a stable model of
⊕
P , then J is a JU-model of P .
Proof. From the assumption we can conclude that (J, J) is an RE-model of P ⊕ U and for every I ( J ,
(I, J) is not an RE-model of P ⊕ U .
We need to show that J is a minimal model of the program Q = [all(P ) \ rej(P , J)]J . First we prove
that J is a model of Q. Take some rule pi′ ∈ Q and let pi be a rule from [all(P ) \ rej(P , J)] such that
pi′ = piJ . We consider two cases:
a) If pi belongs to U , then since (J, J) belongs to [[P⊕U ]]RE and 〈〈P⊕U〉〉RE contains [[pi ]]RE, (J, J) must
also belong to [[pi ]]RE. Thus, J is a model of pi and consequently also a model of pi′ = piJ .
b) If pi belongs to P \ rej(P , J), then since (J, J) belongs to [[P ⊕ U ]]RE and 〈〈P ⊕ U〉〉RE contains
[[pi ]]RE∪
⋃
σ∈U δa([[pi ]]RE, [[σ ]]RE), (J, J) must also belong to [[pi ]]RE∪
⋃
σ∈U δa([[pi ]]RE, [[σ ]]RE). Suppose
first that for some rule σ ∈ U , (J, J) belongs to the set δa([[pi ]]RE, [[σ ]]RE). This implies that [[pi ]]RE 1Jp
[[σ ]]RE for some atom p and by Proposition 64 we can conclude that pi belongs to rej(P , J), contrary
to the assumption. Thus, (J, J) does not belong to the set
⋃
σ∈U δa([[pi ]]RE, [[σ ]]RE) and, consequently,
it belongs to [[pi ]]RE. Hence, J is a model of pi and, consequently, it is also a model of pi′ = piJ .
It remains to prove that J is a minimal model of Q. Take some model I of Q such that I is a subset of
J . We need to show that I = J . In the following we will show that (I, J) is a member of the set [[P⊕U ]]RE
which, together with the assumption that J is a stable model of P ⊕ U , implies that I = J .
So in order to finish the proof, take some setM from 〈〈P ⊕ U〉〉RE. We need to show that (I, J) belongs
toM. Recall that 〈〈P ⊕ U〉〉RE = { [[pi ]]RE ∪
⋃
σ∈U δa([[pi ]]RE, [[σ ]]RE) | pi ∈ P } ∪ 〈〈U〉〉RE. IfM belongs to
〈〈U〉〉RE, then there is some rule pi ∈ U such thatM = [[pi ]]RE. Moreover, piJ belongs to Q, so I is a model
of piJ . It then follows that (I, J) is an RE-model of pi, i.e. that (I, J) belongs toM, as we wanted to show.
The remaining case is when for some pi ∈ P, M = [[pi ]]RE ∪
⋃
σ∈U δa([[pi ]]RE, [[σ ]]RE). Suppose that
(I, J) does not belong to [[pi ]]RE. Then I is not a model of piJ . Since I is a subset of J , we can conclude
from this that
J |= Bpi . (B.1)
Furthermore, from our assumption that I is a model of Q it then follows that piJ does not belong to Q and,
consequently, pi belongs to rej(P , J). So there must be some rule σ ∈ U such that Hσ = Hpi and J |= Bσ.
Since we know from the previous part of the proof that J is a model of Q, we can conclude that J |= Hσ,
so J 6|= Hpi.
Thus, it follows from (B.1) that J is not a model of pi, so (J, J) is not an RE-model of pi. But since J is
a stable model of P⊕U , (J, J) must belong to δa([[pi ]]RE, [[σ′ ]]RE) for some σ′ ∈ U and from the definition of
δa(·, ·) we obtain that (I, J) also belongs to δa([[pi ]]RE, [[σ′ ]]RE). This implies that (I, J) belongs toM.
Proposition 73. Let P = 〈P,U〉 be a DLP free of local cycles, ⊕ a δa-based rule update operator and J
an interpretation. If J is a JU-model of P , then J is a stable model of
⊕P.
Proof. Suppose that J is a justified update model of 〈P,U〉. Then it is a minimal model of the program
Q = [all(P ) \ rej(P , J)]J . We need to prove that (J, J) is an RE-model of P ⊕ U and for every I ( J ,
(I, J) is not an RE-model of P ⊕ U . In order to show that (J, J) is an RE-model of P ⊕ U , recall that
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〈〈P⊕U〉〉RE =
{
[[pi ]]RE ∪
⋃
σ∈U δa([[pi ]]RE, [[σ ]]RE)
∣∣ pi ∈ P }∪〈〈U〉〉RE and take some setM from 〈〈P⊕U〉〉RE.
IfM belongs to 〈〈U〉〉RE, then there is a rule pi ∈ U such thatM = [[pi ]]RE. Also, piJ belongs to Q, so J is a
model of piJ . Consequently, (J, J) belongs toM.
Now suppose that for some pi from P,M = [[pi ]]RE ∪
⋃
σ∈Q δa([[pi ]]RE, [[σ ]]RE). If (J, J) does not belong
to [[pi ]]RE, then J is not a model of piJ , so pi belongs to rej(P , J). So there exists a rule σ from U such that
Hσ = Hpi and J |= Bσ. The previous conclusions, together with the fact that pi and σ are not local cycles,
allow us to use Proposition 64 and conclude that [[pi ]]RE 1Jp [[σ ]]RE holds for some atom p. Hence, (J, J)
belongs to δa([[pi ]]RE, [[σ ]]RE), and consequently also toM.
Now suppose that (I, J) belongs to [[pi ]]RE. We will show that I is a model of Q, which implies that
I = J because J is by assumption a minimal model of Q. Take some rule pi′ from Q and suppose that
pi′ = piJ for some pi ∈ [all(P ) \ rej(P , J)]. If pi belongs to U , then [[pi ]]RE belongs to 〈〈P ⊕ U〉〉RE.
Consequently, (I, J) belongs to [[pi ]]RE, so I is a model of pi′.
The final case to consider is when pi belongs to P. We will prove by contradiction that I is a model
of pi′. So suppose that I is not a model of pi′. Then (I, J) is not an RE-model of pi. However, since by
assumption (I, J) belongs to [[P ⊕ U ]]RE, it must also belong to the set [[pi ]]RE ∪
⋃
σ∈U δa([[pi ]]RE, [[σ ]]RE).
We have already shown that it is not a member of [[pi ]]RE, so there must exist some σ ∈ U such that (I, J)
belongs to δa([[pi ]]RE, [[σ ]]RE). Thus, [[pi ]]RE 1Jp [[σ ]]RE holds for some atom p. We can use Proposition 64 to
conclude that Hσ = Hpi and J |= Bσ. Hence, pi belongs to rej(P , J), contrary to our assumption.
Proof of Theorem 19. Follows from Propositions 68, 71, 72, 73 and the fact that the JU-semantics has
these properties.
Appendix B.3. Syntactic Properties of δb- and δc-Based Operators
Definition 74. We say thatM⊆ X is RE-rule-expressible if there exists a rule pi such thatM = [[pi ]]RE.
Lemma 75. LetM ⊆ X be RE-rule-expressible, S a set of RE-rule-expressible sets of three-valued inter-
pretations, J an interpretation, p an atom, V0 a truth value and δ ∈ { δb, δc }. If augδ(M,S)J(p) = V0,
thenMJ(p) = V0.
Proof. Suppose that augδ(M,S)J(p) = V0. By the definition we then obtain that for all truth values V,
J [V/p] ∈ augδ(M,S) if and only if V = V0 . (B.2)
If the interpretation J [V0/p] belongs toM, then we can use (B.2) together with the fact thatM is a subset
of augδ(M,S) to conclude thatMJ(p) = V0 and our proof ends.
So suppose that J [V0/p] does not belong toM. Then it follows from (B.2) and from the fact thatM
is a subset of augδ(M,S) that the interpretations J [T/p], J [U/p] and J [F/p] do not belong toM. Thus,
since J [V0/p] belongs to augδ(M,S), there must exist some N ∈ S such that J [V0/p] = (I,K) belongs
to δ(M,N ). In other words, there exists an atom q and an interpretation J ′ such that I ⊆ J ′ ⊆ K and
MJ ′(q) 6= N J ′(q). Note that J \ { p } ⊆ I ⊆ J ′ ⊆ K ⊆ J ∪ { p }. Thus, (J ′, J ′) = J [V1/p] for some
V1 ∈ {T,F }. We distinguish two cases:
a) If p 6= q, then by the definition of δb and δc we obtain that J [V1/p], J [U/p] ∈ δ(M,N ).
b) If p = q, let V2 = T is V1 = F and V2 = F if V1 = T. It follows thatMJ [V2/p](p) 6= N J [V2/p](p)
and by the definition of δb and δc we obtain that J [V1/p], J [V2/p] ∈ δ(M,N ).
In either case, it is not possible fo augδ(M,S)J(p) to be defined, a conflict with our assumption.
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Proposition 76 (Exception Independence for Rules). LetM⊆ X be RE-rule-expressible by a non-disjunctive
rule, S , T be sets of RE-rule-expressible sets of three-valued interpretations and δ ∈ { δb, δc }. Then,
augδ(augδ(M,S), T ) = augδ(M,S ∪ T ).
Proof. By applying the definition of augδ(·, ·) we can see that our goal is to show that the set
augδ(M,S) ∪
⋃
N∈T
δ(augδ(M,S),N ) (B.3)
is equal to the setM∪⋃N∈S∪T δ(M,N ) which can also be written as
augδ(M,S) ∪
⋃
N∈T
δ(M,N ) . (B.4)
First suppose that some X ∈ X belongs to (B.3). If X belongs to augδ(M,S), then it directly follows
that X also belongs to (B.4). So suppose that X belongs to δ(augδ(M,S),N ) for some N ∈ T . By
the definition of δb and δc we obtain that there exists some atom p and some interpretation J with cer-
tain properties relative to X such that augδ(M,S)J(p) 6= N J(p). By Lemma 75 we then conclude that
augδ(M,S)J(p) =MJ(p). Thus, X also belongs to δ(M,N ) and, consequently, also to the set (B.4).
Now suppose that someX = (I,K) ∈ X belongs to (B.4). The case whenX belongs to augδ(M,S) is
trivial, so we assume that X belongs to δ(M,N ) for some N ∈ T . This implies that there exists an atom
p and some interpretation J such that I ⊆ J ⊆ K andMJ(p) 6= N J(p). Suppose thatMJ(p) = V0. If
it also holds that augδ(M,S)J(p) = V0, then it can be seen that X belongs to (B.3). Otherwise it follows
from the fact that M is a subset of augδ(M,S) that augδ(M,S)J(p) is undefined and it contains both
J [V0/p] and J [V1/p] = (I ′,K ′) for some V1 6= V0. Thus, for some N ′ ∈ S it holds that (I ′,K ′) belongs
to δ(M,N ′). In other words, there exists an atom q and an interpretation J ′ such that I ′ ⊆ J ′ ⊆ K ′
andMJ ′(q) 6= N ′J ′(q). SinceM is expressible by a non-disjunctive rule, it follows from Proposition 63
that q = p. Also, J and J ′ may only differ in the valuation of p, so we obtain that MJ(p) 6= N ′J(p).
Consequently, X belongs to δ(M,N ′), so it also belongs to (B.3).
Definition 77. Let P = 〈Pi〉i<n be a DLP. We define afteri(P ) =
⋃
i<j<n Pj .
Proposition 78 (Exception Independence for Programs). Let P = 〈Pi〉i<n be a DLP, δ ∈ { δb, δc } and ⊕
a δ-based rule update operator. Then, 〈〈⊕P 〉〉RE = { augδ(M, 〈〈afteri(P )〉〉RE) | i < n ∧M ∈ 〈〈Pi〉〉RE }.
Proof. By Proposition 66, 〈〈⊕P 〉〉RE = { augδ(M, 〈〈〈Pj〉〉RE〉i<j<n) | i < n ∧M ∈ 〈〈Pi〉〉RE }. The claim
follows by induction on n using Proposition 76.
Proposition 79. Let P be a DLP and J an interpretation. The following holds:
(i) If ⊕ is a δb-based rule update operator and J is a stable model of
⊕
P , then J is a JU-model of P .
(ii) If ⊕ is a δc-based rule update operator and J is a stable model of
⊕
P , then J is a UA-model of P .
Proof. Let P = 〈Pi〉i<n. Also, put rej(·, ·) = rejJU(·, ·) if δ = δb and rej(·, ·) = rejUA(·, ·) if δ = δc.
From the assumption we can conclude that (J, J) belongs to [[
⊕
P ]]RE and for every I ( J , (I, J) does not
belong to [[
⊕
P ]]RE. We need to show that J is a minimal model of the program P′ = [all(P )\ rej(P , J)]J .
First we prove that J is a model ofP′. Take some rule pi′ ∈ P′ and let pi be a rule from all(P )\rej(P , J)
such that pi′ = piJ . Then there is some i < n such that pi belongs to Pi. LetM = [[pi ]]RE. Since pi belongs
to Pi, we can use Proposition 78 to conclude that 〈〈
⊕
P 〉〉RE contains the set
augδ(M, 〈〈afteri(P )〉〉RE) =M∪
⋃
N∈〈〈afteri(P )〉〉RE
δ(M,N ) . (B.5)
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Furthermore, since (J, J) belongs to [[
⊕
P ]]RE, it must also belong to (B.5). If (J, J) ∈ M, then J |= pi
and thus also J |= pi′ as desired. So suppose that (J, J) /∈M. Then for some j with i < j < n there exists
some N ∈ 〈〈Pj〉〉RE such that (J, J) ∈ δ(M,N ). Thus, for some atom p,M 1Jp N , and by Proposition 64
we conclude that there is a rule σ ∈ Pj with [[σ ]]RE = N , Hσ = Hpi and J |= Bσ. We consider two cases:
a) If δ = δb, then the assumption pi /∈ rejJU(P , J) is in direct conflict with the existence of σ.
b) If δ = δc, then it follows from pi /∈ rejUA(P , J) that σ ∈ rejUA(P , J). Thus, there is some rule
ρ ∈ (Pk \ rejUA(P , J)) with j < k < n such that Hρ = Hσ = Hpi and J |= Bρ. It fol-
lows from ρ /∈ rejUA(P , J) that no rule from afterk(P ) has the head Hρ and a body satisfied in
J . Thus, the definition of δc and Proposition 64 imply that the set δc([[ρ ]]RE,N ) is empty for all
N ∈ 〈〈afterk(P )〉〉RE. But since (J, J) belongs to [[
⊕
P ]]RE by assumption, it must also belong to
the set [[ρ ]]RE ∪
⋃
N∈〈afterk(P )〉RE δc([[ρ ]]RE,N ) and we conclude that (J, J) ∈ [[ρ ]]RE. Consequently,
J |= ρ and from J |= Bρ we conclude J |= Hρ. Since Hpi = Hρ, we have shown that J |= pi and thus
also J |= pi′, as desired.
It remains to prove that J is a minimal model of P′. Take some I ⊆ J such that I |= P′, we need
to show that I = J . In the following we will show that (I, J) ∈ [[⊕P ]]RE which, together with the
assumption that J is a stable model of
⊕
P , implies that I = J . So take some set
augδ(M, 〈〈afteri(P )〉〉RE) =M∪
⋃
N∈〈〈afteri(P )〉〉RE
δ(M,N ) . (B.6)
from 〈〈⊕P 〉〉RE with M = [[pi ]]RE and pi ∈ Pi. We need to show that (I, J) belongs to (B.6). This
obviously holds if (I, J) ∈ M, so suppose that (I, J) /∈ M. Then, I 6|= piJ . Thus, piJ is different from τ
and, consequently, J |= B−pi . Also, B+pi ⊆ I but H+pi ∩ I = ∅ and since I ⊆ J , this implies that
J |= Bpi . (B.7)
Moreover, since I |= P′, it follows that piJ /∈ P′, so pi ∈ rej(P , J). Thus, there exists a rule σ ∈ Pj for
some j with i < j < n such that for some atom p and literal L ∈ { p,∼ p },
Hpi = {L } and Hσ = {L } and J |= Bσ . (B.8)
Let N = [[σ ]]RE. We consider the following five cases:
a) If L ∈ Bpi, then pi is tautological and we arrive at a conflict with the assumption (I, J) /∈ [[pi ]]RE.
b) If L ∈ Bpi, then it follows from (B.7) and (B.8) that (J, J) /∈ [[pi ]]RE. At the same time, δ(M,N )
is empty for all N because for all interpretations J ′ and atoms q, it is impossible forMJ ′(q) to be
defined. Thus, we obtain a conflict with the assumption that (J, J) ∈ [[⊕P ]]RE.
c) If L ∈ Bσ, then it follows from (B.8) that (J, J) /∈ [[σ ]]RE. At the same time, δ(N ,N ′) is empty for
all N ′ because for all interpretations J ′ and atoms q, it is impossible for N J ′(q) to be defined. Thus,
we obtain a conflict with the assumption that (J, J) ∈ [[⊕P ]]RE.
d) If L ∈ Bσ, then it follows from (B.8) that J |= L and together with (B.7) we obtain that J 6|= pi.
Thus, (J, J) /∈ [[pi ]]RE and since (J, J) ∈ [[
⊕
P ]]RE, there must exist some N ′ ∈ 〈〈afteri(P )〉〉RE such
that (J, J) ∈ δ(M,N ′). It follows from the definitions of δb and δc that (I, J) ∈ δ(M,N ′), and
thus also (I, J) ∈ augδ(M, 〈〈afteri(P )〉〉RE).
e) In the remaining case, Bpi and Bσ do not contain L nor L. Thus, we can use Proposition 64 to
conclude that M 1Jp N . Note that if δ = δc, then the definition of rejUA(·, ·) implies that σ /∈
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rejUA(P , J), so J |= σ. Using (B.8) and (B.7) we can conclude that J 6|= pi, so (J, J) /∈ M.
Consequently, by the definitions of δb and δc it follows that (I, J) ∈ δ(M,N ), and thus also (I, J) ∈
augδ(M, 〈〈afteri(P )〉〉RE).
Proposition 80. Let P be a DLP free of local cycles and J an interpretation. The following holds:
(i) If ⊕ is a δb-based rule update operator and J is a JU-model of P , then J is a stable model of
⊕
P .
(ii) If ⊕ is a δc-based rule update operator and J is a UA-model of P , then J is a stable model of
⊕
P .
Proof. Let P = 〈Pi〉i<n. Also, put rej(·, ·) = rejJU(·, ·) if δ = δb and rej(·, ·) = rejUA(·, ·) if δ = δc. From
the assumption we can conclude that J is a minimal model of the program P′ = [all(P ) \ rej(P , J)]J . We
need to prove that (J, J) ∈ [[⊕P ]]RE and for every I ( J , (I, J) /∈ [[⊕P ]]RE.
In order to show that (J, J) ∈ [[⊕P ]]RE, take some set
augδ(M, 〈〈afteri(P )〉〉RE) =M∪
⋃
N∈〈〈afteri(P )〉〉RE
δ(M,N ) (B.9)
from 〈〈⊕P 〉〉RE whereM = [[pi ]]RE for some pi ∈ Pi. If (J, J) belongs toM, then it obviously belongs to
(B.9). So assume that (J, J) /∈M. Then J 6|= pi, so
J |= Bpi , (B.10)
and we can also conclude that pi belongs to rej(P , J). As a consequence, there exists a rule σ from Pj for
some j with i < j < n such that for some atom p and literal L ∈ { p,∼ p },
Hpi = {L } and Hσ = {L } and J |= Bσ . (B.11)
Let N = [[σ ]]RE. It can be verified that (B.10) and (B.11), together with the assumption that pi and σ are
not local cycles, allow us to use Proposition 64 and conclude that for some atom p,M 1Jp N . Thus, (J, J)
belongs to δ(M,N ), and consequently also to (B.9).
Now suppose that (I, J) ∈ [[⊕P ]]RE. We will show that I |= P′, which implies that I = J because J
is by assumption a minimal model of P′. Take some pi′ ∈ P′. Then there is a rule pi from all(P )\ rej(P , J)
such that pi′ = piJ . Suppose that pi ∈ Pi. We will prove by contradiction that I |= pi′. So suppose that
I 6|= pi′. Then piJ is different from τ and, consequently, J |= B−pi . Also, B+pi is included in I , so since I is a
subset of J , B+pi is included in J as well. Hence,
J |= Bpi . (B.12)
Also, (I, J) /∈ [[pi ]]RE. By our assumption, (I, J) ∈ M ∪
⋃
N∈〈〈afteri(P )〉〉RE δ(M,N ) whereM = [[pi ]]RE.
We have already shown that (I, J) /∈ M, so there must be a rule σ ∈ Pj for some j with i < j < n
such that (I, J) ∈ δ(M,N ) where N = [[σ ]]RE. Thus, there exists some interpretation K and an atom p
such that I ⊆ K ⊆ J , M 1Kp N and if p ∈ J \ I , then J = K. By Proposition 64, there is a literal
L ∈ { p,∼ p } such that Hpi = {L } and Hσ = {L }. We consider three cases:
a) If p /∈ J \ I , then I(p) = J(p). Furthermore, J |= pi because J |= P′ and from (B.12) we obtain that
J |= Hpi. Thus, I |= piJ , a conflict with the assumption that I 6|= pi′.
b) If p ∈ J \ I and δ = δb, then it follows from the definition of δb that J = K, soM 1Jp N . Thus, by
Proposition 64 we conclude that pi ∈ rej(P , J), contrary to the way pi was picked.
c) If p ∈ J \ I and δ = δc, then the definition of δc implies that (J, J) /∈ [[pi ]]RE, contrary to the
assumption that J |= P′.
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Appendix B.4. Syntactic Properties of δd- and δe-Based Operators
Lemma 81. Let P be a DLP, ⊕b, ⊕c, ⊕d and ⊕e be δb-, δc-, δd- and δe-based rule update operators,
respectively. Then the following holds:
(i) IfM∈ 〈〈⊕dP 〉〉RE, then eitherM = X orM∈ 〈〈⊕bP 〉〉RE;
(ii) IfM∈ 〈〈⊕eP 〉〉RE, then eitherM = X orM∈ 〈〈⊕cP 〉〉RE.
Proof. Follows by induction on the length of P .
Lemma 82. Let P be a DLP, ⊕b, ⊕c, ⊕d and ⊕e be δb-, δc-, δd- and δe-based rule update operators,
respectively. Then the following holds:
(i) IfM∈ 〈〈⊕bP 〉〉RE, then for some N ∈ 〈〈⊕dP 〉〉RE, N ⊆M;
(ii) IfM∈ 〈〈⊕cP 〉〉RE, then for some N ∈ 〈〈⊕eP 〉〉RE, N ⊆M.
Proof. The following two stronger statements follow by induction on the length of P using Proposition 76:
(i) IfM ∈ 〈〈⊕bP 〉〉RE, then for some set of RE-rule-expressible sets of three-valued interpretations S
and some N ∈ 〈〈⊕dP 〉〉RE,M = augδb(N ,S).
(ii) IfM ∈ 〈〈⊕cP 〉〉RE, then for some set of RE-rule-expressible sets of three-valued interpretations S
and some N ∈ 〈〈⊕eP 〉〉RE,M = augδb(N ,S).
Proposition 83. Let P be a DLP, ⊕b, ⊕c, ⊕d and ⊕e be δb-, δc-, δd- and δe-based rule update operators,
respectively. Then [[
⊕
bP ]]SM = [[
⊕
dP ]]SM and [[
⊕
cP ]]SM = [[
⊕
eP ]]SM.
Proof. By Lemma 81, 〈〈⊕bP 〉〉RE ∪ {X } ⊇ 〈〈⊕dP 〉〉RE and 〈〈⊕cP 〉〉RE ∪ {X } ⊇ 〈〈⊕eP 〉〉RE, so
[[
⊕
bP ]]RE =
⋂
〈〈⊕bP 〉〉RE = ⋂(〈〈⊕bP 〉〉RE ∪ {X }) ⊆⋂〈〈⊕dP 〉〉RE = [[⊕dP ]]RE ,
[[
⊕
cP ]]RE =
⋂
〈〈⊕cP 〉〉RE = ⋂(〈〈⊕cP 〉〉RE ∪ {X }) ⊆⋂〈〈⊕eP 〉〉RE = [[⊕eP ]]RE .
Furthermore, by Lemma 82,
[[
⊕
bP ]]RE =
⋂
〈〈⊕bP 〉〉RE = ⋂
M∈〈⊕bP 〉RE
M⊇
⋂
N∈〈⊕dP 〉RE
N =
⋂
〈〈⊕dP 〉〉RE = [[⊕dP ]]RE ,
[[
⊕
cP ]]RE =
⋂
〈〈⊕cP 〉〉RE = ⋂
M∈〈⊕cP 〉RE
M⊇
⋂
N∈〈⊕eP 〉RE
N =
⋂
〈〈⊕eP 〉〉RE = [[⊕eP ]]RE .
Thus, [[
⊕
bP ]]RE = [[
⊕
dP ]]RE and [[
⊕
cP ]]RE = [[
⊕
eP ]]RE, and the rest follows from Proposition 15.
Proof of Theorem 23. Follows from Propositions 79, 80 and 83.
Proof of Theorem 22. Follows from Theorem 23 and from the fact that the JU- and UA-models satisfy all
of these properties.
Proof of Corollary 24. It suffices to putR = ⊕〈Pi〉i≤j and apply Theorem 23.
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Appendix B.5. Semantic Properties
Proposition 84. Let ⊕ be a δ-based rule update operator. Then ⊕ satisfies (Initialisation), (Disjointness),
(P1) and (P2.>) with respect to RR, SR, RMR, SMR, RE, SE and SM (where applicable).
Proof. We prove these properties with respect to RR-equivalence; their satisfaction with respect to the other
notions of program equivalence follows from Proposition 15. To verify that (Initialisation) holds, it suffices
to observe that
〈〈∅ ⊕ U〉〉RE = { augδ(M, 〈〈U〉〉RE) | M ∈ ∅ } ∪ 〈〈U〉〉RE = 〈〈U〉〉RE .
Thus, ∅ ⊕ U is RR-equivalent to U . As for (Disjointness), it suffices to observe that 〈〈(R ∪ S) ⊕ U〉〉RE
coincides with
{ augδ (M, 〈〈U〉〉RE) | M ∈ R ∪ S } ∪ 〈〈U〉〉RE
= ({ augδ (M, 〈〈U〉〉RE) | M ∈ R } ∪ 〈〈U〉〉RE) ∪ ({ augδ (M, 〈〈U〉〉RE) | M ∈ S } ∪ 〈〈U〉〉RE)
= 〈〈R ⊕ U〉〉RE ∪ 〈〈S ⊕ U〉〉RE = 〈〈(R⊕ U) ∪ (S ⊕ U)〉〉RE .
In order to prove that (P1) holds, consider that 〈〈U〉〉RE is a subset of 〈〈R⊕U〉〉RE. Consequently,R⊕U |=RR U .
Finally, (P2.>) follows from the fact that augδ(M, ∅) =M for allM⊆ X.
Lemma 85. Let P, Q be programs over disjoint alphabets and δ ∈ { δa, δb, δc, δd, δe }. Then for all
M∈ 〈〈P〉〉RE, either augδ(M, 〈〈Q〉〉RE) =M or augδ(M, 〈〈Q〉〉RE) = X.
Proof. Follows from Proposition 63 and the definitions of δa, δb, δc, δd, and δe.
Lemma 86. Let M ⊆ X be RE-rule-expressible, U a program, p an atom and V0 a truth value. If
augδa(M, 〈〈U〉〉RE)J(p) = V0, then eitherMJ(p) = V0, or p occurs in U .
Proof. Suppose that augδa(M, 〈〈U〉〉RE)J(p) = V0 and MJ(p) 6= V0. Thus, augδa(M, 〈〈U〉〉RE) contains
J [V/p] if and only if V = V0. SinceM is a subset of augδa(M, 〈〈U〉〉RE), it follows thatM does not contain
J [T/p], J [U/p] nor J [F/p]. Let pi be some rule such that [[pi ]]RE = M. We can conclude that p does not
occur in pi. Furthermore, if V0 = T, then by the definition of δa we obtain a conflict with the fact that
J [U/p] does not belong to augδa(M, 〈〈U〉〉RE). Consequently, V0 = F. Furthermore, since J [T/p] does not
belong to augδa(M, 〈〈U〉〉RE) but J [F/p] does, there exists some N ∈ 〈〈U〉〉RE and some atom q such that
M 1J [F/p]q N but it is not the case thatM 1J [T/p]q N . Since p does not occur in pi, this is only possible if
p occurs in U .
Proposition 87. Let ⊕ be a δa-, δb-, δc, δdor δe-based rule update operator. Then ⊕ satisfies (Non-
interference) for non-disjunctive programs with respect to RR, SR, RMR, SMR, RE, SE and SM.
Proof. We prove this property with respect to RR-equivalence; its satisfaction with respect to the other
notions of program equivalence follows from Proposition 15. Suppose that P, U and V are non-disjunctive
programs, δ ∈ { δa, δb, δc, δd, δe } and ⊕ is a δ-based rule update operator. Take someM0 ∈ 〈〈(P ⊕ U) ⊕
V〉〉RE. We will show thatM0 either belongs to 〈〈(P ⊕ V)⊕ U〉〉RE orM0 = X. Note that 〈〈(P ⊕ U)⊕ V〉〉RE
coincides with { augδ (M, 〈〈V〉〉RE) | M ∈ 〈〈P ⊕ U〉〉RE } ∪ 〈〈V〉〉RE. We consider three cases:
a) Suppose that M0 ∈ 〈〈V〉〉RE. Then M0 ∈ 〈〈P ⊕ V〉〉RE and since 〈〈(P ⊕ V) ⊕ U〉〉RE coincides with
{ augδ(M, 〈〈U〉〉RE) | M ∈ 〈〈P ⊕ V〉〉RE }∪〈〈U〉〉RE, it must contain the set augδ(M0, 〈〈U〉〉RE). Further-
more, since U and V are over disjoint alphabets, it follows from Lemma 85 that augδ(M0, 〈〈U〉〉RE) is
eitherM0 or X, as desired.
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b) Suppose that M0 = augδ(M, 〈〈V〉〉RE) and M ∈ 〈〈U〉〉RE. As in the previous case, since U and V
are over disjoint alphabets, it follows from Lemma 85 that augδ(M, 〈〈V〉〉RE) is eitherM or X. If the
former is true, thenM0 ∈ 〈〈U〉〉RE, soM0 ∈ 〈〈(P ⊕ V)⊕ U〉〉RE.
c) Suppose thatM0 = augδ (augδ (M, 〈〈U〉〉RE) , 〈〈V〉〉RE) for someM∈ 〈〈P〉〉RE. If δ ∈ { δb, δc }, then it
follows directly from Proposition 76 that
M0 = augδ (M, 〈〈U〉〉RE ∪ 〈〈V〉〉RE) = augδ (augδ (M, 〈〈V〉〉RE) , 〈〈U〉〉RE) .
Consequently,M0 ∈ 〈〈(P ⊕ V)⊕ U〉〉RE.
If δ ∈ { δd, δe }, then eitherM0 = X orM0 = augδb
(
augδb (M, 〈〈U〉〉RE) , 〈〈V〉〉RE
)
. The rest follows
by the previous paragraph.
Finally, if δ = δa, then we consider two subcases:
(i) If augδa(M, 〈〈U〉〉RE) =M, thenM0 = augδa(M, 〈〈V〉〉RE), soM0 belongs to 〈〈P⊕V〉〉RE. Take
some N ∈ 〈〈U〉〉RE and suppose that M0 1pJ N . Then, by Lemma 86, either MJ(p) = V0
for some truth value V0, or p occurs in V . In the former case we obtain a conflict with the
assumption that augδa(M, 〈〈U〉〉RE) =M while the latter case is in conflict with the assumption
that U and V are over disjoint alphabets. Thus, no suchN exists and augδa(M0, 〈〈U〉〉RE) =M0.
Consequently,M0 belongs to 〈〈(P ⊕ V)⊕ U〉〉RE.
(ii) If augδa(M, 〈〈U〉〉RE) 6= M, then there is some N ∈ 〈〈U〉〉RE such that M 1pJ N for some
atom p and interpretation J . Thus since U and V are over disjoint alphabets, it follows from
Proposition 64 that augδa(M, 〈〈V〉〉RE) =M, so augδa(M, 〈〈U〉〉RE) belongs to 〈〈(P⊕V)⊕U〉〉RE.
It remains to show thatM0 = augδa(M, 〈〈U〉〉RE). PutM1 = augδa(M, 〈〈U〉〉RE) and suppose
that for some N ′ ∈ 〈〈V〉〉RE, some atom q and some interpretation K, M1 1Kq N ′. Then, by
Lemma 86, eitherMK(q) = V0 for some truth value V0, or q occurs in U . In the former case,
p = q by Proposition 64 and we obtain a conflict with the fact that U and V are over disjoint al-
phabets. In the latter case, q occurs in both U and V , so the same conflict follows. Consequently,
no such N ′ exists and M0 = augδa
(
augδa (M, 〈〈U〉〉RE) , 〈〈V〉〉RE
)
= augδa (M1, 〈〈V〉〉RE) =
augδa (M, 〈〈U〉〉RE).
The proof of the other inclusion is symmetric.
Remark 88 ((Non-interference) for Disjunctive Programs). The following programs form a counterexample
to (Non-interference) for δb-, δc-, δd- and δe-based operators under SM-equivalence (and thus under all
stronger notions of equivalence as well):
P : p; q; r. U : ∼ p← ∼ r. V : ∼ q.
p← r.
r ← p.
As for δa-based operators, the singleton programsP′ = { p; q. }, U ′ = {∼ p← ∼ r. } and V ′ = {∼ q ← s. }
form a counterexample to (Non-interference) under SE-equivalence and all stronger notions of equivalence.
Proposition 89. Let ⊕ be a δ-based rule update operator where δ(M,X) ⊆ M for allM ⊆ X. Then ⊕
satisfies (Tautology) and (Immunity to Tautologies) with respect to RR, SR, RMR, SMR, RE, SE and SM.
Proof. For RR-equivalence this can be verified in a straight-forward manner. For the remaining notions of
program equivalence this follows from Proposition 15.
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Proposition 90. Let ⊕ be a δ-based rule update operator. Then ⊕ satisfies (Idempotence) with respect to
RMR, SMR, RE, SE and SM. Moreover, if ⊕ is δd- or δe-based, then it also satisfies (Idempotence) with
respect to RR and SR.
Proof. (Idempotence) states the following: R⊕R ≡ R. We will show that this is true under RMR-equiva-
lence which, together with Proposition 15, implies that it holds under SMR-, RE-, SE- and SM-equivalence.
First take some M ∈ min〈〈(R ⊕ R) ∪ { τ }〉〉RE. If M = X, then R ⊕ R is tautological and since
〈〈R〉〉RE is a subset of 〈〈R ⊕ R〉〉RE, R is itself tautological. Thus, X also belongs to min〈〈R ∪ { τ }〉〉RE. In
the principal case, eitherM ∈ 〈〈R〉〉RE, orM = augδ(M0, 〈〈R〉〉RE) for someM0 ∈ 〈〈R〉〉RE. In the latter
case we have thatM0 is a subset ofM and sinceM0 belongs to 〈〈R ⊕R〉〉RE, by the minimality ofM we
obtain thatM =M0, soM belongs to 〈〈R〉〉RE. Now it follows thatM is minimal 〈〈R〉〉RE because 〈〈R〉〉RE
is a subset of 〈〈R ⊕R〉〉RE andM is minimal in the latter set.
Now take some M ∈ min〈〈R ∪ { τ }〉〉RE. If M = X, then R is tautological and it follows by the
properties of⊕ thatR⊕R is also tautological. Thus, X also belongs to 〈〈(R⊕R)∪{ τ }〉〉RE. In the principal
case,M ∈ 〈〈R〉〉RE. Take some N ∈ 〈〈R ⊕ R〉〉RE such that N is a subset ofM. If N belongs to 〈〈R〉〉RE,
then it follows by minimality ofM thatM = N . On the other hand, if N is of the form augδ(N0, 〈〈R〉〉RE)
for someN0 from 〈〈R〉〉RE, thenN0 ⊆ N ⊆M, so by the minimality ofM,N0 = N =M. Thus, in either
case,M = N , which proves that it is minimal within 〈〈R ⊕R〉〉RE.
Now consider some δd- or δe-based rule update operator ⊕. Then, 〈〈R ⊕ R〉〉RE ⊆ 〈〈R〉〉RE ∪ {X }, so
obviously 〈〈(R⊕R) ∪ { τ }〉〉RE = 〈〈R ∪ { τ }〉〉RE.
Remark 91 ((Idempotence) under ≡SR and ≡RR). The rule base R = { (p← ∼ q.), (∼ p← r.) } forms a
counterexample to (Idempotence) for δa-, δb- and δc-based operators with respect to SR and RR.
Lemma 92. LetM ⊆ X be RE-rule-expressible, S a set of RE-rule-expressible sets of three-valued inter-
pretations. The following holds:
(i) If δ ∈ { δb, δc }, then augδ(augδ(M,S),S) = augδ(M,S).
(ii) If δ ∈ { δd, δe }, then either augδ(augδ(M,S),S) = augδ(M,S), or both augδ(augδ(M,S),S) =
X and augδ(M,S) ∈ S.
Proof. Let δ ∈ { δb, δc }, putM′ = augδ(M,S) and take someN ∈ S such thatM′ 1pJ N for some atom
p and some interpretation J . ThenM′J(p) = V0 for some truth value V0, so it follows from Lemma 75 that
MJ(p) = V0. But this impliesM 1pJ N , so both (J \ { p } , J \ { p }) and (J ∪ { p } , J ∪ { p }) belong
toM′, a conflict with the assumption thatM′J(p) is defined. As a consequence, no such N ∈ S exists, so
augδ(M′,S) =M′ = augδ(M,S).
On the other hand, if δ ∈ { δd, δe }, then we can observe that either the previous case applies, or both
augδ(augδ(M,S),S) = X and augδ(M,S) ∈ S.
Proposition 93. Let ⊕ be a δb-, δc-, δd- or δe-based rule update operator. Then ⊕ satisfies (Absorption)
with respect to RMR, SMR, RE, SE and SM. Moreover, if ⊕ is δd- or δe-based, then it satisfies (Absorption)
with respect to RR and SR.
Proof. (Absorption) states the following: (R ⊕ U) ⊕ U ≡ R ⊕ U . We will show that this is true under
RMR-equivalence which, together with Proposition 15, implies that it holds under SMR-, RE-, SE- and
SM-equivalence.
So suppose that ⊕ is δb-, δc-, δd- or δe-based. By Lemma 92, 〈〈((R⊕ U)⊕ U) ∪ { τ }〉〉RE is a superset
of 〈〈(R⊕U)∪ { τ }〉〉RE. Thus, wheneverM is minimal in 〈〈((R⊕U)⊕U)∪ { τ }〉〉RE, it is also minimal in
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〈〈(R⊕U)∪{ τ }〉〉RE. Furthermore, the extra elements of 〈〈((R⊕U)⊕U)∪{ τ }〉〉RE are never smaller than
the elements of 〈〈(R⊕U)∪{ τ }〉〉RE because they are of the form augδ(N , 〈〈U〉〉RE) for someN ∈ 〈〈U〉〉RE ⊆
〈〈(R ⊕ U) ∪ { τ }〉〉RE. Thus, wheneverM is minimal in 〈〈(R ⊕ U) ∪ { τ }〉〉RE, it must also be minimal in
〈〈((R⊕ U)⊕ U) ∪ { τ }〉〉RE.
Furthermore, if ⊕ is δd- or δe-based, then it additionally holds that 〈〈((R ⊕ U) ⊕ U) ∪ { τ }〉〉RE =
〈〈(R⊕ U) ∪ { τ }〉〉RE.
Proposition 94. Let ⊕ be a δb-, δc-, δd- or δe-based rule update operator. Then ⊕ satisfies (Augmentation)
for non-disjunctive programs with respect to RMR, SMR, RE, SE and SM. Moreover, if⊕ is δd- or δe-based,
then it satisfies (Augmentation) for non-disjunctive programs with respect to RR and SR.
Proof. The proof for RMR-equivalence follows from Proposition 76 and Lemma 81 and from the fact that
the extra elements of 〈〈((R⊕U)⊕V)∪{ τ }〉〉RE, as compared to 〈〈(R⊕V)∪{ τ }〉〉RE, are non-minimal in the
latter set. If ⊕ is δd- or δe-based, then there are no extra elements and the rest follows from Proposition 76
and Lemma 81.
Remark 95 ((Absorption) and (Augmentation) violated by δa). The rule bases R = { p. } and U = V =
{∼ p← ∼ q., q. } form counterexamples to (Absorption) and (Augmentation) for δa-based operators with
respect SM-equivalence and any stronger notion of equivalence.
Remark 96 ((Augmentation) for Disjunctive Programs). The following programs form a counterexample to
(Augmentation) for δb-, δc-, δd- and δe-based operators under SM-equivalence (and thus under all stronger
notions of equivalence as well):
P : p; q; r. U : ∼ p← ∼ r. V : ∼ p← ∼ r.
p← r. p← r.
r ← p. r ← p.
∼ q.
Remark 97 ((Associativity) and δa, δb, δc, δd, δe). The rule pi = (∼ p.), when updated by σ = (p ← q.),
must be weakened, anticipating the potential conflict. In the case of δa-, δb-, δc, δd and δe-based operators,
the resulting rule is pi′ = (∼ p← ∼ q.) (or another RE-equivalent rule). Consider the following rule bases:
R = { p. } , U = {∼ p. } , V = { p← q., q ← p. } .
Note that (Associativity) states the following: R⊕ (U ⊕V) ≡ (R⊕U)⊕V . However, while in (R⊕U)⊕V
the fact from R is completely annihilated (i.e. transformed into a tautological rule) due to the negative fact
pi in U , this does not happen in R ⊕ (U ⊕ V) because the pi is first weakened into pi′. As a consequence,
R⊕(U⊕V) has one extra stable model comparing to (R⊕U)⊕V: { p, q }. This implies that (Associativity)
does not hold for δa-, δb-, δc-, δd- and δe-based rule update operators under SM-equivalence, nor under any
stronger equivalence.
Proposition 98. Let ⊕ be a δ-based rule update operator. Then ⊕ satisfies (P2.1) and (P5) with respect to
RMR, SMR, RE and SE.
Proof. Under RMR-entailment (P2.1) follows from the fact that M is a subset of augδ(M,S) and (P5)
follows from the fact that augδ(M,S) is a subset of augδ(M,S ∪ T ). For the remaining notions of
program entailment this follows from Proposition 15.
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Remark 99 ((P2.1) under |=SR and |=RR). Consider again the rules pi, σ from Remark 97 and rule bases
R = {pi }, U = {σ }. Note that (P2.1) states the following: R ∪ U |= R⊕ U . However, if ⊕ is δa-, δb-,
δc-, δd- or δe-based, R⊕ U will contain pi′ (or another RE-equivalent rule or program) which results from
weakening of pi by σ. Consequently, when SR- or RR-entailment is used,R∪U cannot entailR⊕U simply
because pi′ (or another RE-equivalent rule or program) does not belong toR∪ U .
Remark 100 ((P2.2) and Rule Updates). Consider R = { p. } and U = {∼ p. } and note that (P2.2) states
the following: (R∪ U)⊕ U |= R. In other words, it requires that
{ p.,∼ p. } ⊕ {∼ p. } |= p .
In the presence of (P1) this amounts to postulating that one can never recover from an inconsistent state.
Such a requirement is out of line with the way these situations are treated in state-of-the-art approaches to
rule updates which allow for recovery from an inconsistent state if all involved conflicts are resolved by
the update. Note that, though for different reasons, (B2.2) has also been subject of harsh criticism in belief
update literature [34].
Proposition 101. Let ⊕ be a δ-based rule update operator where δ(M,X) ⊆ M for allM ⊆ X. Then ⊕
satisfies (P4), (P4.1) and (P4.2) with respect to RR.
Proof. Principle (P4) can be verified straightforwardly and (P4.1) as well as (P4.2) are its consequences.
The condition on δ is necessary to ensure that augδ(M, 〈〈U〉〉RE) =M whenever U is tautological, to keep
it in line with the case when U = ∅.
Appendix C. Proofs: Condensing into a Nested Program
Lemma 102. For any DLP P = 〈Pi〉i<n,
⊕
JU
P} consists of the following rules:
1. for all pi ∈ P}i with i < n− 1, the nested rule
(
Hpi ← Bpi ∧
∧
i<j<n∼αP}j
(
Hpi
)
.
)
;
2. all nested rules in P}n−1.
Proof. Follows by induction on n.
Proposition 103. Let I , J be interpretations and P a DLP. Then,
I |= (all(P ) \ rejJU(P , J))J if and only if I |=
(⊕
JU
P}
)J
.
Proof. First suppose that I |= (all(P ) \ rejJU(P , J))J and take some rule σJ ∈ (
⊕
JU
P})J . We need to
prove that I |= σJ . It follows from Lemma 102 that one of the following cases occurs:
a) If σ ∈ P}n−1, then it immediately follows that σ ∈ (all(P ) \ rejJU(P , J))}. Consequently, since
I |= (all(P ) \ rejJU(P , J))J , it follows that I |= σJ .
b) Otherwise, σ =
(
Hpi ← Bpi ∧
∧
i<j<n∼αP}j
(
Hpi
)
.
)
for some pi ∈ P}i with i < n− 1. Suppose that
I |= BJσ . Then I |= BJpi and it also follows that for all j with i < j < n, J 6|= αP}j (Hpi). Consequently,
pi ∈ (all(P ) \ rejJU(P , J))} and by the assumption we conclude that I |= piJ . Hence, from I |= BJpi
it follows that I |= HJpi , implying that I |= σJ .
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For the converse implication, suppose that I |= (⊕
JU
P})J and take some pi ∈ (all(P ) \ rejJU(P , J))}.
We need to show that I |= piJ . If pi ∈ P}n−1, then it follows by Lemma 102 that pi ∈ (
⊕
JU
P}) and since
I |= (⊕
JU
P}
)J by assumption, we can immediately conclude that I |= piJ .
In the principal case, pi ∈ P}i for some i < n − 1. Consequently, by Lemma 102,
⊕
JU
P} contains
a rule σ =
(
Hpi ← Bpi ∧
∧
i<j<n∼αP}j
(
Hpi
)
.
)
. Since pi is not part of the set of rejected rules, we can
conclude that for all j with i < j < n, J 6|= αP}j (Hpi). Hence, B
J
σ = B
J
pi ∧
∧
i<j<n>. It follows that
if I |= BJpi , then I |= BJσ and using our assumption we conclude that I |= HJσ . Since Hpi = Hσ, we
demonstrated that I |= piJ .
Lemma 104. For any DLP P = 〈Pi〉i<n,
⊕
UA
P} consists of the following rules:
1. for all pi ∈ P}i with i < n− 1, the nested rule
(
Hpi ← Bpi ∧
∧
i<j<n∼αP}j
(
Hpi
)
.
)
;
2. for all pi ∈ P}i with Hpi ∈ A and i < n, the nested rule
(
Hpi ∨ Hpi ← Bpi.
)
;
3. all nested rules in P}n−1.
Proof. Follows by induction on n.
Proposition 105. Let P be a DLP and J an interpretation. If J is a UA-model of P , then it is a stable
model of
⊕
UA
P}.
Proof. In order to show that J is a stable model of
⊕
UA
P}, we first establish that J satisfies (
⊕
UA
P})J .
Take some rule σ from
⊕
UA
P}. We need to prove that J |= σJ . Due to Lemma 104, we need to consider
the following cases:
1) In the first case, σ =
(
Hpi ← Bpi ∧
∧
i<j<n∼αP}j
(
Hpi
)
.
)
where pi ∈ P}i and i < n − 1. Suppose
that J |= BJσ . Then J |= BJpi and for all j such that i < j < n, J 6|= αP}j (Hpi). Thus, we can conclude
that pi ∈ (all(P ) \ rejUA(P , J))}, by the assumption, J |= piJ . So since J |= BJpi , it also holds that
J |= HJpi and since Hpi = Hσ, we conclude that J |= σJ .
2) In the second case, σ =
(
Hpi ∨ Hpi ← Bpi.
)
for some pi ∈ P}i with Hpi ∈ A and i < n. If J |= Hpi,
then it easily follows that J |= σJ . On the other hand, if J 6|= Hpi, then the head of σJ contains > as
the second disjunct and, once again, it follows that J |= σJ .
3) In the third case, σ ∈ P}n−1. It immediately follows that σ ∈ (all(P ) \ rejUA(P , J))}. Thus, our
assumption implies that J |= σJ .
It remains to verify that J is also subset-minimal among interpretations that satisfy (
⊕
UA
P})J . To
show that this is the case, take an interpretation I with I ⊆ J that satisfies (⊕
UA
P})J . In the following we
will prove that I |= (all(P ) \ rejUA(P , J))J . Since J is subset-minimal among interpretations satisfying
this program, it will follow that I = J as desired.
Take some rule pi ∈ (all(P ) \ rejUA(P , J))}, our goal is to prove that I |= piJ . We consider the
following cases:
1) In case pi ∈ P}i with i < n − 1 and there is no rule pi′ ∈ Pj with i < j < n such that
pi′ 1 pi and J |= Bpi′ , we can use Lemma 104 to conclude that
⊕
UA
P} contains a rule σ =(
Hpi ← Bpi ∧
∧
i<j<n∼αP}j
(
Hpi
)
.
)
. It also follows that for all j with i < j < n, J 6|= αP}j (Hpi), so
that BJσ = B
J
pi∧
∧
i<j<n>. Thus, if I |= BJpi , then I |= BJσ and by the assumption that I |= (
⊕
UA
P})J
we obtain I |= HJσ , so it also follows that I |= piJ .
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2) In case pi ∈ P}i with i < n − 1 and there is a rule pi′ ∈ Pj with i < j < n such that pi′ 1 pi and
J |= Bpi′ , it follows that since pi is unrejected, pi′ is itself rejected. Consequently, there is also an
unrejected rule pi′′ ∈ Pk with j < k < n such that pi′′ 1 pi′ and J |= Bpi′′ . Furthermore, Hpi′′ = Hpi
and by the assumption we know that J satisfies the rule pi′′, so we can conclude that J |= Hpi. If Hpi
is a default literal, then it follows that (Hpi)J = >, so trivially I |= piJ .
If Hpi is an atom, then, by Lemma 104,
⊕
UA
P} contains a rule σ =
(
Hpi ∨ Hpi ← Bpi.
)
. Note that
HJσ = Hpi ∨ ⊥. Thus, if I |= BJpi , then I |= BJσ and it follows from our assumption that I |= HJσ , so
that I |= HJpi . Hence, I |= piJ .
3) In case pi ∈ P}n−1, it immediately follows from Lemma 104 that pi ∈
(⊕
UA
P}
)
. Thus, by the
assumption that I |= (⊕
UA
P})J we obtain I |= piJ .
Proposition 106. Let P be a DLP and J an interpretation. If J is a stable model of
⊕
UA
P}, then it is a
UA-model of P .
Proof. To show that J is a UA-model of P , we first establish that J satisfies P = (all(P ) \ rejUA(P , J))J .
Take some rule pi ∈ (all(P ) \ rejUA(P , J))}, our goal is to prove that J |= piJ . We consider the following
cases:
1) In case pi ∈ P}i with i < n − 1 and there is no rule pi′ ∈ Pj with i < j < n such that
pi′ 1 pi and J |= Bpi′ , we can use Lemma 104 to conclude that
⊕
UA
P} contains a rule σ =(
Hpi ← Bpi ∧
∧
i<j<n∼αP}j
(
Hpi
)
.
)
. It also follows that for all j with i < j < n, J 6|= αP}j (Hpi),
so that BJσ = B
J
pi ∧
∧
i<j<n>. Thus, if J |= BJpi , then J |= BJσ and by the assumption that
J |= (⊕
UA
P})J we obtain J |= HJσ , so it follows that J |= piJ .
2) In case pi ∈ P}i with i < n − 1 and there is a rule pi′ ∈ Pj with i < j < n such that pi′ 1 pi and
J |= Bpi′ , it follows that since pi is unrejected, pi′ is itself rejected. Take the maximal index k such
that Pk contains a rule pi′′ with pi′′ 1 pi′ and J |= Hpi′′ . It follows that pi′′ satisfies the condition of the
previous case, and thus J |= HJpi′′ . Since Hpi = Hpi′′ , we conclude that J |= piJ .
3) In case pi ∈ P}n−1, it immediately follows from Lemma 104 that pi ∈
(⊕
UA
P}
)
. Thus, by the
assumption that J |= (⊕
UA
P})J we obtain that J |= piJ .
It remains to verify that J is also subset-minimal among interpretations that satisfy P. To show that
this is the case, take an interpretation I with I ⊆ J that satisfies P. In the following we will prove that
I also satisfies the program (
⊕
UA
P})J . Since J is subset-minimal among interpretations satisfying this
program, it will follow that I = J as desired.
So take some σ ∈ (⊕
UA
P}), our goal is to prove that I |= σJ . Due to Lemma 104, we need to consider
the following cases:
1) In the first case, σ =
(
Hpi ← Bpi ∧
∧
i<j<n∼αP}j
(
Hpi
)
.
)
where pi ∈ P}i and i < n − 1. Suppose
that I |= BJσ . Then I |= BJpi and for all j such that i < j < n, J 6|= αP}j (Hpi). Thus, we can conclude
that pi ∈ (all(P ) \ rejUA(P , J))}. Furthermore, from I |= BJpi and the assumption that I |= P, it
follows that I |= HJpi . Consequently, since Hpi = Hσ, I |= σJ .
2) In the second case, σ = (Hpi ∨ Hpi ← Bpi.) for some pi ∈ P}i with Hpi ∈ A and i < n. If pi is not
rejected, then it follows from our assumption that I |= piJ . In the principal case, there exists a rule
pi′ ∈ Pj with i < j < n such that pi′ 1 pi and J |= Bpi′ . Furthermore, pi′ itself is not rejected, so due
to our previous considerations we can conclude that J |= Hpi′ . Note that since Hpi is an atom, Hpi′ is a
default literal, so the rule σJ has > as one of the disjuncts in its head. Thus, I trivially satisfies σJ .
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3) In the third case, σ ∈ P}n−1. It immediately follows that σ ∈ (all(P ) \ rejUA(P , J))}. Thus, our
assumption implies that I |= σJ .
Proof of Theorem 28. Follows from Propositions 103, 105 and 106.
Appendix D. Proofs: Condensing into a Disjunctive Program
Remark 107. Throughout the following proofs we abuse notation by ignoring differences between formulas
that can be eliminated by regrouping and reordering conjuncts and disjuncts within them. That is, when a
formula can be obtained from another formula only by using the commutative and associative laws for
conjunction and disjunction, we consider the two formulas identical. We can afford to do this because the
order and grouping of conjuncts and disjuncts has no effect on the resulting semantics.
Definition 108 (Strong Equivalence [50]). Let P, Q be programs. We say that P is strongly equivalent to
Q if for every program R, the stable models of P ∪ R coincide with the stable models of Q ∪ R. Strong
equivalence is extended to rules by treating each rule pi as the program {pi }.
Proposition 109 ([50, 71]). Let P, Q be programs and pi a rule. If for all interpretations I , J with I ⊆ J ,
J |= P ∧ I |= PJ if and only if J |= Q∧ I |= QJ , then P is strongly equivalent to Q.
Proof. Take some program R and some interpretation J . J is a stable model of P ∪ R if and only if
J |= (P ∪ R)J and ∀I ( J : I 6|= (P ∪ R)J . Due to the definition of reduct and the assumption, this is
equivalent to J |= (Q∪R)J and ∀I ( J : I 6|= (Q∪R)J . In other words, J is a stable model of P ∪R if
and only if it is a stable model of Q∪R.
Corollary 110. Let P, Q be programs and pi a rule. If for all interpretations I , J , I |= PJ if and only if
I |= QJ , then P is strongly equivalent to Q.
Proof. Follows from Proposition 109 and the fact that for every interpretation K and program R, K |= R
if and only if K |= RK .
Corollary 111. Let φ, ψ be formulas and pi a rule. If for all interpretations I , J , I |= φJ if and only if
I |= ψJ , then the rules (Hpi ← Bpi ∧ φ.) and (Hpi ← Bpi ∧ ψ.) are strongly equivalent.
Proof. Follows from the definition of rule reduct and from Corollary 110.
Definition 112. Given a set of formulas S, we define ∼S = { ∼φ | φ ∈ S }.
Lemma 113. Let P be a program, L a literal, S be a set of formulas and I , J interpretations. Then,
(i) I |= (∧∼S)J if and only if I |= (∼∨S)J ;
(ii) I |= (∼αP}(L))J if and only if I |=
(∨
S∈βP(L)
∧∼∼S+ ∧∧∼S−)J .
Proof.
(i) By the definition of reduct, I |= (∧∼S)J if and only if for all φ ∈ S it holds that J 6|= φ. This in
turn holds if and only if J 6|= ∨S, which is the case if and only if I |= (∼∨S)J .
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(ii) Suppose that αP}(L) is the formula (L11 ∧ · · · ∧ L1k1) ∨ · · · ∨ (Ln1 ∧ · · · ∧ Lnkn). By the definition
of reduct, I |= (∼αP}(L))J if and only if J 6|= αP}(L). Equivalently, for every j with 1 ≤ j ≤ n
there exists some ij with 1 ≤ ij ≤ kj such that J 6|= Ljij . By the definition of blocking sets, this is
equivalent to J |= S for some S ∈ βP(L). Equivalently, for some S ∈ βP(L),
∀L ∈ ∼S+ : J 6|= L and ∀L ∈ S− : J 6|= L ,
or in other words, (
∧∼∼S+ ∧∧∼S−)J = ∧L∈S >. Equivalently, we can also write I |=(∨
S∈βP(L)
∧∼∼S+ ∧∧∼S−)J .
Lemma 114. Let pi be a rule and S a set of formulas. Then the rule (Hpi ← Bpi∧
∨
S.) is strongly equivalent
to the program { Hpi ← Bpi ∧ φ | φ ∈ S }.
Proof. Let σ denote the rule and P the program. According to Corollary 110, it suffices to prove that for
all interpretations I , J , it holds that I |= σJ if and only if it holds that I |= PJ . This easily follows from
the fact that I |= σJ if and only if I |= BJσ implies I |= HJσ , or, equivalently, for all φ ∈ S, I |= BJpi ∧ φJ
implies I |= HJpi , which is another way of writing I |= PJ .
Lemma 115. Let pi be a rule and φ a formula. Then the rules (Hpi ← Bpi ∧∼∼φ.) and (Hpi ∨∼φ← Bpi.)
are strongly equivalent.
Proof. Let σ1 denote the first rule and σ2 the second. By Corollary 110, it suffices to prove that for all
interpretations I , J , it holds that I |= σJ1 if and only if it holds that I |= σJ2 . If J |= φ, then σJ1 = (HJpi ←
BJpi ∧ >) and σJ2 = (HJpi ∨ ⊥ ← BJpi), so it follows that I |= σJ1 holds if and only if I |= σJ2 .
On the other hand, if J 6|= φ, then σJ1 = (Hpi ← Bpi ∧ ⊥) σJ2 = (Hpi ∨ > ← Bpi) and trivially both
I |= σJ1 and I |= σJ2 hold.
Lemma 116. Let pi be a rule such that Hpi is a default literal and Bpi is a conjunction of literals and double-
negated atoms. For any atom p, the rules (Hpi ← Bpi ∧ ∼∼ p.) and (Hpi ← Bpi ∧ p.) are are strongly
equivalent.
Proof. Let Hpi = ∼ q, where q is an atom. Also, let σ1 denote the first rule and σ2 the second. By
Proposition 109, it suffices to prove that for all interpretations I , J with I ⊆ J ,
J |= σ1 ∧ I |= σJ1 if and only if J |= σ2 ∧ I |= σJ2 ,
First suppose that J |= σ1 and I |= σJ1 . Then clearly J |= σ2 and it remains to prove that I |= σJ2 .
Suppose that I |= BJσ2 . Then I |= BJpi and from I ⊆ J we conclude that J |= p, so I |= (∼∼ p)J .
Consequently, I |= BJσ1 and from the assumption that I |= σJ1 we conclude that I |= HJpi as desired.
Now suppose that J |= σ2 and I |= σJ2 . Then clearly J |= σ1 and it remains to prove that I |= σJ1 .
Suppose that I |= BJσ1 . Then I |= BJpi , so it follows from I ⊆ J that J |= Bpi. Furthermore, from
I |= (∼∼ p)J it follows that J |= p. Thus, J |= Bσ2 and from J |= σ2 we conclude that J |= Hpi. This
implies that HJpi = (∼ q)J = > and, thus, I |= HJpi as desired.
Lemma 117. Let pi be a rule and φ a formula such that Hpi is an atom and both Bpi and φ are conjunctions of
literals and double-negated atoms. For any atom p, the programs
{
Hpi ∨ Hpi ← Bpi; Hpi ← Bpi ∧ φ ∧ ∼∼ p
}
and
{
Hpi ∨ Hpi ← Bpi; Hpi ← Bpi ∧ φ ∧ p
}
are strongly equivalent.
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Proof. Let P1 denote the first program and P2 the second one. Also, let σ denote the rule (Hpi ∨Hpi ← Bpi),
σ1 the rule (Hpi ← Bpi ∧ φ ∧ ∼∼ p) and σ2 the rule (Hpi ← Bpi ∧ φ ∧ p). Thus, P1 = {σ, σ1 } and
P2 = {σ, σ2 }.
According to Proposition 109, it suffices to prove that for all interpretations I , J with I ⊆ J ,
J |= P1 ∧ I |= PJ1 if and only if J |= P2 ∧ I |= PJ2 ,
First assume that J |= P1 and I |= PJ1 . Clearly, it follows that J |= P2 and I |= σJ , so it remains to
verify that I |= σJ2 . Suppose that I |= BJσ2 . Then, since I ⊆ J , it follows that J |= p and so (∼∼ p)J = >.
Consequently, I |= BJσ1 and from the assumption that I |= PJ1 we can conclude that I |= HJpi as desired.
For the converse implication, assume that J |= P2 and I |= PJ2 . It immediately follows that J |= P1
and I |= σJ , so it remains to verify that I |= σJ1 . Suppose that I |= BJσ1 . From I ⊆ J and the assumption
that both Bpi and φ are conjunctions of literals and double-negated atoms, we conclude that J |= Bσ1 , so
it follows that J |= Hpi. Consequently, (Hpi)J = ⊥ and since I |= σJ , I |= BJpi implies that I |= HJpi as
desired.
Lemma 118. Let P, Q be programs and L a literal. Then,
βP∪Q(L) = { S ∪ T | S ∈ βP(L) ∧ T ∈ βQ(L) } .
Proof. Suppose that αP}(L), αQ}(L) and α(P∪Q)}(L) are, respectively, of the forms
(L11 ∧ · · · ∧ L1k1) ∨ · · · ∨ (Lm1 ∧ · · · ∧ Lmkm) ,
(Lm+11 ∧ · · · ∧ Lm+1km+1) ∨ · · · ∨ (Ln1 ∧ · · · ∧ Lnkn) ,
(L11 ∧ · · · ∧ L1k1) ∨ · · · ∨ (Ln1 ∧ · · · ∧ Lnkn) .
By the definition, S ∈ βP(L) and T ∈ βQ(L) if and only if
S =
{
L1i1 , . . . , L
m
im
}
and T =
{
Lm+1im+1 , . . . , L
n
in
}
where 1 ≤ ij ≤ kj for every j with 1 ≤ j ≤ n. This is equivalent to S∪T being a member of βP∪Q(L).
Lemma 119. Let P = 〈Pi〉i<n be a DLP. Then
⊕∨
JU
P consists of the following rules:
1. for all pi ∈ Pi with i < n− 1 such that Hpi = { p } for some p ∈ A, and all S ∈ β⋃
i<j<n Pj (∼ p), the
rule
(
Hpi;S+ ← Bpi, S−.
)
;
2. for all pi ∈ Pi with i < n− 1 such that Hpi = {∼ p } for some p ∈ A, and all S ∈ β⋃
i<j<n Pj (p), the
rule
(
Hpi ← Bpi, S+, S−.
)
;;
3. all rules in Pn−1.
Proof. Follows by induction on n using Lemma 118.
Lemma 120. Let P = 〈Pi〉i<n be a DLP. Then
⊕∨
UA
P consists of the following rules:
1. for all pi ∈ Pi with i < n− 1 and all S ∈ β⋃
i<j<n Pj
(
Hpi
)
, the rule
(
Hpi ← Bpi, S+, S−.
)
;
2. for all pi ∈ Pi with i < n such that Hpi = { p } for some p ∈ A, the rule (p;∼ p← Bpi.);
3. all rules in Pn−1.
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Proof. Follows by induction on n using Lemma 118.
Proof of Theorem 31.
(i) Due to Theorem 28, it suffices to show that the programs
⊕
JU
P} and
⊕∨
JU
P have the same sta-
ble models. To see that this is indeed the case, consider the contents of these programs, as estab-
lished in Lemmas 102 and 119. For all pi ∈ P}i with i < n − 1,
⊕
JU
P} contains the nested rule(
Hpi ← Bpi ∧
∧
i<j<n∼αP}j (Hpi).
)
. By Lemma 113(i) and Corollary 111, this rule is strongly equiv-
alent to the rule
(
Hpi ← Bpi ∧ ∼
∨
i<j<n αP}j (Hpi).
)
which, by the definition of activation condition,
can also be written as
(
Hpi ← Bpi ∧ ∼α⋃
i<j<n P}j (Hpi).
)
. Furthermore, due to Lemma 113(ii) and
Corollary 111, the latter rule is strongly equivalent to the rule
Hpi ← Bpi ∧
∨
S∈β⋃
i<j<n Pj (Hpi)
∧
∼∼S+ ∧
∧
∼S−.
and by using Lemma 114 we obtain the strongly equivalent program that contains, for each S ∈
β⋃
i<j<n Pj (Hpi), the rule
Hpi ← Bpi ∧
∧
∼∼S+ ∧
∧
∼S−.
Double-negated atoms from the bodies of these rules can be eliminated using Lemmas 115 and 116,
obtaining (Hpi ∨
∨∼S+ ← Bpi ∧∧∼S−.) if Hpi is an atom and (Hpi ← Bpi ∧∧S+ ∧∧∼S−.) if
Hpi is a default literal. In this way, the original nested rules can be converted, one at a time, into
a strongly equivalent disjunctive program. After this process is finished, the nested syntax can be
converted to the syntax of disjunctive programs and the result coincides with the disjunctive program⊕∨
JU
P .
(ii) Due to Theorem 28, it suffices to show that the programs
⊕
UA
P} and
⊕∨
UA
P have the same sta-
ble models. To see that this is indeed the case, consider the contents of these programs, as estab-
lished in Lemmas 104 and 120. For all pi ∈ P}i with i < n − 1,
⊕
UA
P contains the nested rule(
Hpi ← Bpi ∧
∧
i<j<n∼αP}j (Hpi).
)
. By Lemma 113(i) and Corollary 111, this rule is strongly equiv-
alent to the rule
(
Hpi ← Bpi ∧ ∼
∨
i<j<n αP}j (Hpi).
)
which, by the definition of activation condition,
can also be written as
(
Hpi ← Bpi ∧ ∼α⋃
i<j<n P}j (Hpi).
)
. Furthermore, due to Lemma 113(ii) and
Corollary 111, the latter rule is strongly equivalent to the rule
Hpi ← Bpi ∧
∨
S∈β⋃
i<j<n Pj (Hpi)
∧
∼∼S+ ∧
∧
∼S−.
and by using Lemma 114 we obtain the strongly equivalent program that contains, for each S ∈
β⋃
i<j<n Pj (Hpi), the rule
Hpi ← Bpi ∧
∧
∼∼S+ ∧
∧
∼S−.
Finally, double-negated atoms from the bodies of these rules can be eliminated using Lemmas 117 and
116, obtaining (Hpi ← Bpi ∧
∧
S+ ∧∧∼S−.) In this way, the original nested rules can be converted,
one at a time, into a strongly equivalent disjunctive program. After this process is finished, the
nested syntax can be converted to the syntax of disjunctive programs and the result coincides with the
disjunctive program
⊕∨
UA
P .
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Appendix E. Proofs: Belief Updates Using Exception-Based Operators
Appendix E.1. Model-Based Update Operators
Theorem 34. If  is an update operator that satisfies (B1), (B2.1) and (B4), then there exists an exception
function ε such that for every ε-based update operator ⊕ and all finite sequences of knowledge bases D,
[[3D ]] = [[⊕D ]].
Proof. Let the exception function ε be defined for all sets of interpretationsM ⊆ I and all sets of sets of
interpretations S, T ⊆ 2I as
ε(M,S, T ) = [[B  U ]] (E.1)
where B, U are some knowledge bases such that [[B ]] = ⋂S and [[U ]] = ⋂ T . Note that this definition is
unambiguous since the existence of such B and U is guaranteed and regardless of which pair of knowledge
bases with these properties we choose, we obtain the same result due to the assumption that  satisfies (B4).
Take some ε-based operator ⊕. We proceed by induction on the length n of D = 〈Bi〉i<n.
1◦ If n = 0, then it immediately follows that [[3D ]] = [[3〈B0〉 ]] = [[B0 ]] = [[
⊕〈B0〉 ]] = [[⊕D ]].
2◦ Suppose that the claim holds for n, i.e. for D = 〈Bi〉i<n we have [[3D ]] = [[
⊕D ]]. Our goal is to
show that it also holds for n+ 1, i.e. for D′ = 〈Bi〉i<n+1. It follows that
〈〈⊕D′〉〉 = 〈〈⊕D ⊕ Bn〉〉 = { [[φ ]] ∪ ε([[φ ]], 〈〈⊕D〉〉, 〈〈Bn〉〉) | φ ∈⊕D } ∪ 〈〈Bn〉〉 .
By (E.1) and the inductive assumption, ε([[φ ]], 〈〈⊕D〉〉, 〈〈Bn〉〉) = [[3D  Bn ]] = [[3D′ ]]. Conse-
quently,
[[
⊕D′ ]] = ⋂〈〈⊕D′〉〉 = ⋂({ [[φ ]] ∪ [[3D′ ]] ∣∣ φ ∈⊕D } ∪ 〈〈Bn〉〉) .
This can also be written as ([[3D′ ]] ∪⋂〈〈⊕D〉〉) ∩⋂〈〈Bn〉〉. Substituting [[3D ]] for ⋂〈〈⊕D〉〉 and
distributing ∩ over ∪ yields ([[3D′ ]] ∩ [[Bn ]]) ∪ ([[3D ]] ∩ [[Bn ]]). Finally, using (B1) and (B2.1) we
can write this as
([[3D  Bn ]] ∩ [[Bn ]]) ∪ [[(3D) ∪ Bn ]] = [[3D  Bn ]] ∪ [[(3D) ∪ Bn ]]
= [[3D  Bn ]] = [[3D′ ]] .
Appendix E.2. Formula-Based Update Operators
The set of possible remainders has a number of important properties from which properties of specific
formula-based operators follow. We start with two auxiliary results which make it possible to construct a
subset of a knowledge base with important properties on the semantic level.
Lemma 121. Let B, U be knowledge bases. Then U is consistent if and only if rem(B,U) is non-empty.
Proof. First suppose that U is consistent and let R be the set of all subsets B′ of B such that B′ ∪ U is
consistent. R must be non-empty because ∅ clearly belongs to R. So take some subset-maximal element
B∗ ofR. It is easy to see that B∗ belongs to rem(B,U).
On the other hand, if rem(B,U) is non-empty, then it contains some set B′ such that B′∪U is consistent.
Thus it follows directly that U is also consistent.
Lemma 122. Let B, C be knowledge bases with 〈〈B〉〉I = 〈〈C〉〉I, B′ ⊆ B and C′ = { φ ∈ C ∣∣ [[φ ]] ∈ 〈〈B′〉〉I }.
Then 〈〈B′〉〉I = 〈〈C′〉〉I.
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Proof. Suppose first thatM belongs to 〈〈B′〉〉I. Then it also belongs to 〈〈B〉〉I, so by our assumption either
M = I orM belongs to 〈〈C〉〉. In the former caseM belongs to 〈〈C′〉〉I and we are finished. In the latter
case there is a formula φ ∈ C such that [[φ ]] =M and φ belongs to C′ by its definition. Consequently,M
belongs to 〈〈C′〉〉I.
As for the other inclusion, ifM belongs to 〈〈C′〉〉I, then eitherM = I or for some formula φ ∈ C′ we
haveM = [[φ ]]. Therefore,M belongs to 〈〈B′〉〉I by the definition of C′.
Lemma 123. Let B, C, U , V be knowledge bases such that 〈〈B〉〉I = 〈〈C〉〉I and 〈〈U〉〉I = 〈〈V〉〉I, B′ ⊆ B such
that B′ ∪ U is consistent and C′ = { φ ∈ C ∣∣ [[φ ]] ∈ 〈〈B′〉〉I }. Then C′ ∪ V is consistent.
Proof. To verify that C′ ∪ V is consistent, we only need to use Lemma 122 and observe that
[[C′ ∪ V ]] =
⋂
〈〈C′ ∪ V〉〉 =
⋂
(〈〈C′〉〉 ∪ 〈〈V〉〉) =
⋂
(〈〈C′〉〉I ∪ 〈〈V〉〉)
=
⋂
(〈〈B′〉〉I ∪ 〈〈U〉〉) =
⋂
(〈〈B′〉〉 ∪ 〈〈U〉〉) =
⋂
〈〈B′ ∪ U〉〉 = [[B′ ∪ U ]] .
Proposition 124 (Syntax-Independence of Remainders). Let B, C, U , V be knowledge bases such that
〈〈B〉〉I = 〈〈C〉〉I and 〈〈U〉〉I = 〈〈V〉〉I. Then ((rem(B,U)))I = ((rem(C,V)))I.
Proof. We prove that ((rem(B,U)))I ⊆ ((rem(C,V)))I, the other inclusion follows by the same arguments
since the formulation of the proposition is symmetric.
Take some B′ from rem(B,U) and put C′ = { φ ∈ C ∣∣ [[φ ]] ∈ 〈〈B′〉〉I }. We need to show that 〈〈B′〉〉I
belongs to ((rem(C,V)))I. Due to Lemma 122, 〈〈B′〉〉I = 〈〈C′〉〉I, so it suffices to prove that C′ belongs to
rem(C,V). First, note that C′ is clearly a subset of C and, by Lemma 123, C′ ∪ V is consistent. We prove
that C′ is subset-maximal with these properties by contradiction. Suppose that C∗ is such that C′ ( C∗ ⊆ C
and C∗ ∪ V is consistent and let B∗ = { φ ∈ B ∣∣ [[φ ]] ∈ 〈〈C∗〉〉I }. Clearly, B∗ is a subset of B and, by
Lemma 123, B∗ ∪ U is consistent. To reach a conflict, we need to show that B′ is a proper subset of B∗.
First note that 〈〈C′〉〉I cannot be equal to 〈〈C∗〉〉I – if it were, then for every formula φ ∈ C∗ it would hold that
φ belongs to C and [[φ ]] belongs to 〈〈B′〉〉I, so φ belongs to C′ by its definition, contrary to the assumption
that C′ is a proper subset of C∗. This, together with Lemma 122, implies that
〈〈B′〉〉I = 〈〈C′〉〉I ( 〈〈C∗〉〉I = 〈〈B∗〉〉I . (E.2)
It immediately follows that B′ 6= B∗. Furthermore, for any formula φ from B′, φ belongs to B and it follows
from (E.2) that [[φ ]] belongs to 〈〈C∗〉〉I, so φ belongs to B∗ by its definition. This means that B′ is a proper
subset of B∗, contrary to the assumption that B′ belongs to rem(B,U).
Lemma 125 (Equivalent Formulas in Remainders). Let B, U be knowledge bases, φ, ψ ∈ B formulas such
that [[φ ]] = [[ψ ]] and B′ ∈ rem(B,U) a possible remainder. Then φ ∈ B′ if and only if ψ ∈ B′.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that φ belongs to B′ but ψ does not. Then B′ ∪ {ψ } is a subset
of B that is consistent with U . This is in conflict with the maximality of B′.
Corollary 126. Let B, U be knowledge bases and R ⊆ rem(B,U) a set of possible remainders. Then⋂
((R)) = 〈〈⋂R〉〉.
Proof. First suppose thatM belongs to ⋂((R)) and take some B′ ∈ R and some formula φ ∈ B′ such that
[[φ ]] =M. Now take an arbitrary B∗ ∈ R. SinceM belongs to 〈〈B∗〉〉, there must exist a formula ψ ∈ B∗
such that [[ψ ]] = M. Consequently, [[φ ]] = [[ψ ]] and by Lemma 125 we obtain that φ also belongs to B∗.
Thus, φ belongs to
⋂R andM belongs to 〈〈⋂R〉〉.
On the other hand, if M belongs to 〈〈⋂R〉〉, then there is a formula φ ∈ ⋂R such that [[φ ]] = M.
Consequently,M belongs to all members of ((R)), thus also belongs to their intersection.
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Corollary 127. Let B, U be knowledge bases, R ⊆ rem(B,U) a set of possible remainders. Then,⋂
((R))I = 〈〈⋂R〉〉I.
Proof. Follows from Corollary 126 and from the fact that I belongs to both sides of the equation.
Proposition 128 (Properties of the WIDTIO Operator). The WIDTIO operator satisfies (F1), (F2.1) and
(F4).
Proof. By definition U ⊆ B ◦widtio U and (F1) is obtained by applying 〈〈·〉〉 to both sides of this inclusion.
In order to verify that (F2.1) holds, suppose thatM belongs to 〈〈B ◦widtioU〉〉. Then there is some formula
φ from U ∪ ⋂ rem(B,U) such that [[φ ]] = M. If φ belongs to U , then it immediately follows that M
belongs to 〈〈U〉〉, and consequently also to 〈〈B ∪ U〉〉. If φ belongs to B′ for all B′ ∈ rem(B,U), then φ also
belongs to B. Thus,M is a member of 〈〈B〉〉, and consequently also of 〈〈B ∪ U〉〉.
Finally, to verify (F4), suppose that 〈〈B〉〉I = 〈〈C〉〉I and 〈〈U〉〉I = 〈〈V〉〉I. The following follows from the
definition of the WIDTIO operator, Corollary 127 and Proposition 124.
〈〈B ◦widtio U〉〉I =
〈〈
U ∪
⋂
rem(B,U)
〉〉I
= 〈〈U〉〉I ∪
〈〈⋂
rem(B,U)
〉〉I
= 〈〈U〉〉I ∪
⋂
((rem(B,U)))I = 〈〈V〉〉I ∪
⋂
((rem(C,V)))I
= 〈〈V〉〉I ∪
〈〈⋂
rem(C,V)
〉〉I
=
〈〈
V ∪
⋂
rem(C,V)
〉〉I
= 〈〈C ◦widtio V〉〉I .
Proposition 129 (Properties of Regular Bold Operators). Regular Bold operators satisfy (F1), (F2.1) and
(F4).
Proof. By definition U ⊆ B ◦sbold U and (F1) is obtained by applying 〈〈·〉〉 to both sides of this inclusion.
In order to verify that (F2.1) holds, suppose thatM belongs to 〈〈B ◦sbold U〉〉. Then there is some formula
φ from U ∪ s(rem(B,U)) such that [[φ ]] = M. If φ belongs to U , then it immediately follows that M
belongs to 〈〈U〉〉, and consequently also to 〈〈B∪U〉〉. If φ belongs to B′ = s(rem(B,U)), then φ also belongs
to B. Thus,M is a member of 〈〈B〉〉, and consequently also of 〈〈B ∪ U〉〉.
Finally, to verify (F4), suppose that 〈〈B〉〉I = 〈〈C〉〉I and 〈〈U〉〉I = 〈〈V〉〉I. The following follows from the
definition of the WIDTIO operator, Proposition 124 and the regularity property of ◦sbold.
〈〈B ◦sbold U〉〉I = 〈〈U ∪ s(rem(B,U))〉〉I = 〈〈U〉〉I ∪ 〈〈s(rem(B,U))〉〉I
= 〈〈V〉〉I ∪ 〈〈s(rem(C,V))〉〉I = 〈〈V ∪ s(rem(C,V))〉〉I = 〈〈C ◦sbold V〉〉I .
Proposition 130 (Properties of the Cross-Product Operator). The Cross-Product operator satisfies (F1),
(B2.1) and (F4) but does not satisfy (F2.1).
Proof. By definition U ⊆ B ◦cp U and (F1) is obtained by applying 〈〈·〉〉 to both sides of this inclusion.
To see that ◦cp does not satisfy (F2.1), note that { p, q }◦cp {¬p ∨ ¬q } = { p ∨ q,¬p ∨ ¬q } and [[p∨ q ]]
does not belong to 〈〈{ p, q,¬p ∨ ¬q }〉〉.
In order to verify (B2.1), take some I from [[B ∪ U ]]. We need to show that I is a model of B ◦cp U .
Obviously, I is a model of U , so it remains to prove that I is a model of the formula
ψ =
∨
B′∈rem(B,U)
∧
φ∈B′
φ .
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Since I is a model of U , we conclude that U is consistent, so according to Lemma 121, rem(B,U) is non-
empty. Take some B∗ from rem(B,U). We obtain the following: [[ψ ]] = ⋃B′∈rem(B,U)[[B′ ]] ⊇ [[B∗ ]] ⊇ [[B ]].
Hence, since I belongs to [[B ]], it also belongs to [[ψ ]].
Finally, to verify (F4), suppose that 〈〈B〉〉I = 〈〈C〉〉I and 〈〈U〉〉I = 〈〈V〉〉I and take someM from 〈〈B◦cpU〉〉I.
In the trivial case when M = I it immediately follows that M belongs to 〈〈C ◦cp V〉〉I. Otherwise, there
is a formula φ from U ∪ {ψ } such that [[φ ]] = M. If φ belongs to U , then M belongs to 〈〈U〉〉 and by
assumption also to 〈〈V〉〉I. By (F1) we then obtain thatM belongs to 〈〈C ◦cp V〉〉I. On the other hand, if φ is
ψ, then due to Proposition 124, ((rem(B,U)))I = ((rem(C,V)))I, so
[[φ ]] = [[ψ ]] =
⋃
B′∈rem(B,U)
[[B′ ]] =
⋃
C′∈rem(C,V)
[[C′ ]] = [[ψ′ ]]
where C ◦cp V = V ∪ {ψ′ }. Therefore, [[φ ]] belongs to 〈〈C ◦cp V〉〉I. The proof of the other inclusion is
symmetric.
Proof of Proposition 36. Follows from Propositions 128, 129 and 130.
Proposition 131. If ◦ is an update operator that satisfies (F1), (F2.1) and (F4), then there exists an exception
function ε such that for every ε-based update operator ⊕ and all finite sequences of knowledge bases D,
〈〈©D〉〉I = 〈〈⊕D〉〉I.
Proof. Let the exception function ε be defined for all sets of interpretations M and all sets of sets of
interpretations S, T as
ε(M,S, T ) =
{
∅ M ∈ 〈〈B ◦ U〉〉I ;
I M /∈ 〈〈B ◦ U〉〉I ,
where B, U are some knowledge bases such that 〈〈B〉〉I = S ∪ { I } and 〈〈U〉〉I = T ∪ { I }. Note that this
definition is unambiguous since the existence of such B and U is guaranteed and regardless of which pair
of knowledge bases with these properties we choose, we obtain the same result due to the assumption that
◦ satisfies (F4). Take some ε-based operator ⊕. We proceed by induction on the length n of D = 〈Bi〉i<n.
1◦ If n = 0, then it immediately follows that 〈〈3D〉〉 = 〈〈3〈B0〉〉〉 = 〈〈B0〉〉 = 〈〈
⊕〈B0〉〉〉 = 〈〈⊕D〉〉.
2◦ Suppose that the claim holds for n, i.e. for D = 〈Bi〉i<n we have 〈〈3D〉〉I = 〈〈
⊕D〉〉I. Our goal is to
show that it also holds for n+ 1, i.e. for D′ = 〈Bi〉i<n+1. It follows that
〈〈⊕D′〉〉 = 〈〈⊕D ⊕ Bn〉〉 = { [[φ ]] ∪ ε([[φ ]], 〈〈⊕D〉〉, 〈〈Bn〉〉) | φ ∈⊕D } ∪ 〈〈Bn〉〉 .
Thus, 〈〈⊕D′〉〉I = { [[φ ]] ∪ ε([[φ ]], 〈〈⊕D〉〉, 〈〈Bn〉〉) | φ ∈⊕D }∪ 〈〈Bn〉〉 ∪ { I } which in turn can be
written as{
M
∣∣∣M∈ 〈〈⊕D〉〉 ∩ 〈〈⊕D ◦ Bn〉〉I } ∪ { I ∣∣∣M∈ 〈〈⊕D〉〉 \ 〈〈⊕D ◦ Bn〉〉I } ∪ 〈〈Bn〉〉 ∪ { I }
and simplified into
(〈〈⊕D〉〉I ∩ 〈〈⊕D ◦ Bn〉〉I) ∪ 〈〈Bn〉〉I. Since ◦ satisfies (F4), it follows from the
inductive assumption that 〈〈⊕D ◦ Bn〉〉I = 〈〈©D ◦ Bn〉〉I. Thus, we obtain the set(
〈〈©D〉〉I ∩ 〈〈©D ◦ Bn〉〉I
)
∪ 〈〈Bn〉〉I
and by distributing ∪ over ∩ and using (F1) and (F2.1) we obtain(
〈〈©D〉〉I ∪ 〈〈Bn〉〉I
)
∩
(
〈〈©D ◦ Bn〉〉I ∪ 〈〈Bn〉〉I
)
= 〈〈©D ∪ Bn〉〉I ∩ 〈〈©D ◦ Bn〉〉I
= 〈〈©D ◦ Bn〉〉I = 〈〈©D′〉〉I .
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Proposition 132. If ◦ an update operator that satisfies (F1), (B2.1) and (F4), then there exists an exception
function ε such that for every ε-based update operator⊕ and all knowledge bases B, U , [[B◦U ]] = [[B⊕U ]].
Proof. Let the exception function ε be defined for all sets of interpretations M and all sets of sets of
interpretations S, T as
ε(M,S, T ) = [[B ◦ U ]] ,
where B, U are some knowledge bases such that 〈〈B〉〉I = S ∪ { I } and 〈〈U〉〉I = T ∪ { I }. Note that this
definition is unambiguous since the existence of such B and U is guaranteed and regardless of which pair
of knowledge bases with these properties we choose, we obtain the same result due to the assumption that
◦ satisfies (F4).
Take some ε-based operator ⊕. Then [[B ⊕ U ]] = ⋂ ({ [[φ ]] ∪ ε([[φ ]], 〈〈B〉〉, 〈〈U〉〉) | φ ∈ B } ∪ 〈〈U〉〉),
which can be written as
⋂ { [[φ ]] ∪ [[B ◦ U ]] | φ ∈ B }∩⋂〈〈U〉〉 and simplified into ([[B ◦U ]]∪ [[B ]])∩ [[U ]].
Furthermore, due to (B1) and (B2.1),
([[B ◦ U ]] ∪ [[B ]]) ∩ [[U ]] = ([[B ◦ U ]] ∩ [[U ]]) ∪ ([[B ]] ∩ [[U ]]) = [[B ◦ U ]] ∪ [[B ∪ U ]] = [[B ◦ U ]] .
Proof of Theorem 37. Follows from Propositions 131 and 132.
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